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Abstract

Al though ultimately victorious in the Crimean War ( 1854-56),
the performance of the British Army had been so disappointing that
the government at the time was compelled to investigate the causes
of military dalliance.

Apart from expected and repeated references

to embarrassments of strategy,
expressed

by

the

tactics and command,

investigating

military financial

committees

and supply management.

over

concern

deficiencies

At the time,

was
in

and in

concert with these findings, the British Army was insistent that its
performance

in

the

field

was

deleteriously

affected

both

by

excessive economy in military spending and by the means with which
Parliament exercised control over military spending.
After the Civil War and military reign of Cromwell (1642-1658)
and the Revolution of 1688 Parliament had determined that it could
effectively control the administration of the British Army through
its control of the Nation's purse.
military

finance

were

given

representatives of Parliament.

into

Thus all matters related to
the

hands

of

civilian

For over two centuries the army was

to have almost no say in its finances.
In

the

latter

half

of

the

19th

century

Parliamentary

surveillance of military spending was strengthened with improvements
in government accounting .

In particular the wider use of audits

carried out by the Exchequer and Audit Department on behalf of
Parliament extended Parliamentary control over military finance.

At

the same time the military were given almost complete control over
their administration.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION
1.1

SCOPE OF THIS STUDY
This

study

was

undertaken

to

identify:

the

nature

of

Parliament's role in British military finance;

influences on, and

changes

during

in

the

1846-1899;
role

for

way

this

role

was

exercised

the

period

and to examine some of the implications of Parliament's
military

performance.

Essentially,

this

study

is

an

investigation of control, controls and the behaviour , intentioned or
otherwise,

they elicited within

the context of British military

finance from 1846 to 1899 .
Throughout this study the term army finance {military finance)
will refer to the appropriation or provision and use of money for
military

purposes.

In

addition

army

finance

will

encompass

procedures and policies directed towards monitoring and controlling
army resources {see Amery 1902 , p . 608) .
Inappropriate

controls

adversely

behaviour

can

produce

affecting

desired

grossly

dysfunctional

performance

levels .

Significant amongst the pathological responses to controls is what
is now termed rigid bureaucratic behaviour.

In other words, control

measures can produce inflexible, control-system oriented behaviour
where people, and therefore departments which are the aggregation of
individuals,

concentrate

on

that

part

of

their

work

which

is

measured and upon which rewards and punishments depend. This form of
behaviour

is

most

common

with

incomplete

measures

of

control ;

controls which have regard for only some of the key dimensions of
performance {March and Simon
the

dysfunctional

effects

1958;
of

Merton 1940) .

incomplete

financial

In Chapter Two
controls

on

military performance are investigated in the context of the Crimean
War.
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There were a number of trends throughout the second half of the
19th century which were relevant to the control of British military
finance and therefore to this study.

Of especial concern as a

control used by Parliament in its supervision of military finance
are

the

increasingly

requirements

comprehensive

throughout

the

latter

accounting

Parliamentary

half

of

the

19th

century .

Beginning in 1846 with An Act to provide for the Preparation, Audit
and Presentation to Parliament of Annual Accounts of the Receipt and
Expenditure of the Naval and Military Departments , military finance
was characterised throughout the latter half of the 19th century by
tighter accounting controls on behalf of Parliament.
progressive

were

the

accounting

procedures

Indeed,

employed

so

in

the

supervision of military accounts that they were not uncommonly in
the vanguard of developments in government accounting.
the

development

military

of

Parliamentary

expenditure and

the

accounting

impact

of

as

Thus it is

a

control

Parliamentary

demands which is one important concern of this study.
military

finance,

accounting

controls

developed

over

accounting
In British

for

and

by

Parliament produced behaviour largely compatible and consistent with
the

controls

yet

were

unsatisfactory

in

promoting

military

efficiency (the lowest financial, human and material cost consistent
with

victory)

and

deficient

in

assisting

in

the

attainment

of

economy 1 in military spending.
Related
surveillance

to

the

through

increasing
accounts

sophistication
was

the

of

Parliamentary

progressively

greater

administrative responsibilities given to the military in the latter
1.

As measured by the total amount of money spent.

-4-

With better appropriation accounting

half of the 19th century.

controls Parliament appeared more prepared to release the army from
other

administrative

remained concentrated in civilian hands.
of

finance

in

the

and

19th

a

highly

century

as

of

Control

controls.

centralised
crucial

finance

however,

Both civilian domination
finance

elements

in

function
the

remained

Parliamentary

structure of financial control .
1.2

PURSUIT OF CONSTITUTIONAL SECURITY:
ON ARMY FINANCE

THE FORMATIVE INFLUENCE

In Chapter Three the dominating influence of constitutional
conflicts, primarily those of the 17th century concerning national
finances,

in the relationship between Parliament and the army is

explored.

Financial

predicated

on

indisputable

the

control

in

constitutional

control

in

the British army 1846-1899 was
principle

national

finance

that
and

Parliament
over

the

had

army.

Parliament 1 s long struggle with the Crown for constitutional and
financial supremacy ensured an abiding concern by Parliament for the
means by which it could continuously monitor the allocation and use
of public money.

Control over the right to raise revenue and the

authority to determine the allocation of revenue were the sources of
power.

Financial

sovereignty

gave

Parliament

administrative

dominion over the army which was the most potent aggregation of the
forces

for

violence

in

the

nation

and

potentially

greatest threat to Parliament and the Nation 2 .

2.

the

single

Thus the emphasis by

Command of the Army resided with the reigning monarch . It was
to the sovereign the army, in theory and practice, owed its
allegiance, at least until the War Office Act 1870.

-5-

Par l iamen t on the control of military finances.

An army could not

exist, no matter who held the reins of command, without money; money
for pay, but more especially money for food and the necessaries of
military life (see Furse 1894, p.87).

1.3

THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL CONTROL

1.3.1

Appropriation and Government Accounting
The structure of financial control as exercised by Parliament

over the British Army 1846-1899 was directed towards control of
procedures established to govern the expenditure process, not the
objects of expenditure.

The most powerful controls over British

military

finqncial

finance

were

Parliament's exclusive right to
incorporated,

during

the

measures

which

stemmed

from

raise revenue from taxation and

period

of

this

study,

the

ability to

dictate the appropriation of money raised by Parliament. The ability
to raise revenue and govern its employment gave Parliament effective
control over the existence and size of the British Army but little
else prior to 1846. Parliamentary control over military spending
prior

to

the

mid

1800's

was

based

upon

a

system

with

little

informational content for there existed only very imperfect means of
assessing or checking on the use of money once appropriated by
Parliament.

It was not until

1846 that Parliament was able to

reliably review in detail the use of money by the army as directed
by Parliament

in

the annual

Appropriation Act.

From

1846 the

statutory accounting and auditing requirements superimposed on the
army

became

increasingly

military spending.

significant

financial

controls

over

It is the task of Chapter Four to trace the

development of parliamentary accounting requirements in so far as

-6-

they

related

to

the

Chapter Four reveals that Army

army.

accounting originated to serve first and foremost the purposes of
Parliament while
1846-1899
accounts

only

the

rapid development

served

to

presented to

primarily

sought

to

strengthen

Par Ii amen t
provide

by

of government

the

appropriation

the army.

evidence

accounting

that

role

of

Army accounting

responsibilities

to

Parliament had been discharged and it was to this end accounting
reforms were directed.

Accounts submitted to Parliament served the

narrowest of stewardship purposes.
negligible

role

in

the

Army accounting therefore, had a

consideration of

financial

and

military

consequences of administrative and policy decisions. Accounting was
not institutionalised as a management tool in the administration of
the British Army in the period of this study. 3 Government accounting
in the form it took in the 19th century was unable to assist in the
pursuit of economic and efficient management of military resources
to augment military effectiveness.

1.3.2

Civilian Control - and Centralisation of Military Finance
Chapter

Five

establishes

that coincident with, and essential

to, Parliament's financial controls of appropriation, accounts and
audit was
army

Parliament's determination

finances,

which

was

dominated

would be the province of civilians.

3.

that

the administration

by accounting

of

requirements,

Civilians would be interposed

Even when cost accounting was introduced in the army in 1919 it
continued to follow the same mesmerised and legalistic approach
of earlier army accounting (see Hewgill 1980, p. 9).

-7between the Nation and its army to safeguard both the Nation's
freedom and its purse.
Further,

as

constitutional
expenditure
augment

Chapter Six

suspicion

and

determined that

Parliament's

investigates,
avoidance

both

of

the motives

excessive

of

military

the reporting function necessary

authority,

i.e.

accounting,

would

be

to

both

highly centralised and used almost exclusively in the surveillance
of

the

regularity

and

legality

of

As

expenditure.

a

highly

centralised system for financial control, the administration of army
finance

could

only

function

effectively

in

an

organisation

as

diverse and widespread as the British Army with the assistance of
minutely

detailed

financial

and

accounting

regulations.

These

regulations were meant to serve the purpose of accountability (to
Parliament) and, coincidentally, to ensure there was no wastage or
dishonesty.
1

things'

Control

was

through control

seen

in

personal

over people.

accounts sought to ensure

terms,

Financial

control

control

over

through

that responsible people could provide

evidence that public money and property entrusted to them had been
dealt with in accordance with the law and relevant regulations.
Accounting

for

military

expenditure

was

another

form

of

'charge-discharge' accounting with the entire system of surveillance
of

military

spending being obsessed with

internal

and

external

checks (See The Comments of Charles Fox 1793, as found in Sweetman
1971(b~,

p.41.).

Unfortunately,

the

oppressive

regulations

of

British military finance emanating from central authorities had what
proved to be the effect of destroying initiative and leaving little
room for independent action.

-8-

At the time of the Crimean War not only was army finance in
civilian

hands

but

also

all

army

In

administration.

some

administrative departments e.g. the Commissariat, administration and
finance were in the same hands.

While ever civilians controlled the

total sums available for spending and the rate and direction of
spending, critics of military control of administration could see
sound constitutional safeguards.
From

1855

the

monopoly

of

all

military

administrative

departments by civilians quickly began to dissolve in the glare of
the administrative inadequacies shown in the Crimean War.

There

thus developed the separation of military finance, always civilian
controlled,

from the administration

by the military of military

executive departments.
The
widespread

breach

between

consternation

administration
amongst

the

and

finance

civilians

amongst the military, but for different reasons.

and

created

eventually

Civilians were

concerned that the absence of civilians in administration not only
denied the Nation a constitutional safeguard but was also a licence
to

waste

for

now

conscientiousness

there

appeared

with which

the

to
funds

be

no

were

control
spent.

over

the

There was

therefore a call that finance and administration be again united
under civilian leadership.

The tide towards reform in the latter

half of the 19th century was however, too great for those seeking a
return to the status quo in military administration.
the

marriage

of

finance

and

administration

Thus calls for

received

increasing

-9-

support but under military sovereignty.

The following diagram

summarises this trend:
1855

CIVILIAN

1880's..

1855-1880's

FINANCE +
ADMINISTRATION

I
I
I

,_.,.,

FINANCE I

""- ........

I
.....

'-.._

'~~~~~~~~-

~

I ADMINISTRATION I -!-+FINANCE +
I ADMINISTRATION
I
I
I
ACTUAL
I PROPOSED

MILITARY
ACTUAL

The military argued with increasing force in the late 19th century
that

economical

and

efficient

military administration

was

only

possible if the military controlled not only the spending of money
allocated by Parliament but also the management of the money.

With

the military deciding on a course of action and then being required
to submit this to another, non-military group, for approval and to
have

the

proposal modified or refused was both frustrating and

humiliating

to the

proud military

(The Duke of Cambridge 1837,

Quoted in Gordon 1935, p. 45; Fortnightly Review, Vol. CCCXCVII, New
Series 1900, p. 2).

Therefore, the military sought control over

their own finances not only to escape the judgement of civilians but
also because they appreciated the significant role of finance in
military performance.

In the following section this nexus between

finance and military performance is examined primarily to establish
the appropriateness of military concern for finance.

-10-

1.4

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCE AND MILITARY PERFORMANCE
Parliamentary financial controls, along with the dominance of

civilians in extremely centralised military finance,

essential as

they were to Parliament's view of the structure of control of army
spending, were the sources of great friction between civilians and
the military.

More importantly,

they were argued to impede the

economic and efficient maintenance of troops in the field.
The provision of everything necessary for the combatant to live
and fight, upon which success in battle hinges, is above all else a
matter of money (See the Comments of Petrie, Director General of the
Commissariat,British Parliamentary Papers, Vol.XL, 1856, p.45; Lord
Panmure to Sir William Codrington, November 16 1855, Panmure Papers
1908, p.490.)

There must be enough money in the right place at the

right time and, frequently, in a form that is locally acceptable to
procure the necessary supplies, the "first conditions of success in
War" (Edinburgh Review Vol. CXXXIII January to April 1871, p. 233).
Thomas Simes reminded his readers in 1780 that:
famine makes greater havoc of an army than the enemy and
is more terrible than the bayonet. Time and opportunity
may repair other misfortunes, but where forage and
provisions are not carefully provided, the evil is without
remedy (Quoted in Glover 1963, Appendix A, pp. 255-256-}. 4
Therefore, finance of itself is unimportant in times of war.

The

crucial role played by finance in the military is solely derived

4.

On the importance of supply, see also Wavell 1941, pp. 25-26;
Shaw 1939, p.26;
Miller 1892, p.17;
"The Further Report of
the Federal Military Committee", June 1901, Commonwealth
Parliamentary Papers, Vol.II, 1901-2, p.67; Griffiths 1900, p.
216).

-11from

the service it provides

in meeting the military's material

needs (see Lord Haliburton, formerly an officer in the Commissariat
1855, in a letter to the Times August 30, 1906, reproduced in Atlay
1909, p. 35).

Thus, the connection between finance and supply gave

financial arrangements and controls exercised over military spending
their crucial role in military performance.
At the commencement of the Crimean War in 1854 not only did the
army have no control over the money which had been allotted to
military uses by Parliament, as Chapter Two demonstrates, but they
were also precluded from control over the distribution of supplies
purchased

with

this

money.

The

army

was

able,

through

the

Commander-in-Chief, to indicate its supply needs but from that point
on the army was, to December 1854, at the mercy of the Treasurycontrolled civilian Commissariat. Attention to matters of military
economy was, therefore, more certain because the Treasury not only
superintended how much of the appropriated money was spent but also
how and when the supplies procured with this money would be used.
This was shown however,

in the Crimean War, not to be conducive

either to military efficiency or effectiveness .
By 1899 the supply organisation of the British Army was firmly
military, 5 as were most other administrative branches ,
military
civilians .

finances
If

were

still

anything,

the

very

much

within

proliferation

of

the
new

although
hands

of

accounting

requirements related to appropriation in the latter half of the 19th
century meant that the hold of civilians over financial details
became even stronger.
5.

Despite this the military, who had little or

In 1883 all administrative and executive offices connected with
supply (and transport) were completely severed from civilian
control.
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no

financial

experience

in

peace,

discretion in spending during war;
be

both

expensive

and

were

given

wide

powers

of

an arrangement which proved to

inefficient.

In these circumstances

the

military were criticised frequently for spending with, what seemed
to more than one Royal Commission, abandon and without due care and
consideration for economy.

The constraining hand of the Treasury in

war as Parliament's agent was far less noticeable towards the end of
the century than it had been when the Treasury had controlled the
issue as well as purchase of supplies.
Deficiencies

in

the

military's

financial

abilities

were,

throughout the period of this study, primarily a direct consequence
of Parliament's preference for a highly centralised and civilian
controlled military finance function.
Dawkins

(1901)

and

Esher

(1904)

It was realised by both the

Committees

that a system which

controlled military spending in this manner provided little or no
opportunity for the military to gain experience in handling large
amounts of money without the fetters of minute peacetime financial
regulations.

Economy of operation and a more efficient military

presence could only be assured, argued both Committees, by allowing
the military a greater influence in their financial destiny. 6
The Crimean, War at the beginning of the period covered by this
study, in particular chronicled the malodorous influence of a rigid
finance

system

which

was

preoccupied

with

accountability

and

accounting procedures and which denied the military the opportunity
to take an active role, both in peace and war, in the management of

6.

Others preferred to bracket military extravagancies not with
lack of financial experience, but with the military's pursuit
of victory, at any cost.
The the blame for extravagance was

all the military's (see pages 134-136 following).
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Economy of operation, as measured by the amount of

its finances.
money

spent,

and

efficiency,

military objectives for

as

measured

by the achievement of

the least practical financial

cost,

were

only compatible and simultaneously achievable aims with the support
of a financially experienced and sophisticated military.

An

army

officered by men possessing these characteristics would have allowed
consideration

to

be

accorded

administrative decisions
civilians

to

the

financial

consequences

in the pursuit of victory.

looking to the

Instead,

interests of Parliament sought

while the army above all else pursued effectiveness.

of
the

economy

Ultimately,

whether an army is financially educated or not, the achievement of
victory in war must override all other considerations; yet there is
the

still

opportunity

for

consideration

of

the

financial

implications of military decisions and how these redound on military
performance. Because of widespread, and to many military cherished,
financial

this nexus

ignorance,

between

economy,

efficiency

and

effectiveness was lost to military financial controllers.
As

more

details

of

army

administration

were

taken

from

civilians throughout the second half of the 19th century and became
the province of the military so concern was

increasingly voiced,

both within and outside the army, as to the financial repercussions
of administrative decisions taken by financially illiterate officers
(See Clode 1869 also Atlay 1906).

An officer trained in finance, it

was strenuously argued, could be imbued with the need to consider
the

financial

side

of

any

military decision.

He would

be more

conscious not only of getting the most for each pound spent, but
also aware that the number of pounds spent may on any particular

-14occasion both affect the expectation of victory and be an indication
of his abilities and fitness to lead. Presumably, an officer who
accomplished comparably more militarily for comparable expenditure
would be judged a superior soldier and administrator.
Increasingly, towards the latter part of the period covered in
this study

what was particularly worrying to

the civilians in

military finance and to Parliament 7 was the knowledge that in a
world of recurring international political unease, a very pronounced
feature of the late 1880's and throughout the 1890's, the financial
demands of the army could probably be checked only temporarily.
While the money spent on the army in peace seemed to be an annoying
and fruitless drain on national finances which had to be closely
monitored, within the urgency of war the army could hold the Nation
to

financial

ransom knowing that

demands

for

money,

couched in

anxiety for the Nation's safety, would prove an irresistable lever
on the Nation's purse

(See the comments of the Edinburgh Review

April 1855, p.566).
Thus, no matter what lip-service the army paid to Parliament's
control of military finance

in peacetime,

the perpetuation of a

financially

army

by

unsophisticated

tethered

minute

accounting

requirements was, in the long run, a case of being 'penny wise and

7.

As indicated by the number of Committees and Commissions
appointed to examine military administration and finance
towards the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th
century, e.g. Brodrick (1898), Dawkins (1901), Esher (1904).
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pounds foolish'.

The extravagant expenditure committed by Britain

through

to

its army

shortsighted

peacetime

even a

small

savings

war could

procured

soon outweigh any

through

a

policy which

propagated financial ignorance amongst soldiers by restricting their
access to finance (See Amery's Comments Vol.2 1902, p.46).

CHAPTER

2

FINANCIAL CONTROL AND THE
CRIMEAN WAR

-17-

2.1

INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the nexus, towards the beginning of the

period covered in this study, between the national attitude towards
the army, Parliament's control over military finance and its impact
upon military performance.
The administration of supply of the British Army in the Crimea
is

examined

financial

in so

control

far
of

as

the

it

is

the outcome

military

required

by

of

the

system of

Parliament.

In

particular, this chapter details the impact on military performance
of Parliamentary control as exercised through Treasury accounting
regulations.

The

position

outlined

in

this

section,

while

it

possibly shows the worst features of the system of financial control
applicable throughout the period of this study, is atypical only in
its severity when compared to later conflicts. Certainly the hell of
the Crimean War was not novel in its time (See Comments by Stanmore
Vol. I 1906, p. 237).

While the Crimean War prompted major changes

in

of

almost

all

areas

military

administration,

in

particular

supply, the lessons for military finance remained ignored.

2.2

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CRIMEAN CHAOS
The extent of the ineptitude which characterised the conduct of

the Crimean War ( 1854-1856) by the British was such that it "has
become a byword for disaster, gross mismanagement and incompetent
leadership" (Judd 1973, p.29), which, according to Barnett (1870, p.
283),

has

historical

made

it

writing".

"one

of
It

the

compulsive

was , wrote

subjects

Florence

of

British

Nightingale,

-18"calamity 1 unparalleled

in the history of calamity"

(Cited in

Woodham-Smith 1977, p .15; See also Henry Drummond's comments made
in a speech before Parliament, January 23, 1855 as cited in Stanmore
1906, p . 250). 2

1.

Ninety per cent of the British casualties were due to disease,
exposure and deprivation.
Especially ruinous were the months
between October 1854 and April 1855, a time of minimal combat,
yet deaths amounted to:
about 35 per cent of the average strength of the army ...
and it seems clearly established that this excessive
mortality is to be attributed to ... exposure to the wet and
cold,
imporper
food,
insufficient
clothing
and
insufficient shelter
(First Report of the McNeil-Tulloch
Commission 1856, pp.2-3; see also Dixon 1978, p. 44).

2.

Undoubtedly the greatest influence in shaping the British
people's attitude towards the war was the series of articles in
The Times by William Russell.
For the first time, the public
became intimately familiar with the conditions of war under
which the soldier was expected to live and fight and judged
them unacceptable (see Laffin 1964, p.137; Lloyd 192t, p.11).
As early as 23 December, 1854 Russell described how the
"noblest army England ever sent from these shores has been
sacrificed
to
the grossest mismanagement.
Incompetency,
lethargy, aristocratic hauteur, official indifference, favour,
routine, perverseness, and stupidity reign, revel and riot in
the camp before Sabastopol ... " (Quoted in Reid 1911, p.3}. The
conditions were so poor that one combatant, a week before
Russell's December article appeared, expressed doubt as to
whether any British Army had ever been worse off (Clifford 1956
reprint, p .128).
At the time Russell's reports were criticised by the Government
and mischievious
and the Queen and branded as malevolent
exaggerations . (General Estcourt to Sidney Herbert February 12,
1855 in Stanmore Vol. I 1906, p. 316). The Duke of Newcastle,
then Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, scoffed at
Russell's reports indicating they were entirely and utterly
incorrect, the ravings of a "miserable scribbler" (Prince
Albert to Lord Panmure, October 6 1855, Panmure Papers 1908, p.
430; Also See Lord Palmerston to Lord Panmure, July 20 1855;
Panmure Papers 1908, p. 308;
Queen Victoria to Lord Panmure
February 20, 1856, p. 116; Sir W. Codrington to Lord Panmure
February 24 and 26 1856 , p. 128; Hansard 27/4/1854 cxxxii

-19The causes of the calamities which befell the British Army were
initially attributed to individuals until it became recognised that,
whilst

deficiencies

difficulties
financial

of

experienced,

considerations .

individuals
the

major

Lord

certainly
cause

Raglan

in

could

contributed
be

particular,

traced
who

to
to
had

... (footnote from p. 18 continued)
c.908). Sweetman (1971a), also has criticised those who place
too much reliance on Russell 1 s dispatches.
In particular he
argues much of Russell's reporting was based on hearsay. Not
content with calling into doubt Russell's records, Sweetman
also criticises most eyewitness accounts of the conditions in
the Crimea. His conclusion however, overlooks and makes light
of the remarkable concurrence of opinion and reporting found in
the diaries and correspondence of the combatants. These diaries
and letters uphold each other even on the smallest points. Thus
in spite of the different locations and experiences of the
writers, the contemporary accounts do provide a very dependable
source of description, and possibly a little less reliable
explanation, as to the conditions which ,e xisted.
To those
serving in the Crimea, on the contrary, Russell's dispatches
were faithful in their rendition of the circumstances
prevailing (see Clifford, 19 January 1855). Without Russell's
constant nagging and prodding it appeared doubtful to the
combatants that things would otherwise have improved
(see
Clifford, 10 February 1855).
In the Crimea, Russell was
scorned by the military authorities who regarded him "as a mere
camp follower, whom it would be impossible to take more notice
of than you would of a crossing sweeper ... " (Russell, quoted
in Huxley 1975, p.58; For a detailed account of Russell's work
see Furneaux 1944).
For a discussion of the part played in the Crimean War by The
Times and other newspapers, see Anderson 1967, Chapter Two.
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assumed command of the army upon the death of Wellington in 1852,
was to receive much of the criticism. 3

To the men at the front, the

day to day contact with their senior officers and observance of
their nonchalant attitude towards the living conditions of the men
made it seem obvious that the officers' indifference was responsible
for

the

nightmare

into

which

they

had

all

been

pitched

(see

Clifford's letter, 8 February 1855). The assessment made of officers
in the Seven Years War by Ferdinand of Brunswick's biographer was,
appallingly,

3.

equally applicable

to

the

British

officers

in

the

Raglan was especially criticised for the meagreness of his
correspondence with the Government;
something which Lord
Panmure as Secretary of State for War consistently tried to
rectify in his letters to Lord Raglan (see Panmure Papers
1908). Sidney Herbert also tried vainly to induce Lord Raglan
to communicate with the Government more regularly (letter March
5, 1855, in Stanmore 1906, p. 327). Others who were to receive
more of the blame later were Commissary-General Filder,
Quarter-Master-General Airey and Adjutant-General Estcourt (See
Lord Clarendon to Lord Raglan Apri~ 23, 1855, Panmure Papers
1908, p. 165; Lord Palmerston to Lord Panmure, April 15, 1855,
Panmure Papers 1908, p. 150).
For examples of Estcourt 's
incompetence and complete denial of the urgency in the Crimea
see his letters to Sidney Herbert, Secretary-at-War, in
Stanmore Vol. I 1906, p. 277, 279, 280-281.
Gladstone also received some of the blame because of the
niggardly attitude of successive governments towards military
spending immediately prior to the Crimean War (See Moncrief
1909, p.380; Buxton 1901, pp. 592-595; Morely 1903, Vol. II,
pp. 51, 53, 56, 62, 63).
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Crimean War for little had changed:
(They)
do not trouble their heads about the service;
and understand of it ... absolutely nothing whatever ... ,
their home customs incline them to the indulgences of
life;
and nearly without exception, they all expect to
have ample and comfortable means of sleep.
This leads
them often into military indulgences (Quoted in Barnett
1970. p. 185) . 4

Successive British Governments, without exception, were content
to leave military matters in the hands of an artistocratic, wealthy
and amateur elite 5 interested in the army for its sport and social
value

(See Sidney Herbert to General Estcourt December 12,

in Stanmore Vol.

I,

1906,

p.

310).

1854

An army ruled over by the

aristocracy was accepted as being constitutionally safe.

Because

of
the ties of relationship with the rank, wealth, and more
advanced intelligence of the country,
(they) can be
relied upon under all circumstances to maintain order and
obey the laws (Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine November
1857, p.583).

4.

Lord Cardigan provided an extreme vindication of this judgement
of the British Officer. Each evening he retired to his private
yacht moored in Balaclava harbour, resolutely refusing to sleep
on land with his men.

5.

To open the army off iceship to those of the 'lower orders'
would raise the spectre of the Interregnum and its military
abuses perpetrated by the 'common' officers and thus "would
disconnect the army
from the general sympathy of the
country" (Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine November 1857, p.
583). See also Chapter Three.

-22Writing to Sydney Herbert in March 1855, Florence Nightingale
decried the incompetence of the army's aristocratic officers.

She

complained that "the real hardship of this place ... is that we have
to do with men who are neither gentlemen nor men of education nor
even men of business ... whose only object is to keep themselves out
of blame"
Prince

(Quoted in Woodham-Smith 1977, p .162).

Concort

expressed his

anguish

at

the

Privately the

amateurism of

the

gentleman officer who seemed to seek "to excuse himself for being an
officer by assuming as unsoldierlike . . . a manner as he possibly
can" (Prince Albert to Lord Clarendon, September 17, 1855, Panmure
Papers 1908, p.

393).

through

professional

their

By appearing "less and less as soldiers"

proclaiming their stupidity,

incompetence

they

succeeded

in

inefficiency and incapability to the

world (Prince Albert to Lord Clarendon, September 17, 1855. Panmure
Papers 1908, p. 393).
Despite the incompetence of the Army's leaders by 1855 it had
become clear to the British public that the army in the Crimea had
been sacrificed primarily because of financial considerations, and
not those of just Lord Aberdeen's Government (see Trevelyan 1922,
p.305;

Russell 1858, p. 30; Morely 1903, Vol.

I, pp. 487-493):

"Parsimony, as regard military establishments, was the order of the
day"

(Blackwood' s Edinburgh Magazine January,

Charles Stephenson,

1856, p. 115) .

Sir

in a letter to his brother on March 5, 1855

demanded that
the late Government have a heavy account to answer for. They
have been to this army . . . a greater enemy to us than the
Russians;
they have, in short, done what I deem it
impossible for a Russian army to do - annihilated the British
army . . . ( 1915 ) .

-23Not only were successive Governments ultimately seen as neglectful
and obtuse in the extreme when it came to the care of the men
entrusted to them in the army,

It was the

but maliciously so.

Government of Lord Aberdeen that was to carry the blame and pay the
price for the decimation of the British army when the government was
forced

to

retire

in

February

1855,

to

be

succeeded

by

Lord

Palmerston's Government (See the Comments of the Edinburgh Review,
July 1855, p . 274).

At the time Lord Panmure wrote to Lord Raglan

describing how the public had been sufficiently roused to sacrifice
"two victims to their disappointment ... Lord Aberdeen and the Duke
of Newcastle" (February 12, 1855 Panmure Papers 1908, p . 58;

Also

Sidney Herbert to Lord Raglan March 5 1855, in Stanmore 1906, Vol. I
p. 326).
Sidney Herbert, Secretary at War, only too readily agreed that
the

responsibility

for

the

then

present

state

of

military

preparedness was
the fault of every parliament;
we have always had the
same stereotyped system of economy in military affairs ...
I am as much to blame as anyone ... I say ... it has been
the fault of all parties, all administrations, every
parliament
On one (thing) they have agreed,
improvident economy
(Speech in the House of Commons as
reported in Blackwoods Magazine, January 1855, Volume
For a fuller account see Stanmore Vol. I
LXXVII, p.13;
1906, pp. 239-240).
Successive British Governments since the Peninsular Wars may
have been less intent on military parsimony, assured Russell (1858,
p.

55),

(supply)

if

they had

services

in

"seen

the

times

of

evil
peace".

effects
If

of
"all

strangling the
our

political

economists could ... have been ... enlisted in the army at Scutari
for a month ... till they had obtained some practical knowledge of
the system"

( p.

56), Russell felt confident they "would not for

-24the future listen so readily to their counsellors who tell [them]
that it is economy to tighten his purse strings around the neck
of army" (sic)(p.55).
The calamity of the Crimea was so monstrous and so avoidable
that

blame,

urged

General

Sir

Edward

transcended

Coffin,

individuals, departments and Government (Appendix VII to Evidence
before the Strathnairn Committee 1867, p. 67).
preparation for

The deficiencies in

the maintenance of the troops can,

in part,

be

traced to these sources but more especially to the traditional and
slowly eroded British suspicion of the constitutional consequences
of maintaining standing armies in peace.

"National indifference",

argued Sir Edward, must be held in the first place to be culpable
for the suffering in the Crimea (Appendix VII to Evidence before the
Strathnairn

Committee

1867,

p.267;

Also

Magazine Vol.LXXIX, February 1856, p.233;

Blackwood's

Edinburgh

Also Stephenson 1915 in a

letter to his brother June 29, 1855 pp. 146-147).
National indjfference

a~d

constitutional fears stemming mainly

from an aversion to the military manifest themselves in a preference
for cheeseparing economy, 6 obsessive surveillance of finance through
accounts and a grossly centralised and minutely regulated financial
administration in the hands of civilians.
tragedy enacted in the Crimea.

Each had its part in the

It is the task of later chapters to

examine these elements in the structure of financial control within
which Parliament frequently pursued its goal of economy in military
spending.
6.

"
being more earnest in the maintenance of our civil
liberties than in the extension of our military power, we
shackle ... the will of the executive in the matter of military
expenditure" (Edinburgh Review April 1855, p.540) .

-252.3

SUPPLY AND WAR
The British Government in 1854 sent to the Crimea an army with a

primitive means of maintenance to invade the territory of a foe of
unknown strength (Barker 1971, p.878 ;

Russell 1858, p. 62 and 66).

Preparation for supply was so inadequate, lamented Alison, that at
the

first

experience

of

hardship

the

army's

"magnificent

battalions ... melted away like snow" (1869, p.6).
Supply preparations for the Crimean War were essentially the
same

as

with

revolution

of

those

preceding

1688. 7

All

any
were

other

conflict

characterised

since
by

the

"belated

preparation; frantic effort;

disappointment ... " (Midleton 1939, p.

Gordon 1935, p. 33) .

Generally, apart from the · Peninsular

138;

Wars (see Glover 1963), there had always been a lack of foresight,
no coherent and cohesive attempts at planning for the maintenance of
the army and tremendous ignorance born out of national indifference
to

the

Army,

lassitude,

and

traditional

British

Government

obstruct! veness where the pressing demands of the situation took
second place to inflexible and even moronic regulations (Moncrieff
1909, p.380). The supply of an army however, needs careful attention
and must not merely reflect responses to spasmodic and haphazard
episodes of distress, as it did in the British Army (See Comments in
Edinburgh Magazine April 1855, p. 540;

Sir William Codrington to

7. Apart from army personnel from the Peninsular Wars who were still
alive, there was pathetically little to guide in planning for supply
at the time of the Crimean War (see Shaw 1939, p.27). There was, as
Major-General Fuller observed, "almost complete silence upon the
problem of supply.
Not in ten thousand books written on war ...
(was) there to be found one on this subject" (Shaw 1939, Preface on
p. 9: also see Reid 1910, P. 458). Few supply personnel ever wrote
about their experiences, even after the valuable lessons learnt in
the Napoleonic Wars. After all, decided Shaw, if a supply officer
did put his experiences on paper "who would read them" (1939,p.24) .
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Lord

Panmure

March

15,

1856,

Panmure

Papers

1908,

p.

155).

Maintenance of an army in the field cannot be improvised. Armies are
unquestionably emergency services and therefore must be organised in
such a manner that they are never completely relaxed to potential
danger (Fortnightly Review No. CCLII, New Series, December 1887, p.
751). Every part of the military body must know its function and be
able to react without hesitation in an effective manner whenever
called upon (See Arnold-Forster 1906, p. 437). The most that should
occur

in an

emergency is

some expansion and strengthening,

not

radical changes, as occurred in the Crimea, which can only lead to
uncertainty, waste and the retardation of military efficiency. 8

The

mechanisms of maintenance require careful nurturing and cultivation
over a prolonged period.

So important was adequate attention to

supply, Alison warned that an
army sent into the field without efficient and thoroughly
well organised, and long previously trained, staff and
supply departments is an army foredoomed to dogs and
vultures;
and ... no expenditure at the moment, however
lavish, can supply these wants or avert this gloom (1869,
p. 5).

Russell also expressed concern for giving due consideration to
the training of supply personnel, in particular duties other than
the purely financial:
a commissariat officer is not made in a day, nor can the
most lavish expenditure effect the work of years, or atone
for the want of experience. The hardest working Treasury
clerk9 has much to learn ere he could become an efficient
commissariat officer ... (1858,p.66; Alsop. 35).
8.

For an excellent summary of the changes that occurred in the
organisation of army administration see Clode 1869, Appendix
CXLIX, p.769.

9.

Reference to the Commissariat as an agent of the Treasury.

-27Viewed in the light of the traditional hostility of the nation
towards the military 10

and consequently,

successive governments'

fervent pursuit of economy in the long peace after the Napoleonic
Wars,

the inadequate preparation for the supply of a large army

fighting
surprising

in

hostile

territory,

the

Crimea,

becomes

far

less

(Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine January 1856, p.

115).

Economy had increasingly become the measure of virtue and worth of
government programmes and departments, but especially in the case of
the army (see "Observations of Lord Panmure" Feburary 1855, Panmure
Papers, 1908, p. 46).

The army, exposed and susceptible in peace to

the barbs and gibes of the zealous missionaries of economy, came
into more than its share of attention and criticism in this regard .
An army at peace represented an easy target for retrenchment, the
non-combatant

services

were

especially

ripe

Comments in Edinburgh Review 1855, p. 539;

for

cutting

(See

British Parliamentary

Papers 1840, XXIX (149), p. 270).
Britain had always been content to raise an army for war when
expressly needed, and not before.

The Crimean War showed only too

clearly the repercussions of such a piecemeal and niggardly stance
on defence and in particular military supply.
that the future Commander-in-Chief,

What was alarming was

Lord Raglan,

could with all

conscience, argue before a Select Committee that there was no need
to maintain the Commissariat in peace (Evidence before the Committee
on Army and Ordnance Expenditure 1849, p.240;

see also the Evidence

of Lord Fitzroy Sommerset (Military Secretary at the Horse Guards)
before the same committee,
Minister

(1841-46),

had

Questions 3203-3212) .

sealed

the

fate

of

Peel,

the

as

Prime

non-combatant

branches throughout his ministry, and by a contagion effect to the
10.

See Chapter 3.

-28Crimean War, when he expressed openly the national feeling that
we should best consult the true interests of the country
by husbanding our resources in time of peace and - instead
of lavish expenditure on all means of defence - by placing
some trust in the latent and dormant energies of the
nation, and acting upon the confidence that a just cause
would rally a great and glorious people around the
National standard ... (Quoted in Omond 1933, p.82).
Urgent improvisation over methodical preparation was thereby given
the highest approval as indicated by the declining expenditures on
the Commissariat after the Peninsula Wars.

Expenditure on the

Commissariat between 1825 - 1842 was:
1825 - (373,179
73)
1834 - £290,305
p. 85)
1841 - £213,356)
p. 95) .
1842 - £200,939)
95) .

2.4
2.4.1

(British

Parliamentar~

Pa12ers 1825, XVIII, p.

(British

Parliamentar~

Papers 1834, XXIV,

(British

Parliamentar~

Pa12ers 1842, XXVII,

(British

Parliamentar~

Papers 1842, XXVII, p.

SUPPLY AND THE ARMY IN THE CRIMEA
The Co. .issariat
Supply

of

the

essentials

of

responsibility of the Commissariat.

life

to

the

army

was

the

The Commissariat was a civil

department under the direct control of the Treasury, 11 to which the

11.

For a detailed history of the evolution of the Commissariat and
its relationship with the Treasury see British Parliamentary
Papers, 1854-55, Vol.XXXII, pp.299-301, "Treasury Minute 22
December 1854 on the Transfer of the Commissariat to the War
Department";
British Parliamentary Pa12ers, 1859, Vol.XV,
"Report of the Committee appointed to Inquire into the Existing
Organisation of the Commissariat Department", Question 2,
p.197; Report of F.A. Stanley, Financial Secretary to the War
Off ice on the Subject of Army Pay Accountants which contains a
"Memo on Commissariat and Treasury Chest Duties" by the Deputy
Accountant General,
British Parliamentary Pa12ers,
1878,
Vol.XIX .
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Commissariat directed all its allegiance, until December 1854 when
it passed into the hands of the War Department where it remained
under civilian control and Treasury regulations continued unabated
Biddulph 1904, p.8).

(See the Comments of Griffiths 1900, p.216;

As a consequence of the civilian autonomy from ultimate military
authority

Lord

Haliburton,

despatched

to

Turkey

to

join

the

Commissariat in 1855, described how
the position of the civilian
in constant contact with
soldiers who grudgingly recognised his rank and authority, was
anomalous and unsatisfactory (Quoted in Atlay 1909, p. 9).
The

Commissariat

responsible

was

furnishing

for

and

transporting (at least on land) all provisions, forage, cooking fuel
and light to troops in the field outside England. 12 The Commissariat
was a microcosm of its frequent rival, the army;

an organisation

ruled by a bureaucratic aristocracy "grotesque in their pedantry and
ineptitude"

(Hibbert

1963,

recognised

preference

in

p.37).
the

army

In

keeping

with

the

widely

the

elderly

in

senior

for

positions, Commissariat-General Filder was retrieved from retirement
to head the Commissariat for the duration of the Crimean War. 13
only definite direction he

received from

The

the Government at the

outset of the campaign was to economise wherever possible and that
he was to prepare plans to provide supplies for an army of 10,000
men operating in Turkey (not the Crimea).
12.

The Quarter-Master General's department was responsible for
issuing supplies to the troops once received from the
Commissariat.
For details of Commissariat duties see the
evidence of Commissariat-General Thomas Archer before the
Howick Commission 1837, pp. 31-32.

13.

Lord Panmure in a letter to General Simpson July 16,
refers to Filder as "the old man" (Panmure Papers 1908).

1855

-30The Commissariat from the opening of the fighting in Bulgaria
was insufficient in size, deficient of men of ability, initiative
and intelligence, and totally unprepared in training to meet the
demands of over 30, 000 men locked in a
distant

from

Britain

(see

Appendix

Strathnairn Committee 1867, p.257).
forty,

four

of

whom

were

officers

VI

deadly war 3, 000 miles
to

Evidence

before

the

With an initial staff of only
and

the

rest

predominantly

Treasury clerks knowledgeable in finance but ignorant of supply, the
task which confronted the Commissariat was overwhelming if not out
of the question (see Russell 1858, p.30). 14

In an attempt to give

the public in Britain some idea of the Commissariat's task, Russell
assures them that no one unacquainted with
the actual requirements of an army can form the smallest
notion of the various duties which devolved upon the
Commissariat, or the enormous quantity of stores required
. . . but the issue of rations was but a small portion of
their duty. They had to provide nurses, carts, saddles,
tents. carriages, interpreters, and to provide for the
innumerable legitimate wants of an army in the field
(1858, pp.80-81).
The Commissariat was also the banker for the army and the agent
of the Treasury responsible for supplying money to all branches of
the military, for the safe-keeping of specie, the issue of Bills and
14.

By September 1855, the staff had expanded to include:
3 Commissaires-General
1 Acting Commissary-General
2 Deputy Commissary-General
3 Acting Deputy Commissary-General
24 Assistant Commissary-General
8 Acting Assistant Commissary-General
37 Deputy Assistant Commissary-General
18 Acting Deputy Assistant Commissary-General
45 Commissary Clerks )
81 Temporary Clerks
) Treasury Clerks
12 Military Officers Acting Deputy Assistant Commissary-General
(Evidence of W. Power, Commissary-General-in-Chief, before the
Hartington Committee 1864, Question 2733).

-31for

concluding

British

when

necessary

Parliamentary

any

contracts

supplies

Vol.XXXII,

1854~55,

Papers,

for

(see

pp.300-301,

"Treasury Minute 22 December 1854 on Transfer of Commissariat to the
War Department") . 15
supplies

issued

men

the

of

(Evidence

For every penny spent

records

had

to

Commissariat

of

be

were

kept
held

Commissariat-General

Commission 1837,

p.

and every pound of

and

the

officers

personally

Archer

and

responsible

before

the

Howick

Given the lack of adequate staff and

34).

training and the width of activities encompased by the Commissariat,
there
many

were

unquestionably

accounts

and

too

far

many

"too

many

masters"

responsibilities,

(Appendix

VI

to

Evidence

before the Strathnairn Committee 1867, Question 2739, p.247).
Commissariat-General's

office

at Varna

was

always

too

The

so busy with

its paperwork as to resemble, for Russell, "a bank in the city in
the height of business ... " (1858, p.81). Add to the negligence in
supply

preparations

departments

the

concerned

presence
with

army

of

f ive 16

highly

independent

administration,

it

should

have come as no surprise when the supply system collapsed
Moncrieff

1909,

p. 538).

Yet

p.378;
the

especially in 1854,
was

met

with

Also

miserable

Edinburgn Review April
performance

of

the

(see
1855,

Commissariat,

and despite the reported feverish activity,

exclamations

of

disbelief

(Blackwood's

Edinburgh

Magazine January 1856, p. 116).
15.

For further details on Commissariat duties see the Evidence
before the "Select Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure"
Vol. IX,1849, Questions 8102-8114.

16.

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

The Commander-in-Chief.
The Commissariat.
The Ordnance Department.
The Medical Department.
Quarter-Master General.

-32The inadequacy of the preparations for the maintenance of the
In June 1854

army stood out in stark relief almost immediately.

Raglan, as Commanding Officer of the Crimean forces yet without the
slightest degree of control over or right of intereference in supply,
disconcertedly observed how "the organisation of the Commissariat is
so much in its infancy that I cannot tell ... either what we have or
what we want" (Quoted in Morris 1939, p.335).
to

reprimand

Filder:

Commissary-General

was

"something
told

on

must

Raglan was soon moved
really

be

13 December 1854,

done",

the

"to place the

supply of the army upon a more satisfactory footing or the worst
consequences may follow.

I receive complaints almost daily ... "

(Quoted in Hibbert 1963, p.248).

In the same month the.gallant and

highly regarded Colin Campbell indicated that it seemed to him the
"Commissariat
entirely"

department

(Quoted

seems

in Morris 1939,

to

have

broken

,p.339;

down

see also

almost

the Esher

Committee 1901, Part I, p.7 of the report).

2.4.2

The Influence of Accounting Regulations
Supply deficiencies may have had less effect if the available

supplies had been intelligently handled in the field.
the

behaviour

of

the

Commissariat's

officers

Unfortunately

only

served

to

accentuate the initial supply deficiencies and impede relief when
supplies were plentiful

in early 1855 (McNeil-Tulloch Commission

1856, p. 31; Russell 1858, pp. 290-292).

The responsibility for

this must reside with the Treasury and Parliament for administration
of supply was based on a "ruinous succession of checks and balances"
which retarded supply.

(Edinburgh Review 1855, p. 538).
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The

Commissariat

degree of

officers

were

criticised

bordered on murder . 17

phlegm that

for

exhibiting

The

training and

administration of the Commissariat under the Treasury,
accentuated
initiative ,

regulations

and

accountability

at

a

because it

the

expense

of

bred a corps of numbed automatons. The Commissariat's

task of maintaining the troops in the field was difficult enough,
yet the Commissariat
with

surveillance,

"was so tied down with orders, and so cramped
that

its

energies

were

greatly

diminished"

(Russell 1858, p.62). Minute documentation was required to support
and

evidence each

transaction conducted by the Commissariat,

members being charged "with every article received,
there

is

not

an

article

immediately accounted
1957,

p.73;

see

Vol.XXXII, p.301,

of

Entry or

for

also

Issue

but

British

Parliamentary

In short,

must be exactly

(Le Mesurier 1796,

II

...

its

Part IV;

Papers

Ward

1854-55,

"Treasury Minute 22 December 1854 on Transfer of

Commissariat to War Department").
The punctiliousness of the Commissariat department would have
been

comical

Albert,
1855,

had

the Royal
concerning

England .

not

the

Consort,
the

consequences
wrote

arrival

of

been

so

tragic.

to Lord Panmure on
a

boatload

of

Prince

10 February

vegetables

from

Even though vegetables of any description were urgently

needed, when the Commissariat officer receiving the cargo realised
it

17 .

was

vegetables

he

refused

to

accept

it

be·cause

under

the

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Charles Trevellyan
however, called the accusations against the Commissariat "an
immense crop of lies" (23 April 1855, Quoted in Hart 1960).
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financial regulations of his department he did not have the power to
purchase

and

accept

them

(Panmure

Papers

1908,

p.

54).

The

Commissioners investigating Crimean supplies also referred to this
absurdity (McNeil and Tulloch Commission, 1856, p.8).
Commissariat

officer

was

receipts and issues,

held

personally

Because each

responsible

for

all

contravention of Treasury regulations could

prove a very costly exercise. Besides which, they were trained as
Officers of a Treasury controlled department never to spend money on
their

own

initiative,

no

matter

what

(see

Woodham-Smith

1971,

p.116).
Equally tragic,

and yet not unusual in the context of the

Crimean War, was the plight of the Medical Officer of the hospital
ship ~ Charity.

On the ship he had a large number of cholera cases,

i

whose suffering was aggravated by the absence of warm surroundings.
To improve conditions the Medical Officer sought to acquire some
stoves from the Commissariat.

Despite the obvious urgency of the

situation the Medical Officer was properly informed:
Commissary:

You must make your requisition in due
fora, send it to headquarters, and get
it signed properly, and returned, and
then I will let you have the stoves.

Medical Officer:

But my men may die meantime.

Commissary:

I can't help that;
requisition .

Medical Officer:

It is my firm belief that there are men
now in a dangerous state whom another
night will certainly kill.

Commissary:

I really can do nothing;
I aust have a
requisition
properly signed before I
can
give
one
of
those
stoves
away. (Russell 1858, p.253).

I must have the

-35Airey related the similar fate of 9,000 great coats received in
December 1854.

These coats, instead of being issued, were left in

the stores for over two months while the men were literally freezing
to death in their hundreds.

As Airey disapprovingly indicates, "the

reasons officially given for non-use of these coats was that the
R.e gulations only authorised an issue every three years, so troops
were not therefore entitled to an issue"

(1913,

p. 88).

Florence

Nightingale ref erred with disgust to the similar paralysing effect
of regulations in the hospital wards at Scutari.

There, she wrote,

each department had a series of 'warrants' naming definite
articles.
The Purveyor only gives such amounts of
articles as are justifiable under his 'warrants', by which
he is governed, and is not responsible for those wants of
the soldier
which are in excess of the warrants,
whatever may be the evidence before him, either in the
requisition of the medical officer or the personal
observations, it would appear, he was bound to make of
what was close under his eyes
(Quoted in Woodham-Smith
1977, p.115).
On one occasion, 15 February 1855, Florence Nightingale went to
the Purveyor for shirts.
shirts available.
accusation

that

She was straightway informed there were no

Upon being confronted with Florence Nightingale's
she

knew

of

27,000

shirts

delivered four days

previously the officer retreated into the laager of his department's
regulations.

He was unable to unpack them, he assured her, despite

the pressing need of the men, "without a board", i.e. inspection and
written authorisation (Woodham-Smith 1977, p.152).
Procrastination in the Commissariat was generated by financial
and accounting regulations, most of which had been carried over from
the Peninsula War, which interposed themselves in every facet of

-36the soldier's life.
and

bound

in

The army and its associated services was "tied

the

coils

of

excessively

complex

and

minute

regulations" judged the Esher Committee (1904, Part 2, p.9 of the
report).
another

Rules
time

and

and

regulations 18

conceivably

designed

for

other

for

another

purposes

soon

place,
became

dangerous anachronisms which retarded efficient operations of all
military and civilian branches of the army.
Because the officers of the Commissariat, as befitted agents of
the Treasury,

would be assessed primarily on how well

they met

Treasury regulations and kept records and accounts in the pursuit of
'petty economy' , they refused or were unable to move outside the
guidelines for supply as laid down in Treasury regulations

(see

Florence Nightingale's views in Woodham-Smith 1977, p .114).

This

had been observed much earlier than the Crimean War by the Howick
Commission which was prompted to conclude in 1837 that "the Board of
Treasury seems particularly unfitted by its constitution for
managing the supply of the Army" (p. 13 of the Report). According to
Florence

Nightingale

the

Commissariat's

officers

fixed

"their

attention upon their bookkeeping as the primary object of life"
(Quoted in Moncrieff 1909, p.381).
Department

took

over

the

This did not change when the War

Commissariat

in

December

1854.

Mr.

Augustus Stafford on the basis of his experiences in the Crimea told
the

Roebuck

Committee

(1856)

that,

not

departments but throughout all departments,
responsibility and exceeding regulations
p.130).

only

in

the

supply

there was a fear of

(see Woodham-Sm! th 1977,

Yet, officers of the Commissariat were only following the

example of the Commissary-General.

18.

For a discussion of the relationship between
administration and regulations, see Section 6.2.

centralised

-37The

provision

of

fuel

for

cooking

is

a particularly good

illustration of the inflexibility generated by financial regulations
which

the

afflicted

Commissariat-General
despite

the

plentiful

Commissariat

Filder

desperate

only

one

had

Peninsular Wars.

Commissariat

need

day's

not

refused

had

of

the

to

acquire

men, 19

sailing from
Treasury

top

from

even

the

authority

and

issue

though

Crimea,
to

bottom.

to

do

it

wood
was

because the
so

in

the

Filder would not overstep regulations "by a hair's

breadth" (Edinburgh Review Vol. CI April 1855, p. 566).

The Royal

Commission into the supplies in the Crimea made it plain in its
first

report

Because

"the

how

inappropriate

circumstances

of

it
the

regarded
army

Filder•s

before

behaviour.

Sebastopol

were

obviously exceptional ... an appeal to precedence was out of place",
proffered the Commission (1856, p.10). 20

19.

All available wood in the Crimea had been consumed well before
the end of 1854. Not only trees and buildings had found their
way into the cooking fires of the soldiers but almost all
vegetation that was combustible.
Russell reported that the
countryside was destitute of timber ( 1858, p. 115).
Warner
expressed more than a little concern to his father at the
absence of fuel and how that in the place of timber "one has to
collect ... dry roots to burn" (2 February 1855). The situation
was so desperate that the men frequently crawled out under the
enemy's fire to get enought roots to cook their meals (Russell
1858, p. 263).

20.

Lord Palmerston, the Prime Minister, had urged on numerous
occassions both Lord Raglan and Lord Panmure to remove Filder,
a man he found to be "narrow minded, prejudiced, opposed to
every new resource and improved practice, wedded to routine,
and refusing every improved arrangement . . . you cannot we 11
have a worse man" (Lord Palmerston to Lord Panmure July 15,
1855, Panmure Papers 1908, p. 292; Also May 1, 1855 p. 180;
April 15, 1855 p. 150;
March 2, 1855 p. 90).
Filder was
finally recalled July 1855 (Panmure Papers 1908,p. 292;
see
also Stevenson 1915, letter to his wife 19 June 1854, p. 87).

-38Officers sent to Balaclava to get rations and extra supplies
from

the

Commissariat were

frequently met

with,

if not hostile

passivity, stony indifference and little or no assistance.

Requests

were dealt with with infuriating correctness and parsimony.

Even

threatening gestures and, as shown earlier, earnest supplication did
not normally dent the icy facade of the Commissariat's professional
punctiliousness.

The unsatisfied were not however, silent in their

battles with the Commissariat.

On 13 November 1854, Raglan prepared

a memorandum for Filder where he alluded to the complaints he,
personally, received "almost daily of some impediment being thrown
in the way of issues".

Later, in the same memorandum Raglan, again

in his usual restrained and courteous manner, showed his alarm at
the "flippancy in answers given (to the requests) for supplies
without consideration to the fact that it is the duty of all to
unite in facilitating the issue of supplies and in providing for the
maintenance and comfort of the troops"
p.248).

(Quoted in Hibbert 1963,

Short term improvement unfortunately was almost out of the

question for to change the habits of a lifetime in the service of
the Treasury was easier said than accomplished. For the Commissariat
Officer "to suddenly cast behind every tradition of his department,
every habit to which he had been carefully trained and, in the midst
of new and arduous tasks, construct for himself a new theory of duty
and a new set of regulations" was out of the question (Editor's
Preface to

Buxton 1883,

p.vi).

Besides · which,

as

the Roebuck

Commission found, Commissariat officers generally had no choice but
to follow the given financial

instructions that were

"enforced,

suitable for a time of peace, but inapplicable to a period of war,
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and operating unjustly on soldiers" (McNeil and Tulloch Commission
1856, p.281).

Commissaries were only too aware of the eagerness and relish
with which the army notoriously sought to blame subordinates for
administrative failures and the alacrity with which the Treasury
superintended

its

own

regulations

(see

Ward

1957,

pp.70-72).

History, as found in the numerous Commissions and Committees that
accompanied major conflicts,

had demonstrated that any excuse in

times of trouble, especially an infraction of rules or procedures
however slight or unintentioned, sufficed to unleash and legitimise
insidious persecution (see Midleton 1939, p. 138).

Members of the

Commissariat, like their brothers in the army, therefore endeavoured
to eliminate any avoidable grounds upon which they might be the
scapegoat

for

operational

superior officers

difficulties:

"their

fear

of

their

was abject" (Woodham-Smith 1977, p.114).

To take the initiative was to risk severe censure and possibly
financial ruin.

Consequently, there are few recorded instances of

the initiative being taken.

Upon being informed in 1855 that the

Secretary-at-War, Sidney Herbert, wanted no consideration of expense
in ensuring the soldiers were adequately provided for, the Purveyor,
Mr. Wreford, retorted almost in disbelief that "this is the first
time I have it in writing that I was not to spare the expense.

I

never knew that I might not be thrown overboard" (Cited in Huxley
197 5 ' p. 101 ) .
The rules and financial regulations of the Commissariat were
ultimately designed

to

create uniformity,

regularity and

ensure

conformity (See Durell 1917, p.475; Dawkins Committee 1901, p.182).

-40Tragically, as the Howick Commission recognised 18 years before
Crimean War,

"conflicts of

opinion,

diversities

and

the

delays

exceedingly injurious to the public service" also result (Quoted in
Gordon 1935, p.44). Regulations enabled 'remote-controlled' Treasury
supervision;
Treasury,
orders.

they were,

if

not

the

physical

presence

of

the

its surrogate, the functional equivalent of direct oral
As such, behaviour which contradicted Treasury regulations

could have been readily and threatingly interpreted as denying the
wishes and directions -0f the office from which they emanated.
In the Crimean Army the web of financial regulations, rules and
procedures which served to hem in the Commissariat officer became
not only the servant of the superior but of the ranks-also.

They

were used as a defensive fortress into which the supply officer
could remove himself (see Woodham-Smith 1977, p.117 for examples).
Regulations determined by central authorities as the keystone to a
highly centralised system of administration and financial control
became not, as expected, a link in a chain of responsibility but
rather a component in a chain of irresponsibility.
death

of

common

Gladstone's

sense"

comments

(Woodham-Smith

as

presented

by

1977,

They "were the

p.113;

Moncrieff

see

1909,

also

p.380).

Regulations effectively enabled the officers of the Commissariat to
divorce themselves from the failures of the campaign by the plea
that instructions were followed exactly as given (see, for example,
the evidence of Commissiary-General Filder before the McNeil and
Tulloch Commission,

1856).

could

responsible

not

perceived

be

held

as

their

given

The off ice rs'
for

mandate.

defence was that they

anything

outside

Financial

and

what

they

accounting

-41regulations as finely detailed as those hedging the British Army's
supply services therefore encouraged and produced apathy.
According

to

the

Commissioners

of

McNeil and Tulloch

the

Commission the Commissariat, displaying an apparent indifference for
the

suffering

improvement.

of

the

army,

Minimal

Commissioners,

to

regulations

past

of

meet

made
was

effort
the

little

outmoded

campaigns

supplies shipped from England,

and

effort

maintain

a

promote

stressed

required,
supply

to

requirements
general

the
and

store of

the distribution of which "to the

members in each division, merely involves the simplest operation of
arithmetic"
p.13).

(McNeil

and

Tulloch

Commission

1856,

First

Report,

To do much else must necessarily be

attended with extra trouble, greater complication of
accounts, and no small personal exertion.
It is
natural . . . that -those who have the charge of supplying
the troops should cling to the system which tends so
materially to relieve their difficulties
(McNeil
and
Tulloch Commission 1856, First Report, p.13).
Not only did the regulations facilitate punishment but they
also therefore defined behaviour necessary to avoid punishment by
specifying

minimum

the

level

of

acceptable

performance.

The financial regulations which principally emanated from the
Treasury

with

the

express

sanction

of

Parliament

thus

most

successfully destroyed freedom in decision making, the well-spring
of

initiative

which

is

the

very

substance

of

flexibility,

intelligent assessment and decision making where conditions

are

constantly changing.

Florence Nightingale observed wryly in 1855

that

the

the

flattened

members

of

supply

branches

had

their

heads

"so

between the boards of discipline that they remain old

children all their lives" (cited in Woodham-Smith 1977, p.117).

-42The financial regulations of the Treasury as they impinged on
accounts were of special interest to the McNeil-Tulloch Commission.
Thus it is the purpose of the following section to

examine the

Commission's findings concerning Treasury financial regulations and
Commissariat accounts.

2.5

ARMY ACCOUNTING AND THE ROYAL COMMISSION INTO ARMY SUPPLIES
The indignation of the British at home, (for example see Lord

Clarendon's letter to Lord Panmure December 23, 1855 Panmure Papers
1908, p. 31), convinced as they were that British casual ties were
attributable in no small measure to supply inadequacies, determined
the Government to establish a Royal Commission to enquire into the
supply arrangements in the Crimea. Accordingly letters patent were
issued in 1855 and the McNeill-Tulloch Commission set off for the
Crimea. 21

Among

the directions

to

the Commissioners they were

charged with examining
the mode of accounting, and if the system be in your
opinion unnecessarily complicated for a period of actual
warfare, you will suggest such means of simplification as
may occur to you (First Report 1856, p.3).
Accounting

procedures

followed

in

the

field

were

directly

derived from the need to ultimately account to Parliament for money
21.

The Commission was a sop to public outrage for the
Commissioners received very little co-operation either at home
or in the Crimea and certainly little thanks from the
Government (Quarterly Review Vol. 104 July and October 1858,
pp. 535, 537).
The initial impact of the Commission's findings was explosive.
This was however, soon tempered by the manoeuverings of those
implicated in causing the army's suffering (Lord Panmure to Sir
William Codrington, February 15, 1856 Panmure Papers 1908, p.
105, p. 129).

-43appropriated to military uses.

All

accounting practice in the

Commissariat was subordinated to and fed into Parliamentary needs.
As

it

transpired

referred to as the
supply

in

the

Commissioners

did

not

find

what

was

'unclassified' system 22 of accounting used in

any way unduly

complicated

(see

Evidence

Strathnairn Committee 1867, Question 2677, p.208).

before the

On the contrary

the system "upon which the Commissariat accounts of receipts and
issue have for some years been kept" showed itself to be
well adapted for service in the field, and hardly to admit
of being more simple
(for the) accounts of the
Commissariat Officers attached to Divisions and Brigades
consist ... merely of consecutive entries, or jottings, of
all receipts and issues ... accompanied by the requisite
vouchers
(Second Report 1856, p.43;
see also Notes on
Keeping Army Service Corps Books and Accounts 1919;· Furse
1894' p. 96) .
The operation of army accounting as practiced in the Crimea
owed much to the work of Sir Charles Trevelyan, 23 at one time head
of the
had

Treasury and

taken

what

had

the Commissariat
been

a

(1840-December

tremedously

complex

1854),

who

system

of

accounts involving very detailed classifications and in its place
instituted the simple cash account and a charge-discharge account
for
in

stores. 24
the

intense

field

Sir Charles had
had

demands

shown,
an

that

recognised,
during

inordinately

and past operations

active

complex

service

with

system

of

its
army

22.

The accounts were unclassified in that the only essential
headings of expenditure used were those reflecting the headings
of Votes as appropriated by Parliament.

23.

For biographical notes see Trevelyan 1922, p. 357.

24. For details of the complexity of the accounts prior to Sir
Charles' work see the Report of the Commissioners Appointed to
Inquire into the Mode of keeping the Official Accounts 1829, p.
88.
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According to Sir Charles the

accounting invariably broke down.
uncomplicated

and

system

'unclassified'

of

accounts

he

was

instrumental in introducing in the Commissariat when it was under
the direct control of the Treasury, not only
answered every purpose, but was far better for purposes of
check than any more complex system that could be adopted
and attained the objects of a rnili tary system of
accounts (Evidence before the Strathnairn Committee 1867,
Question 2668, p.207).
The McNeil-Tulloch Commission found also much that was praiseworthy in the arrangement of accounting offices;
audit,

which

received

the

Off ice rs in the Crimea,
Constantinople.

accounting reports

located for

the main office of
of

the

Commissary

the duration of · the war at

In particular, they saw the establishment of a head

accounting off ice in such close proximity highly advantageous in
making possible timely enquiries and any adjustments to the accounts
that may have been required.

By having an accounting office close

to the fighting any bookkeeping mistakes had the potential of speedy
rectification.

Le

Mesurier

in

1796

also

had

commended

decentralising the accounting function for
it is only 'on the spot' that a right judgement can be
formed of the difficulties of the (Commissariat) service
or a just estimate made of its expense
(for) it is
there that the transaction is
open to explanation
(Cited in Glover 1963, Appendix A).
The Commissioners regarded the ability of the accounting office
to acquire local knowledge, because of its close proximity to the
front,

as

established

the greatest advantage of
throughout

the

Crimean

the accounting function as
War

(Second

Report

1856,

pp. 43-44).

While

the

Commissioners

could

find

little

fault

with

the
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arrangement of the offices for accounting for army supplies, they
found much that needed attention in the operation of the accounting
system both at the supply depots at Balaclava and Kadikoi, and by
the Quartermasters of divisions and brigades.

The accounting for

supplies on active service was however, no easy matter if not "one
of

the

greatest troubles

conclusion of a campaign"

on service,

and for

(Furse 1894,

p. 82).

months after

the

Indeed, continued

Furse,
the difficulties
(which)
have
often
to
(be
experienced)
on service are not fully taken into
account in planning the regulations.
The many pressing
details they have to attend to in a very limited space of
time,
the want of writing materials, all militate
against things being done in a thorough businesslike
manner (p.85).
Largely because of the uncertainties and urgency of a major
campaign, much to its horror

the Royal Commission discovered that

the accounts constructed in the field were generally so inaccurate
"that but little reliance could be placed upon the accuracy of the
... returns" (Secoand Report 1856, p. 31).

The Commissariat account

invariably could not be reconciled with the Quartermaster-General's
books; 25 frequently the discrepancies in some important items could
be measured in thousands.

For example, the Quartermaster-General

had issued up to the time of the McNeil-Tulloch investigation 36,231
greatcoats, 26

which

were

duly

entered

as

received

by

the

Commissariat's officers. Yet the accounts of the latter disclosed a

25.

The
Quarter-Master
was
responsible
for
obtaining bulk
quantities of supplies from the Commissariat and distributing
these to the troops.

26.

The Quarter-Master-General was responsible for providing this
item of clothing. Acquisition of other supplies was the
responsibility of the Commissariat.

-46total of greatcoats issued and in stores of 23,880, a shortfall of
12,351.

Even worse was the unexplained difference in the records

for blankets.

Some 75,000 blankets were recorded as received, yet

only a total 56,950 was disclosed in the records as either having
been issued or in store as stock on hand (Second Report 1856, p.31).
Despite voluminous correspondence between the QuartermasterGeneral 1 s

department

and

advocated advantages

the

of

the

Commissariat,

and

accounting system

contrary

to

the

expressed

by

the

Commission~rs,

"no satisfactory rectif !cation of the accounts" had

been possible.

As the supply position improved from the beginning

of 1855 so the accounting for supplies became more inaccurate and
The

chaotic.
reconcile

members

(returns

Commissariat)

of

the

of

Royal

the

so far

as

Commission

"endeavoured

Quartermaster-General
the

to
the

and

explanations we received would

permit, but the discrepancies are st i 11 too great to warrant much

reliance upon the returns,

... " (Second Report 1856, p. 31).

The comments of McNeil and Tulloch were scathing, possibly the
worst that could be made. The Commissioners were expressing dismay
that,

in

demands,

the chaos
despite

of

the

a

protracted war with

immense

number

of

its

extraordinary

financial

and

store

regulations which manacled the Commissariat and the pettifogging
attention
intense

to

documentation

surveillance,

acceptable.

The

records

certainty or confidence.

the

through

accounts

accounting

could not

be

and

results
used

with

the
were
any

resulting
far

from

degree

of

Yet it seemed impossible that the end

product of such a closely scrutinised and laborious system could be
so worthless or, ever worse still, dangerously deceptive.

However,

-47little

else

could

simplification

in

be
the

expected
accounting

despite

improvement

procedures

argued

to

Sir

and

Charles

Trevelyan, because the system of accounting and supply was itself
there was, noted Sir Charles, far "too little system"

defective;

(Appendix VII to the Evidence before the Strathnairn Committee 1867,
p. 266;

see also Florence Nightingale's er i tic ism in Huxley 1975,

p.100).
It will be shown that financial and accounting regulations
gave

the

appearance

of

system

but

were

instead

a

plethora

of

financial and store regulations which had grown up as circumstances
They were not able to compensate for the absence of

dictated.
financial

experience

accounting

and

regulations

initiative

capable

of

nor

were

the

recognising

supply

deficiencies

and
or

pointing towards reforms; they were meant solely to be the servants
of the Treasury as the agent of Parliament.
Of particular concern to the McNeil-Tulloch Commission was the
system

of

ration

accounting.

Like

all

accounting

by

the

Commissariat the accounting for rations was ultimately subordinated
to Parliamentary surveillance of appropriation.
supplies

in

arrangements

the

field

which

the

was

by

well

Commission

The requisition of

established

found

to

have

procedure,
been

of

"questionable expediency" (Second Report 1856, p.31). In particular
the Commission found the system of ration accounting defective and
objectionable.

Rations

were

issued

by

the

Commissariat

on

production of a military indent, covering three days, signed by the
Quartermaster and Commanding Officer of the Corps requisitioning the
supplies.

On the back of the indent form a receipt was made out for

the full amount of the stores due to the Corps, according to the

-48number of men in each Corps.

From these ration returns monthly

abstracts, in duplicate, were prepared by each Commissariat Officer
for each and every unit he was responsible for supplying.

The

original of the indent was retained by the Commissariat Officer for
his own records to verify that all issues for the month could be
accounted for.

The copy of the monthly ration return was then sent

to the Paymaster of the Regiment who ascertained the correctness of
the re.turn as to the number of men entitled to receive rations.

The

return was subsequently taken to the cash off ice by the Paymaster
who paid for the rations from the men's stoppages (see Report of the
Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Mode of keeping the
Official Accounts, 1829, pp. 36, 39).
Ration

accounting

had

previously

been

investigated

by

Lieutenant Leahy, then Acting Quartermaster-General, who on 12 May
1855 presaged

the

findings

of

the

McNeil-Tulloch Commission

on

stores accounting when he wrote that the system of ration accounting
was both "intricate and laborious" yet without any commensurate
accuracy (McNeil-Tulloch Commission,
p.16).

Second Report,

Appendix XX,

The accounting records for rations had not been shown to be

reliable, relevant nor useful in any manner, he argued. According to
Leahy there were two main reasons for the inadequacies of ration
accounting.

Firstly, he noted that the method of issuing supplies,

each unit receiving supplies from its own Commissariat Officer and
Quartermaster, meant that a regiment could be rationed by up to nine
or ten

different officers who normally

returns at different times of the month.

submitted their

monthly

"The amount of labour",

writes Leahy, "necessary to make up the accounts must be evident as

-49well

as

Report,

the absence of
Appendix XX,

p.

reliable

totals

As well,

16) .

for any month''

(Second

the paucity of records

detailing the location and state of health of each man compounded
problems of accounting for rations.

The physical condition of the

soldier, for ration purposes, could range from physically fit for
combat, to injured or unwell, and dead.

Each condition had its own

scale of rations, the dead soldier of course requiring none at all
(to state the obvious) although rations frequently were issued for
dead men.

The location of the soldier also determined his ration

entitlement, whether he be on land, at the front or resting, or at
sea (Second Report, Appendix XX, p.16). The abstracts sent by the
Commissariat Officer each month were checked, as noted earlier, to
ensure only sufficient issues had been made for the number of men in
each unit.

Thus if there were 150 men originally listed in a unit

as entitled to rations then only, for example, 150 lb of meat (1 lb/
man) could be issued. Any excess issues would, upon discovery, be
deducted from the next issue if not returned in the meantime.
This system could work properly only as long as detailed and
accurate records were kept to show where each man was during the
month.

These records, shows Leahy, were simply not available with

the consequence that "it seldom happens that the total number of
rations charged for in the abstracts comes up to the number already
paid for by the soldier (Second Report, Appendix XX, p.16).

This

destroyed "the value of the receipt, which ceases to be a genuine
voucher" (Second Report, p.44).
A year later the Royal Commission could do nothing but concur
with

Leahy's

judgements.

The

Commissioners

found

especially
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objectionable, and contrary to the good management of supplies, the
practice of automatic supply.

Uni ts were frequently told not to
They were instead assured

bother to present indents for rations.

that whenever there were supplies for distribution the units would
be sent a proportion appropriate to the number of men listed in the
command (Second Report, p.30).

This practice of course was bound to

create

in

tremendous

distortions

the

store

records

for

it was

inevitable that the amount issued and the amount entitled would be
different.

In

combat

numbers change

rapidly as

reinforcements

arrive, men are incapacitated or killed and men are transferred.
The storekeeper, thus entered in his books as issued everything
that had been ascertained as the entitlement of the troops and for
which an authorised requisition had been made out.

The Quarter-

masters of the units to be supplied however, owing to the drop in
numbers

occasioned

by

battle

and

disease,

frequently

found

it

necessary not to draw all the rations to which they were entitled
and authorised to receive.

By making entries divorced from actual

issue serious, and what were to prove insurmountable, errors became
built into the store accounts.

The situation had deteriorated to

such a deplorable, and inextricable level that the Commissioners in
1856 recommended that the books of account for rations be closed off
and that no more time be spent on trying to explain errors.

They

saw the task of investigation and reconciliation of the errors as
not only fruitless but tremendously costly and serving no useful
purpose as there was insufficient evidence either to apportion blame
or institute punishment.
of

recovering

articles

Certainly there was little or no prospect
unaccounted

for

in

the

records

(Second

-51Report, p. 31).
Most,

if

not

Commissariat's

all,

store

of

the

accounts

deficiencies
by

the

disclosed

Commissioners

in

the

were

the

by-product of the turmoil of war, something which the peacetime
Disembarcation

regulations found difficult to always cope with.

peculiarities and difficulties were of particular concern to the
Commissioners
Commissariat

in

explaining

returns

disclosed

deficiencies
only

those

in

store

items

that

accounts.
had

been

removed from the ships in the harbour of Balaclava, many of which
never found their way to the Commissariat's store.

There was no

consideration in the books of the Commissariat of supplies still
afloat,

the

Commissariat

regarding

responsibility until unloaded.

these

as

none

of

their

The system of supply encouraged this

attitude, indeed made it mandatory. Supplies on the high seas were
the responsibility of the navy or the merchant vessel in which they
sailed whereas the Commissariat's responsibility extended only to
the shoreline.

Thus the reticence of the Commissariat in unloading

ships, preferring instead to let them float at anchor, mostly full
to the gunwhales, with their precious cargo (Russell 1858, p. 240).
Despite their position on stores afloat the Commissariat was
not above making issues from cargoes still aboard ship.
taken was

very often not entered

in the books

This cargo

as having been

received, yet when it was finally credited to the Commissariat it
"might in fact, have already been issued, wholly or in part" (First
Report, p. 8).

Stores that arrived without invoices distorted the

records even more for there was no established tally of the amounts
that arrived and no time for the understaffed Commissariat to count
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Commissariat

stores

added

to

the

Transporting supplies to

accounting

problems.

The

Commissioners went to great lengths to describe the difficulties
encountered by the Commissariat in transporting supplies from the
Because of the extreme shortage of fodder there were

wharves.

insufficient mules and horses to transport stores.

Thus goods taken

on charge by the Commissariat upon disembarcation would frequently
remain exposed to the weather to deteriorate (Godman to his father,
27

November

1854,

p.

94,

in

Warner

(Ed),

December 1854 in Goldsmith 1979, p. 30;

1977;

Sherrington,

Russell 1858, p. 240).

In

these circumstances it was to be expected that stock-in-store would
be

less

than

that

which

had

been

taken

monitoring and control of supplies was,

on

charge. .

Accurate

if not impossible, purely

coincidental.
To

a

significant

degree

then,

the

Royal

Commission

vindicated Leahy's earlier findings that the records of supplies
which relied on "lengthy abstracts are useless as checks on the
store accounts of the Commissariat

xx,

p.16).

"

(Second Report, Appendix

McNeil and Tulloch argued that reporting which was

prescribed within rigid lines needed to be softened with initiative.
Regulations, especially those operating in peace, could not hope to
meet the demands of war in the inflexible, narrowly oriented form in
which they took for the Commissariat.

Real or imagined punishments

for discrepancies in accounts, no matter how much the Commissariat's
officers quaked and trembled at the prospect, could not overcome the
polluting influences endemic to war.
could

only

but

increase

the

Threats of future chastisement

anxiety

and

inflexibility

of

the

Commissariat officers as they saw circumstances slipping beyond the
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area covered by regulations and predictability.
The miasma of errors in the accounts was compounded by the
emphasis

in

army

accounting

on

the

charge-discharge

form

Each supply officer was made accountable for all items

accounts.

that entered his store.

Once they left his store they were no

longer his concern and so he eliminated them from his books.
practice

of

led

to

the

curious

"habit of

writing

off

as

This

issues,

numerous supplies which had not been distributed to the troops, but
which had been merely transferred from the store at Balaclava to the
reserve store at Kadioki or to store ships in the harbour" (Second
Report,

p.31).

The . stores then,

for all

intents and purposes,

ceased to exist because they did not appear in the Commissariat's
records.

The storemen and Commissariat Officers appeared to use no

commonsense or initiative in the records they made.

Their one

concern, which overrode any considerations of providing a service
suited to the requirements of the situation, was to ensure they had
sufficient documentation or proof to cover themselves given, argued
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the "certainty of detection which
the

nature

of

the

accounts

afforded"27

(Evidence

before

the

Strathnairn Committee 1867, Question 2688, p.209).

The accounting

procedures

for

27.

drilled

Mere puffery in
findings.
The
expressed by the
of control which
of war.

into

the

men

responsible

supplies,

the light of the McNeil-Tulloch Commission's
accounts did however, have the potential
Chancellor if they were used within a system
realistically accommodated the circumstances

- 54 the majority of whom had little education outside that afforded by
their oftentimes brief Commissariat training under the Treasury 1 s
supervision, encouraged blind attention to detail, to the unthinking
application of rigid regulations designed to ensure control over the
minutest matters connected with stores and cash.

Any discrepancies

were made the liability of the storeman and issuing officer (see
Furse

1896,

p.84).

They

were

thus

"paralysed

by

visions

of

reckonings to come" (Edinburgh Review April 1855, p.566).
Given the accountability requirements of Parliament 28 it was
not

inconsistent

for

the

Commissariat

to

see

the

purpose

of

accounting records in terms of surveillance and stewardship and not
as

the

Meeting

means
the

to

facilitate

often

urgent

the

pursuance

requirements

of military victory.

necessary

for

the

very

existence of those engaged in battle was considered after Treasury
requirements had been met.

Evaluation of performance and discharge

did not consider anything outside that which could be disclosed in
reports stipulated by Treasury regulations.
The ostracised

position of

the Commissariat

from

the

army

composed as it was of civilians, 29 only served to reinforce the
callous attention to regulations and the ignoring of the pleas of
the combatants

(See Chadwick 1964,

in particular p.

134 for

a

discussion of the problems encountered when civilians and military
had to work together).

The

Commission found especially disturbing

the manner in which the army was dictated to by the Commissariat and
the resentment of the Commissariat towards enquiries and special
28.

See Chapter 4.

29.

The position of civilians
examined in Chapter 5.

in

military

administration

is
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requests.
not,

More often than not "the special wants of each corps were

therefore,

brought

(Commissariat)"

to

the

(Second Report,

notice

of

p . 30).

the

head

of

the

The Commission strongly

recommended that any practice that relegates the army to a role
subservient to the whims,
service

branches,

immediately

and

the
that

desires and regulations dominating the

Commissariat
the

in

Commissariat

this
be

case,
made

be

removed

sensitive

responsive to the demands of the forces in the field.

and

Even better

would be the addition "upon the staff of an army in the field (of)
an officer
the

supply of

whose duty it should be to devote his attention to
the

army"

(First

Report,

p.

14).

Further,

the

commanding officers were to be given the opportunity to ask for
supplies not merely told to sit and wait and be content with what
was

available

even

though

it

may

have

been

inappropriate

or

superfluous to their needs.

The evil created by this latter effect

of

the

cilvilian

control

Commissariat;

a

of

Commissariat

was

an

unburdened

by

army

Commissariat

ignorant
needs.

Consequently,
we suggest, that the commanding officers ... be informed,
at least once a month of the contents of the store
(Second Report, p. 30).
This noted the Commissioners had

"not been the practice of

the

British Army" (First Report, p. 7).
To envisage that the Commissariat identified itself with the
army and its struggle against suffering would be to gloss over the
antipathy felt by one for the other.

In addition, the army did not

supervise and assess the Commissariat, thus the army's criteria for
an

efficient

and

effective

Commissariat were

irrelevant

to

the

Commissariat Officer and his men, who saw the army as completely

- 56 separate and distinct from their own organisation.

The Roebuck

Committee regarded the system of military organisation with supply
and

finance controlled by civilians as the cause of much of the

difficulties experienced by the Commissariat for it did not afford
the Commissariat any opportunity
of becoming acquainted with the army, or of ministering to
its wants;
so that in a campaign the officers of this
department find themselves called upon to furnish supplies
in regard to which they have had no experience
( 1854-55 p. IX).
Indeed the position only worsened throughout the war as the ire
of the deprived soldiers became more intense and directed at the
Commissariat.

2.6

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
The

great

personal

responsibility

of

each

supply

officer,

discharged through his accounts, induced a state of mind not unlike
that required to participate in a game of
The Commissariat Off leer was

trained to

off ice as a turntable for supplies;

1

pass the hot potato 1 •

regard himself and his

a temporary repository that

received supplies from one direction and issued them in another;
policeman directing traffic:

a

"we were mere custodians of stores.

We were not supposed to have any knowledge of them, but merely the
care of keeping and accounting form them"

(Evidence of A. Gunn,

Commissariat Officer before the Strathnairn Committee 1867, Question
880, p. 51).
The seeming paradox presented by contemporaries at the front
of a very hard working but ineffective Commissariat can be explained
to a very large extent in terms of meticulous attention to the
forms and reports required by Treasury regulations (and ultimately

-57Parliament).

Not only was the Commissariat forced to muddle its way

through the goods as they arrived but also they had to deal with,
what

patently

was

to

clear

the

important part of their job, the mountains of paperwork.
words the Commissariat and the Treasury
'burned'

(see

subsequent

Ward

1957,

manuals,

displayed

a

In other

'fiddled' while the army

Early

p. 73).

most

the

Commissaries

supply

disproportionate

manuals,

and

concern

for

bookwork and correspondence in comparison to attention given to the
mechanics of supply.

"Yet that in itself",

admits Glover when

reflecting upon the 1796 supply manual of Havilland Le Mesurier,
"was the natural result of a system under which the Commissary was
so much more directly responsible to a Treasury which insisted ?n
accurate accounting than to a Commander-in-Chief who merely wanted
his men and horses

to be properly fed"

(1963,

p.257).

As the

military's banker and the Treasury's, and therefore Parliament's,
representative in the field it was above everything else the duty of
the Commissariat to
call to the attention of the officer commanding
every instance in which a payment may be authorised, at
variance with established regulations, or with any
particular direction of the Treasury Board, as well as to
report on the subject to the Trearsury
(Treasury
Regulations cited in Clode 1869, Volume I, p.195).
The

Commissariat

discharged

its

functions

firstly

Treasury, its real master, and not for the British Army.
unsatisfactory audit

result and

for

the

Fear of an

consequent Treasury disciplinary

measures proved to be the immediate motives in the actions of the
Commissariat.
a

well

fed

From the Commissariat-General down the advantages of
and

healthy

army

seem

to

Commissariat (see Moncrieff 1909, p.380).

have

been

lost

on

the
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The unsatisfactory state of the supply administration was not
the result of individual predispositions .

Rather, as alluded to by

the Secretary of State for War, Sidney Herbert, the unsatisfactory
state of the administration of supplies was very much the outcome of
the constitutional history of the army which resulted in Parliament
insisting that the army have little or nothing to do with its means
of maintenance.

It is therefore

the purpose of the next chapter to

examine those constitutional forces which were the major factor in
the development of the structure of financial control as exercised
by Parliament over the army, which applied during the Crimean War
and throughout the latter half of the 19th century.

CHAPTER

CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROL

OF

3

SECURI TV
THE

AND

ARMY

Our God and soldiers we alike adore
Ever at the brink of danger;
Not before;
After deliverance, both alike requited
Our God's forgotten and our soldiers slighted.
Francis Quarles 1592-1655
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INTRODUCTION
------The

purpose

of

this

chapter

is

to

detail

constitutional

factors which were to convince Parliament it should be omnipotent in
military finance

and

which

influenced Parliament

controlled military finance.

in the way it

Understanding the controls exercised

over military spending requires firstly awareness of the motives
underlying control.
The

thesis

Means assume knowledge of ends.

of

this

chapter

a

well

developed and

traditionally had

is

that

the

British

entrenched

people

suspicion

of

standing armies (See for example Prince Albert to Lord Clarendon,
September 17,

1855,

Pannure Papers 1908,

p. 393).

This national

anxiety in the presence of a standing army was the outcome of both
the actions of a vigorous military presence during the Civil War
(1642) and the surreptitious build-up of a large army by James II
for his own purposes.
Throughout the period under examination, aversion to standing
armies

reflected

indication

of

the

constitutional
supposed

apprehensions

financial

but

profligacy

was

more

of armies.

an
Sir

Francis Head in 1850 alluded to these two abiding principles upon
which

the

announced,

Nation

regarded

its

army:

"I

have

inherited",

"a good old English hatred to the standing army;

he
the

thing I tell Ye, is unconstitutional and besides this, I cannot and
will not afford it". (Quoted in Sweetman 1971(b), p.75.)
Discussion in this chapter will firstly establish that by the
19th century Britain had a long standing and well ingrained fear of
standing armies, especially in peace.
encouraged county militia as

a

As a consequence, Parliament

counterbalance

to

any

potential
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In addition, given Britain's

threat imposed by a standing army.

and National caution in dealings

insular position geographically,
with the Army,

the Navy was

to rise as the pre-eminent service

carrying not only the great bulk of the responsibility for defence
but also the Nation's affection.
The remainder of the chapter then examines:

the role of 17th

century constitutional struggles in shaping the prevailing national
attitude of distrust towards the army;

the 19th century obsession

with military economy and, during the vigorous colonial expansion of
the late 19th century, the increased acceptance of a strong military
presence.

3.2

DISTRUST OF STANDING ARMIES
English government prior to the 17th century differed quite

markedly

from

its

European

monarchical authority.

counterparts

in

the

nature

of

its

In both France and Prussia royal authority

was a product not so much of the professed divinity of the king, as
more the extent and loyalty of the army
Trevelyan 1960, p.19;
strength

of

the

(see El ton 1963,

Clode 1869, Vol.I, p.387).

English

Crown

in

the

early

p. 42;

In contrast, the
17th

century

was

determined less by force and more by the weight of accumulated law
and cherished custom which together undergirded royal prerogatives:
it was government by "influence"
p.535;
p. 402).

see

Barnett

Still,

it

throughout history,

1970,
has

p. 71;

been

(Edinburgh Review October 1854,
Elton

argued

1963,

that

p.42,

military

pp.168-169,
force

has,

been so pervasive that "no community of any

-62degree

of

complexity

(Howard 1978, p. 11).

has

succeeded

in

existing without

force"

The manner in which this force is harnessed

and controlled, of course, has an overwhelming bearing on the nature
of the society in which it resides.
stability

have

always

depended

Indeed, social and political
upon

clarification

the

of

constitutional position of the armed forces (Howard 1978, p.12; Wade
1977. p.379).
Parliament had consistently regarded armies on English soil,
because of the army's sworn allegiance to the ruling Monarch as
Commander, as a potential threat to Parliament's sometimes uncertain
position

in

the

government of

the nation and an

inducement

to

extravagance (Edinburgh Review, Vol. cxxxiii, January to April 1871,
p. 240; See "Observations of Lord Pannure", February 1855, Pannure
Papers 1908,

p. 46).

This apprehension,

still maintained

within

Parliament, was declared in the Commons in the early 19th century by
George Fox who noted that while he respected the army

he was not

prepared to
sacrifice to them that jealousy which it is the
duty of the House of Commons to entertain of every set of
men so immediately connected with the Crown. To the Crown
they must look for promotion;
by the Crown they may be
dismissed . . .
Such being the situation of all Military
Officers, they are fit and necessary objects of the
jealousy and vigilance of the House . . . (Quoted in Cl ode
1869, Vol.I, pp.271-272).
While armies raised for war on the Continent or elsewhere were
seen as necessary, the presence of a large standing army in England
during

peace

apprehension

could
by

a

only

be

Parliament

regarded
jealous

suspiciously
of

its

own

and
hard

with
won

prerogatives of government ("Observation of Lord Panmure", Panmure

-63Pape!:§ February 1855, p. 46;

Cabinet Memorandum of Sidney Herbert

November 16, 1859 in Stanmore 1906, p. 220).

An army in peace, an

army with little to occupy its time and energies, was viewed askance
by

Parliament,

ever

worried

about

the

machinations

of a

Crown

resentful and reflective of its long lost hegemony in government
(see Trevelyan 1960, pp.54-55).

A standing army in peace was seen

as fatal to liberty ''when there is no other employment for them, but
" (Sir Thomas Hanmer,

to insult and oppress their fellow subjects
a speech to Parliament, December 6, 1717).
Armies are by nature aggressive;

they are the aggregation of

the means of great violence, and Parliament, after the Revolution,
was intent on ensuring this innate aggression was never. unleashed
against

the Nation.

The

soldier,

according to General Fuller,

aroused suspicions because "his calling is negation of justice, of
freedom,

of loving kindness, and of reason"

( 1935, p. 4).

ever armies existed in peace it would cause,
Morrice,

"a

perpetual

trembling

in

the

wrote Sir William

nation,

inconsistent with the happiness of any kingdom";
absurdity (quoted in Cl ode 1869, Vol.

I, p. 53;

While

for

they

are

they were an
See Dean Swift,

On Public Absurdities in England 1718, quoted in Omond 1933, p. 42).
Similarly,

Commons had resolved in January 1673 that a standing

army could be nothing other than "a great grievance and vexation to
the people" (Quoted in Clode 1869, vol.I, p.62). Fletcher of Saltoun
in his published treatise A Discourse on Government with Relation to
Militias (1698) referred to the unease felt by the Nation "when a
. standing mercenary army is kept up in time of peace; for he that is
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armed is always master of him that is unarmed"
1933, p.46).

(Quoted in Omond

In addition there were:

lesser inconveniences attesting a Standing Army, such as
frequent
Quarrels,
Murders
and
Robberies
the
influencing of Elections of Parliament by an artificial
distribution of Quarters
the Insolence of Off ice rs,
and the Debaucheries that are committed by them and their
Souldiers
to the ruin of Multitudes of Women,
Dishonour to their families . . . add a numerous train of
Mischiefs besides, almost endless to enumerate
(An
Argument showing that a standing army is inconsistent with
a free government, and absolutelx destructive to the
Constitution of the English Monarchy, J. Trenchard &
W. Moyle 1697, as cited in Miller 1946, p.306).
The

Army

preoccupied

to

at

war

in

Europe,

be

introduced

into

or
the

elsewhere,
domestic

was

far

plottings of

too
a

reminiscent monarch or to concede to its own boredom.
The attitude of the Nation to a standing peacetime army was
keenly expressed in 1718 when the annual Mutiny Act attempted to
increase the standing army to 16,347 men.

Opposition was immediate,

intense and vehement on the grounds that the dissenters to this
action were unable, in any way, to satisfy themselves
from whence the necessity should arise; the kingdom being
now
in full peace, without any just apprehension,
either of Insurrections at Home or Invasions from Abroad
(Sweetman, 1971, p. 54).
The dissenters were especially concerned because
so numerous a Force is near double to what hath ever been
allowed within this kingdom by authority of Parliament, in
times of public tranquility; and being, as we conceive no
ways necessary to support may, we fear, endanger our
Constitution ... (Sweetman 1971, p. 54).

-65So despised and derided was the Army that not until 1794, as a
response to the war with France, was a minister appointed who was
specifically

responsible

for

affairs. 1

military

Despite

the

pressures of the French war the moves for a separate off ice for
military affairs, as existed in the admirali ty, were to the last
often strenuously opposed.
concerning

the

established,

suggestion

rejected

apprehension:

Dundas writing to Pitt, on July 9, 1794,
a

separate

idea

out

of

ministry

hand

because

of

war

be

of

public

"a War Minister as a separate Department

on

recollection

the

that

cannot exist in this country",

it would not be

"possible to persuade the public that a separate Department can be
necessary"

(Rose

1914,

p.271).

For

similar reasons ·the Nation

refused , prior to 1793, to re-create the off ice of Commander-inChief in a perpetual form.

Instead,

as each emergency arose the

off ice of Commander-in-Chief was brought out and dusted down for the
occasion

and

then

later

returned

to

hibernate

until

the

next

emergency .
Suspicions that the army would be used to subvert the Nation's
liberty involved not only the role of the Crown.

The Civil War

( 1642-1660) incontrovertibly opened the eyes of the nation to the
fact that anyone, commoner or royalty, might be able to pull the
army

along

in

their

Commander-in-Chief

1.

train

could

as

and

for

easily

their

own

operate

Colonies was added to the portfolio in 1801.

purposes.
as

a

locus

The
of
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militaristic fervour as any monarch, drawing to himself the loyalty
normally directed to the Crown and the authority that should only be
Parliament's (See Lord Wharton's comments in the Lords' debate of
the 1724 Mutiny Bill, quoted in Clode 1869, Vol.I, p.336).

By the

close of the 18th century fears of a rogue Commander-in-Chief had
been tempered.

With

the declaration of war

by France against

England in 1793 the office of Commander-in-Chief was revived and
continued until finally abolished in favour of a General Staff in
1904.
Later armies knew only too well
absence

of

trust and the

and felt

suspicion of

most keenly

the nation

(Northbrook Committee, 3rd Report 1870, p. ix;

towards

the
them

See the comments of

an anonymous officer in 1825 as quoted in Sweetman 1971(b), p. 47).
Aversion to a standing peacetime army did not signify that
Commons

and

action.

the

Rather,

Nation

never

be

Magazine, Vol.
usually

pacifist

a

constitutionally safe,

threat

to

LXXIX, February

referred

rigidly

in

philosophy or

both preferred a means of military action that

could be regarded as
could

were

to

as

the

liberty
1856,

(See

and which

therefore

Blackwoods

Edinburgh

p.233).

Only the militia,

'Constitutional

precondition (see Trevelyan 1960, p.55).

Force',

met

this

In 1673 Sir Henry Capel

expressed in the Commons his admiration for the militia, arguing
that "Our security is the militia:

that will defend us and never

conquer us" (quoted in Plumb 1967, p.33).
and supervision

of

the militia was

Statute of Winchester

The conduct, raising

regulated,

in

turn,

by the

( 1285) and the Militia Act of 1558 which

- 67 created an obligation for all men 16 to 60 to serve in the country
militia (Barnett 1970,
p.359;

Gordon 1935,

p.23;

p.

El ton 1963,

9:

Quarterly Review Vol.

p.12;

October 1871, p. 543) . 2

Western 1965,

131, July and

The mi Ii tia was pref erred because it was

locally raised and therefore, under the control of the local gentry,
of

whom Commons was

largely constituted,

who used their social

authority to ensure the pliability and docility of the militia (see
Plumb 1967, p. 42; Elton 1963, p. 173;

Western 1965, p. 323).

The

gentry could be clearly seen to owe "their allegiance rather to the
ins ti tut ions of the country in Church and State, as established,
than to the king seeking to overthrow them"

( Clode 1869, Vol. I,

see also Trenchard & Moyle 1697, p.21, cited in Miller 1946,

p.36;
p.310).

The militia seemed to be favoured by Parliament because it was
inefficient

and

increasingly

ineffective

in

armed

combat

and

therefore a most unlikely threat to Parliament 3 (Western 1965, pp.
72-73).

European wars in the 17th century had shown militia were no

match for well trained standing armies (see Trevelyan 1960, p.56),
an argument presented by those supporting a standing army. Daniel
Defoe drew his readers 1
Gospel,

attention to how "War

Men must be set apart for it

qualification of a Soldier than formerly,
Principle

(sic)

Art of War"

Standing Armies in England

is now like the

Courage is now less a
Management is the

(A Brief Reply to the History of
1698, cited in Miller 1946, p. 307).

2.

For a detailed history of the constitutional role and
development of the militia see Clode 1869, Vol. I, pp. 31-36.

3.

"The militia looked ridiculous whenever it took the
(Western 1965, p. 53).

field"

-68Even if the Crown succeeded in gaining the backing of the militia in
its mischievous schemes the paucity of the material available would
almost ensure any plans would come to nought.

To ensure this, ever

watchful of any collectives of organised force, Parliament tended to
keep the militia starved of money (see Western 1965, pp. 441-442).
The Preamble to the 1786 Militia Act reiterated the importance
of a military force under the command of officers possessing landed
property

within

Great

Britain

as

being

"essential

to

the

cons ti tu ti on" (Quoted in the Edinburgh Review Vol. CXXXII I January
to April

1871,

p.

211).

The

militia

was

counterbalance to the army's military might:
the

nation's

citizens

armed

and

trained

commonly

seen as

a

with a large part of
for

battle,

however

inefficient they may be, the army would have to include overcoming
possible militia opposition in any plans they may have had to usurp
national liberty and Parliamentary authority (see A letter from a
By-Stander to a Member of Parliament as referred to in Western 1965,
p. 112).
To Parliament an efficient and effective fighting force was a
potential source of the means of oppression and tyranny, especially
if located on English soil.

By the mid-19th century The Edinburgh

Review regarded this apprehension as "excessive"
1855,

p.

565).

(Vol . CI, April

There thus arose a curious paradox,

apparently

acceptable to the majority of society,

of political security and

desirable

was

military

inefficiency which

to

dog

the

army and

Britain in the 19th century (Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine, November
1857, p. 575;

The Contemporary Review, December 1886, p. 766).

The

-69country was prepared to tolerate this curious position arguing, as
the Times, that "Our free cons ti tut ion is a source to us both of
strength and weakness.

The strength is perpetual,

the weakness

periodical" (February 11, 1854). Parliamentary political supremacy,
military amateurism and inefficiency thus became synonymous
Anderson 1967, p.7;

(see

see Prince Albert's criticism of inefficiency

and amateurism, Prince Albert to Lord Clarendon, September 17, 1855
Panrnure Papers 1908, p. 393).

This paradox led Lord Salisbury to

announce,

in

Constitutio~

p.

85).

curious

do

"I

not

believe

the

perfection

of

the

British

as an instrument of War" (1900, Quoted in Ehrman 1969,

Indeed, it proved exceedingly di ff icul t to uncouple this
triumvirate

suspicion

of

even

standing

when
armies

the

motives

for

de-emphasised

parliamentary
constitutional

uncertainties in preference for concern over military economies.

As

long as the Army remained subordinate to the National Will it could
of course only be efficient if the Nation gave adequate provision to
ensure efficiency (Amery Vol.2 1902, p.44; Quarterly Review Vol.
199, January to April 1904, p. 40).
The preference for amateurism in the international military
arena

was

not

as

obtuse

as

it

may now appear,

for

England's

separation from the European continent by the channel provided
barrier of space and time (Howard 1978,
pp.357-364).

p.13;

a

see Elton 1963,

Britain had, in the event of threat of invasion, time

to raise an opposing force;

time provided by the breadth of the

channel and the imposing wall of ships that could be summoned and

-70mustered in and around Britain ' s shores (See Trenchard and Moyle
1697, pp.18-20, cited in Miller 1946, p.311; Edinburgh Review Vol.
It was "not to be taken for

CLXI January to April 1885, p. 177).
granted", remarked Sir Thomas Hanmer,

that if we dismiss our soldiers, we shall therefore leave
ourselves naked, and void of all protection against any
sudden danger that may arise ... Providence has given us
the best protection
Our situation is our natural
protection; our fleet is our protection
(Speech in the
Commons on December 6, 1717).
The British felt comfortable in the 'splendid isolation' that
their

wooden

wall

of

defence

provided

("Observations

Panmure", February 1855, Panmure Papers 1908, p. 46).

of

Lord

Unlike its

European neighbours hemmed in by potentially and actively dangerous
countries and therefore obsessed with military might (Einzig 1959,
p.30;

Omond

1933,

comparatively,

p.

5),

Britain

afford

to

adopt,

a neglectful attitude towards its army (Blackwoods

Edinburgh Magazine November 1857,
relecting

could

upon

the

relative

p. 575).

political

Florence Nightingale,

tranquility

of

England,

remarked on returning home from Europe in November 1838 how that "at
home in England changes and revolutions are like storms one only
hears" (cited in Woodham-Smith 1977, p.27). Upon the announcement of
an increase in the Naval Estimates from £19rn to (22m in the 1896-97
budget

Lord

Goschen,

then

First

Lord

of

the

Admirality

and

previously Chancellor of the Exchequer, sought to deflect criticism
by England's main rivals by reminding them of England's peculiar
defence requirements. Accordingly,

-71Foreign Countries should not compare these estimates with
what they spent on their navies.
They must consider
comparatively what they spent on their armies;
because
the squadrons we sent to sea were the corps d'armee that
we placed on our frontiers, as they placed corps d'armee
upon theirs (Quoted in Elliot 1911, pp.207-208).
Thus, opposition to a standing army can be viewed in terms of
glaring self interest and economic sense:

it was better to have an

inexpensive, though ineffective militia, and devote more resources
to a constitutionally benign but aggressively potent navy 4 than run
the constitutional gauntlet of a large standing army. 5
always be time to arm and supplement the militia.

There would

As a consequence,

the Nation "never looked upon the Army as a force which was to be
kept

available

for

foreign

aggression"

("Observations

of

Lord

Panmure" February 1855, Panmure Papers 1908, p.46).
Impatience throughout the Nation with a defence policy which
continued to rely very greatly on the navy at the expense of the
army steadily grew towards the late 19th century.

In particular as

international squabbles increased and steam ships, which could cross
the channel in an hour independent of prevailing winds, became the
norm for all navies dissatisfaction grew (Edinburgh Rev-iew October
1895,

p.

539;

The

Contemporary

Fortnightly Review No. CCLII,
Edinburgh Review Vol.

Review

December

1886,

New Series, December 1887,

CLXXXV,

April

1897,

p.

509;

p.

763;

p. 746;

Westminster

Review Vol CXXVIII, April to December 1887, p. 154).

4.

"Our Navy must be our first and greatest defence" wrote Sidney
Herbert in a confidential Memorandum to Cabinet, December 13
1859 as (cited in Stanmore Vol II 1906, p. 274).

5.

Firm belief in a strong navy was still evident at the end of
the period of this study (See S.C.G. 1903, p.459), but now in
conjunction with demands for a strong army to meet the possible
threat of the new navies of America, Germany, France, and

Russia (S.C.G. 1903, p.460).
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THE ARMY AND THE 17TH CENTURY CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE

3.3.1

The Petition of Right
The ever present fear of Parliament of a large, brooding army

loyal to the Crown was openly expressed in the Pe ti ti on of Right
presented to Charles I

The Petition,

in 1628.

which El ton has

branded "as futile a document as even constitutional struggles have
ever thrown up"

( 1974, p .160),

involved in

long constitutional

the

brought into the open the issues
struggle

between Crown

and

Parliament which had simmered since Magna Carta and which derived
from differing beliefs on the authority of the Crown.
kept alive the mutual distrus.t

James I had

of Crown and Parliament with his

treatise on kingship, True Law of Free Monarchies, which expressed
in some detail his belief in an absolute monarchy founded on the
principles of divine right.

The King (or Queen) in James' view was

answerable only to God, he was above all law for "a good King will
frame all his actions according to the law, yet he is not bound
thereto but of his good will and for good example to his subjects"
(quoted in Williams 1965, p.39). Fortuitously for James the monarch,
again in his view, also had the divine right to control taxation.
James' monograph greatly alarmed Commons.

The opinion held by

Commons and the framers of the Petition of Right,

most notably

Edward Coke, in contrast stressed the moral and legal supremacy of
the Common Law of England over both Sovereign and Parliament (see
White 1979, p. 224 in particular). Matters came to a head and the
Commons,
working

which had found
relationship

with

it increasingly difficult to develop a
James

I's

abrasive

and

tactless

Charles I (see Einzig 1959, p.57), became apprehensive when

son

Charles

-73in 1628 declared that a state of martial law existed throughout the
country.

Charles

soldiers

returning

rescue

the

usual,

billeted

took
from

Huguenots.
in

this

step to facilitate

the

Isle

The

returning

households

de

around

Rhe

the

expedition

soldiers
the

sent

were,

of
to

as

was

Billeting

country.

however, had always been resented by both commoner and
alike (see Trevelyan 1960, p. 55):

control

aristocrat

few householders looked forward

with relish to the prospect of entertaining for an indeterminate
period, an army of men who were
the most drunken and probably the worst man of the trade
or profession to which he belongs (Wellington, Dispatches
V pp.592-3, quoted in Hanham 1969, p359;
see also
Woodham-Smith 1977, p.117). 6
Wealthy

citizens

could

escape

the

rigors

of

billeting

by

payments to the Crown in lieu (for examples, see Clode 1869, p.19
and p.61).

Consequently, billeting was seen by Parliament not so

much as a convenient and inexpensive way of housing troops as a
devious, coercive measure to exert royal pressure on those reluctant
to grant loans and benevolences to the Crown

(see Einzig 1959,

p. 52). 7

The Petition of Right in 1628 called upon the King to rescind
his

martial

law proclamation,

which had

effectively meant

that

civilians were under the authority of the military, and withdraw all
soldiers from their billets.
Act were to brand martial

Later, dissenters to the 1718 Military
law as

"unknown to our Cons ti tut ion,

6.

It was not
empty the
country of
in Wheeler

uncommon for the army when in need of recruits to
prisons and taverns and to "scour both town and
rogues and vagabonds" (Barnaby Rich 1587, as quoted
1914, p.5; see also General Fuller 1935, p. 6).

7.

Clode called billeting the "greatest social
by the people" (quoted in Gordon 1935, p.147).

evil

endured

-74destructive of our Liberties, not endured by our Ancestors and never
mentioned in any of our Statutes but to condemn it".

The 1718

antagonists were also especially concerned at the temptation of any
army, during a period of martial law, to strip others "of all the
Rights and Privileges which render People of this Realm the Envy of
other Nations".
Coincident with its demands concerning the army the Petition
also

required

Charles

I

to

recognise

Parliament's

exclusive

authority in all matters of finance:
... no tallage or aid shall be paid or levied by the King
or his heirs in this realm, without the ... authority of
Parliament . . . (for by) good laws and statutes of this
realm, your subjects have inherited this freedom, that
they should not be compelled to contribute to any tax,
tallage, aid or other like charge, not set by common
consent in Parliament.
Unfortunately for Parliament the tentative expression of its intent
and belief found in the Petition of Right achieved very little in
the way of executive recognition of Parliament's financial powers.
Before

the

issue

of

financial

control

was

finally

settled

in

Parliament's favour another sixty years were to pass and the country
was to endure a civil war and a revolution.

3.3.2

Civil War and the

Interre~

During the rebellion by Parliament against the Crown in 1642 a
large and well led army was raised by Parliament.

This army proved

so effective that not only did it successfully deny victory to
Charles' forces but by 1647, under Cromwell, it. had become the most
powerful estate of the realm (Williams 1965, p.71;

Barnett 1970,

-75p.102). 8

However,

at

the

cessation

of

hostilities

in

1647

Parliament discovered that it had created a monster, in the form of
the army, that threatened to devour its master (see Churchill 1962,
Vol.II, p.210).
victorious

It was astutely realised, but too late, that "a

army,

out

of

assume power over their
quoted

in

Williams

imployment,

Principals"

1965,

is

very

to

(A contemporary observer as
Parliament

p.75).

inclinable

soon

saw

it

had

placed itself in a position no less unfavourable than that of the
From 1647 to 1660 the military were supreme in the land

king.

(Barnett 1970, p.102).
During the Interregnum the army evolved a character peculiar to
itself

and

divorced

from

Constitutional

traditional structure and habits

history

and · from

of English society

the

(See Prince

Albert to Lord Clarendon, September 17, 1855, Panmure Papers 1908,
p. 393).

Cromwell was only too well aware of the exposed position

of the army and attempted,
marshal!

behind

him

a

though manifestly unsuccessfully,

durable

base

of

to

support and acceptance.

Despite his efforts at no time was Cromwell able to successfully
masquerade

the army as

history and life.

constitutionally compatible with

English

He was unable to give the army chameleon like

qualities to enable it to meld into the social fabric or to gain the
army acceptance as a beloved ins ti tu ti on. 9

In the meantime the

public became the army's hawkeyed adversary.

8.

Davies refers to the New Model Army as "a political force of
the first magnitude" (1954, ~· 26).

9.

In 1857 Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine could still confidently
pronounce that "The army can never become among us more than an
adjunct to our national institutions - a mere excrescence

growing out of them" (Vol.LXXXII, November. 1857, p.5891).

-76Cromwell's most outlandish attempt at integrating the army into
national

life and the nation's conscience was his

Government (1653) (Gardiner 1906, p . 504).
the sham Rump Parliament,

Instrument of

Whereas Parliament , even

refused to acknowledge the need for a

standing army and to allow financial provision for its maintenance,
the

Instrument of Government clearly established the army as an

integral

feature,

if

not

society and government.

the

essential

institution

Section XXVII declared

of

"that a

English
constant

yearly revenue shall be raised ... for maintaining of 10000 horse
and

dragoons,

and

20000

foot

..." .

Cromwell aggravated the

population even more when he divided local government into eleven
districts under the direct control of Major-Generals.

Unfortunately

these military districts bore little resemblance to the traditional
rustic structure and county loyali ties of English country

life.

Country gentry were forced to stand aside and let the army take over
their position of influence and leadership in their local community
(see Trevelyan 1960,

p .14).

Meanwhile,

Cromwell declared himself
I

'Lord Protector of the Commonweal th of England'

yet was widely

regarded not as a protector but a substitute absolute ruler whose
authority rested not on custom and statute but on the very much less
acceptable exercise of naked violence and threat. The Civil War had
not set out to destroy the institution of the monarchy, let alone
replace it with what was regarded as an offensive deformity in the
shape of the military (see Barnett 1970, p.107;
pp. 71-85).

Williams 1965,

"Is this the liberty which we claim to vindicate by

shedding our blood?", queried the Earl of Essex, " . .. Posterity will

-77say

that

to

deliver

them

from

the

yoke

of

the

king we

have

subjugated them to that of the common people" (quoted in Williams
1965, p.72).
The 'common people' referred to by the Earl of Essex were the
officers of Cromwell's army who represented a complete break with
tradition.
lower

Commissions in Cromwell's army were dominated by the

classes on

century.

a

scale never

to

be

repeated

until

the

20th

At the time, and later, it was argued that the inherent

poverty of these members of the now ascendant lower orders made the
army especially dangerous.

Because the New Model Army's men were

poor they had a strong interest in remaining in the paid employ of
the army (Quarterly Review Vol. 129, July to October 1870, p. 246).
Therefore, there arose concerted resistance within the army against
attempts by Parliament to disband the army. 10
John Lilburne, a leader of the Levellers, decried Cromwell's
reign (for which he was subsequently imprisoned):
I had rather chuse to live seven years under old King
Charles
than live one year under this present
Government that now rule: nay let me tell you, If they go
on with that tyranny they are in, they will make Prince
Charles have friends enow, not only to cry him up but also
really to fight for him . . .
(Quoted in Gregg 1961,
p.283).

10. The purchase system which ensured an aristocratic officer class,
did not however, have these constitutional disadvantages.
The
abandonment of purchase in army commissions in 1870 brought on a
rash of articles, some of which again alluded to the danger of
employing officers from the lower classes because the army would
be their "sole object in life" (See the Edinburgh Review Vol.
CXXXIII, January to April 1871, p. 239).

-78The Civil War and its military dictatorship aftermath etched
indelibly
national

on

English

minds

army harnessed

Gordon 1935, p.24).

the

by a

potential

despot

for

oppression

(see Trevelyan 1960,

by

a

p. 55;

As a consequence the army in Britain became

an exotic
unknown to the old Consti tu ti on of the
country;
required or supposed to be required, only for
the defence of its foreign possessions; disliked by the
inhabitants, particularly of the higher orders, some of
whom never allow one of their family to serve in it . . .
The officers and soldiers of the army are an object of
dislike
and
suspicion
to
the
inhabitants ... ,
(Wellington, Dispatches V, pp.592-3, Memorandum on 22
April 1829 as quoted in Hanham 1969, p.359; also see
Barnett 1970, p.110).
3.3.3

The Revolutionary Settle•ent of 1689
Demands for the return of the monarchy, despite the Civil War

still a much loved institution, 11 saw the restoration of the Stuarts
to the throne in 1660.

Charles II, son of Charles I, sought to

restore England to its previous position of greatness by promoting
commerce, science and the navy.
succeeded him,
exclusive

However, his brother James II, who

through his persistent challenges to Parliament's

right

to

levy

taxation

and

to

appropriate

the

revenue, and his religious views, ensured the demise of the Stuart
monarchy.
James II, unable to pay for a large army from Parliamentary
grants, had directed "money for and to the use of the Crown by
Pretence of Prerogative for other time and in other manner than the
same was granted by Parliament ... " (Declaration of Right, 1689).

11.

Churchill argues the king was loved not only for his position
as monarch but because, even in revolution, of the conviction
that "law in his name was the sole foundation ... of all law"
(Churchill 1962, Vol. III, p. 212).

-79He had taken money destined for the militia and the navy (see Gordon
1935, p.233) and by stealth, had raised and maintained a large army
of 34,000 men by 1688;

an army which, according to Barnett, "badly

frightened the nation - far more than Cromwell's.
plainly designed to coerce" (1970, p.122;
Gordon 1935, p.25;

It has been so

also Einzig 1959, p.119;

Clode 1869, Vol.I, p.25 and p.54}.

The army was

far larger than any previous monarch had been able to maintain in
peace and thus a far more dangerous portent of arbitrary autocratic
power based on military intimidation.
Consequently, the Bill of Rights sworn to by William and Mary
of Orange, categorically denounced monarchy devoid of Parliamentary
control:

(Almighty God)

Arbitrary Power".
Parliament

deliver "this kingdom from ·Popery and

The Bill of Rights established the authority of

once

and

for

all

constitutional monarchy.
and

Parliament

over

the

Crown

by

establishing a

The king was now a servant of the State

henceforth

"was

free

to

harry

ministries, cut supplies, refuse taxation

monarchs,

topple

" (Plumb 1967, p. 73;

see also Trevelyan 1960, p.133, and p.164).
To "secure the Rights and Liberties of the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal

and

Commons"

from

being

invaded

and

overpowered

by

military force the incumbents to the throne were made to agree, as a
condition of their assumption of the monarchy, that Parliament was
supreme in law making and that only Parliament could raise an army
(Bill of Rights as quoted in the Quarterly Review Vol. 146, July to
October 1878,

p.

237;

see also the Quarterly Review Vol.

January to April 1904, p. 40}.

189

To circumvent any tendency towards

forgetfulness or laxity on the part of the monarchy in the matter of

-80authority over armed forces,
Crown was

each year 12 in the Mutiny Act the

required in the opening to that Act to reaffirm its

allegiance to the principle of parliamentary control of the army as
enunciated in the Bill of Rights (1689 1 William and Mary c. 5 & 6
S.R.55). 13

The annual Mutiny Act 14 also represented, in part, the

ultimate compromise reached between Crown and Parliament in the
contest for control of the army.

The army became a constitutional

force, though not a Parliamentary Army, whose existence depended on
votes of supply made by Parliament.

Its loyalty however, remained

the province of the monarch until the 19th century (1870). 15
A cornerstone of the British Cons ti tut ion in the late 17th
century was therefore the supremacy of Parliament in all matters
related to the administration, though not command, of the army.

12.

Section VII I of the first Mutiny Act in 1689 stipulated the
annual provision.

13.

The Mutiny Act required the monarch to affirm "it is illegal
for the Queen [King] to keep a standing army in time of peace".
(See Wilson 1973, p. 50).

14.

The Mutiny Acts ceased in 1879 to be replaced by the Army Act
from 1881 (Phillips and Jackson 1978, p. 347).

15.

This was seen as a great strength because by taking command of
the army from the Parliament it could never become an
instrument in Parliamentary tyranny:
"Once allow the command
of the Army to pass out of the hands of the Crown ... and the
Army becomes a Parliamentary Army and would become dangerous to
the State" (Duke of Cambridge to Queen Victoria quoted in
Wilson 1973, p. 51).
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3.4

The 18th century marks the grudging acceptance by the nation of
a standing peacetime army, although not the total allay of suspicion
(Quarterly Review, Vol. 129 July to October 1870, p. 250). A closer
relationship emerged between army and Parliament with civil-military
antagonism derived less from constitutional issues and more from
administrative

disagreements,

particularly

1969' p .186).

In the 19th century attitudes toward the army were

shaped by a complexity of influences:

over

money

(Roseveare

constitutional, political,

moral, class and economic.
There still remained in the 19th century a lurking and what
might be regarded as paranoic antipathy towards the army derived
from

constitutional

fears

(See

Blackwoods

Edinburgh

Magazine,

Vol.LXXXII, Nov. 1857, p.575;

Fortnightly Review, Vol. CCXCIV, New

Series, June 1 1891, p. 858).

The appointment, for example, of Sir

Redvers

Buller,

a

general

in

the

British Army,

to

a

civilian

position in Ireland in 1886 created great consternation, with many
regarding

the

appointment

as

"a

standing

innovation

in

Constitution, a serious blow to civil and religious liberty"

our
(as

summarised by Lord Randolph Churchill 1886, in Churchill 1906, p.
142).

Recognising the civilian lordship of the army as found in

Parliament's

authority,

and

representative

the

Secretary-at-War,

Lord Hardinge in 1832 indicated with satisfaction that
the Secretary-at-War is in a constitutional point of view,
the proper person to draw up the Mutiny Bill ...
He is
bound to stand between the civil subject and the military,
and it is his duty to see that the civil part of the
community are properly protected ... (Referred to by the
Hartington Commission 1890, p.XXIV).

-82In the 19th century the Nation appeared unable to free itself
completely of the spectre of rampant military might in Britain.
Soldiers were not permitted in the House of Commons, unless a member
or a witness, until August 1855.

Further, use of the army to quell

internal rebellion, as at Preston in 1842, only served to add fuel
to radical fervour opposed to a peacetime army on any terms.

The

army was commonly seen as a pawn of the ruling classes and an
instrument

to

oppress

working

men

and

deny

them

reform

"Observations of Lord Panmure on Military Organisation",
Papers February 1855, p. 46;

Sweetman 1971(b), p . 83;

(See

Panmure

for further

examples and comments see Clode 1869, Vol.II, pp.152-155).

Between

1846 and 1856 the army was called upon to aid civil authorities on
fifty five occasions (British Parliamentary Papers 1856 ( 126) L.
pp.522-523).
Recommendations of
abolition

of

the

post

the Hartington
of

Commission

Commander-in-Chief,

(1890),

and

namely

allowing

one

minister complete control over the army in all matters, still had
the capacity to resurrect old antipathies.

The Prime Minister,

Campbell-Bannerman, rejected the suggestions of the commission on
the ground that they amounted to an unwarranted extension of the
military presence when England was at

peace

(Campbell-Bannerman

quoted in Ehrman 1969, pp. 17-18).
Fear of the Crown usurping Parliament's authority with the aid
of

the

army

had

however,

become

a

pitiable

anachronism,

an

'absurdity', by the mid 19th century ("Observations of Lord Panmure"
February 1855, Panmure Papers 1908, p. 47).

By the middle of the

19th century for many of the middle and upper classes the greatest
threat to the constitution as it stood was certainly not fear of a

-83renegade sovereign deploying the army for their own ends. Instead,
the extension of the suffrage beyond the middle classes loomed on
the horizon as the single greatest threat. 16
and Walter Bagehot wrote of the
Houghton 1957, pp.55-56).
his

book

The

English

Both John Stuart Mill

' tyranny of the majority'

(See

In the Preface to the second edition of
Constitution

Bagehot

drew

his

readers'

attention to the danger of "a political combination of the lower
classes geared as it needs to be to their own objects".

This "evil

of the first magnitude" would mean that the lower classes would be
"supreme in the country; and that their supremacy, in the state they
now are,

means

the supremacy of

numbers over knowledge".
(Fortnl..ghtly Review,

Vol.

ignorance over instruction and

Not all commentators were so pessimistic
XXXII,

British Conversationalist, Vol.

New Series 1882,

p.

I I I, New Series 1857,

723;
pp.

The
65-67,

123-129, 217-221, 267-271, 169-171).

3 . 4.1 Moral and Social Attitudes Towards the Aray
Moral indignation to military might strengthened in the mid
19th century.
their

devout

Both Gladstone and Sidney Herbert were noted for
Christian

outlook

which

found

it

difficult

to

accommodate enthusiasm for forces of destruction and death, even on
a national scale (see Woodham-Smith 1977, p.59).

Gladstone regarded

the army as amoral and a vicious waste of money while to Cobden a
national army was a curse (Sweetman 1971(b), p.84).

16.

This was also blamed for the blossoming expenditure on the army
in the late 19th century (Edinburgh Review, Vol. CLXXXV, April
1897' p. 507).

-84Wellington

in

1809

could,

without

fear

of

contradiction,

characterise his nation as "not naturally a military people;

the

whole business of any army upon service is foreign to our habits" 17
(cited in Sweetman 1971(b), p.84).

Similarly in 1816 the founding

of the United Services Club prompted Lord Liverpool to confide to a
friend:
a general military club with the Commander-in-Chief at its
head is a most ill advised measure, and so far from it
being serviceable to the army it will inevitably create a
prejudice against that branch of our military establishment
(Quoted in Barnett 1970, p.279).
Palmerston could still gather support and sympathy when in 1854 he
persisted in referring to the militia as a civilian bulwark against
the military (Anderson 1967, p.58, footnote 1).

3.4.2

Economic Parsimony
Thus, despite pockets of reaction, by 1854 constitutional

antagonism between the Crown and Parliament had long ceased to be
the main

force which

sustained Parliamentary determination

that

military spending would be closely hedged by Parliamentary imposed
controls
Papers

("Observations of Lord Panmure" February 1855,
1908,

pp.

46-47).

Instead,

by

the

mid-19th

Panmure
century

Parliament's relations with the army were heavily influenced more by

17.

Trevelyan
characterised
Wellington,
"England's
greatest
soldier", as "the least militaristic of men". He was concerned
that the soldier be seen simply as a gentleman serving his
country in this capacity (1922, p.173).

-85-

a national obsession with economic parsimony and uneasiness with
what was seen as an incorrigibly spendthrift army.
noted Gordon,
costs

of

"Parliament",

"had exchanged new panics for old"; dislike for the

maintaining a

standing army

sufficient

to ensure the

Nation's safety instead of fear of the army itself ( 1935, p. 56).
Especially to the close of the 1880's this was to be the dominant
justification for close control of army finances (see Lord Randolph
Churchill, "Memorandum to the Hartington Commission" 1890, p.xv).
Throughout the latter years of the 1880 1 s however, Parliament,
though not by any means unanimously (see Midleton 1939,
tended at times to be less concerned about economy.

p.

77) ,

The shifting

balance of power in Europe with the rise of Germany as a Nation
State and the naval buildup in Germany (especially after the Naval
Act of 1891) contributed towards disillusionment with stringent and
crippling military economy (See Comments in The Fortnightly Review,
New Series April 1, 1900).

There was further poli tilcal pressure

throughout the late eighties and early nineties when France and
Russia developed increasingly close ties, much to the consternation
of

Britain.

In

particular,

Britain was

worried

that

a

close

alliance between France and Russia would allow Russia to seriously
challenge British interests to the north of India and allow France a
freer hand to prod the British empire in Africa (Quarterly Review,
January-April Vol. 164, 1887, pp. 219-240).

-86The

last

two

decades

of

the

19th

century

were

also

internationally very unstable as

colonially agrieved new nation

states

place

sought

to

obtain

their

especially in Africa and China.

in

the

'colonial

sun',

War appeared ready to break out on

numerous occassions (see Lord Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill
22

December

1886,

in

Churchill

1906,

Vol

II

p.

237;

Lord

Beaconsfield to Queen Victoria, 16 July 1877 in Hicks Beach Vol. I
1932, p. 63; Sir Michael Hicks Beach to Lord Salisbury 10 October
1878 in Hicks Beach Vol. I 1932, pp. 71-72;

Sir Michael Hicks Beach

to Sir Bartle Frere, April 4 1878 in Hicks Beach Vol I 1932, p. 84;
At lay 1909, pp.

47-48;

1900, pp. 792-806).

Fortnightly Review,

New Series , Vol. CCCC,

Therefore, increased military spending became

unavoidable as the empire grew. 18

Military spending throughout the

second half of the 19th century was a barometer of the international
forces which came to bear on domestic political policy (see Lord
Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury, 22 December 1886, in Churchill
1906, Vol. II, p. 238).

18. Military Expenditure 1870-1904
1895-(18m
1870 - (13.4m
1900-$21.4m
1880 - £15.0m
1890 - $17.6m
"The public demand (in the late 19th century) was always for
expenditure, never economy" (Hicks Beach 1932, Vol. II p.
147).
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3.5

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
Controls

are

developed

predetermined ends.

and

instituted

to

serve

certain

Controls are derived mechanisms, the value and

effectiveness of which can only be ascertained by knowing the forces
which

brought

them

into

Further,

being.

controls

become

unintelligible if decoupled from the ends they were meant to serve.
It has therefore been the object of this chapter to examine
those forces which motivated Parliament in its control of military
finances.

This involved firstly a study of 19th century national

and Parliamentary attitudes towards the British Army.

It has been

shown that there was traditionally little affection shown by the
Nation for its army, apart from during periods of war.
was,

whenever possible,

kept at arm's-length,

The army

garrisoned

in

the

corners of the Empire or imposed on unwilling hosts in Europe and
stationed

as

little

as

possible

at

home.

This

attitude

was

especially curious when compared to the honoured position of the
large standing armies of France and Prussia.

It was therefore also

the purpose of this chapter to examine those forces and events which
shaped 19th century British antipathy towards standing armies.
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Const! tutional broils of the 17th century in which the army
played a prominent and, what was widely seen as a distateful and
part,

treacherous

apprehensiveness
Parliament

to

bad

towards
use

the

produced
a

National

standing army.

powers

at

its

and

Parliamentary

This had
disposal

determined

to

exercise

administrative control over the army to meet the influence of the
Crown

in

the

command

of

the

army.

In

particular

Parliament,

uncertain still in some measure of its authority and jealous of the
esteem held for the Crown by society at large, 19 was determined to
exercise a rigid control over the army's spending through various
means as examined in the following chapters.
The structure of financial control prompted by constitutional
difficulties remained in force throughout the 19th century despite a
shift in Parliamentary attitudes.
with

creating

constitutional

Parliament was no longer obsessed

brakes

on

the

army

but

instead

concentrated its concern on economy in military spending within the
limits imposed by the rapid colonial expansion of the latter decades
of the 19th century.

19.

See the "Observations Upon the Memorandum of Financial Control
by the Comptroller General of the Exchequer", Select C_ommi ttee
on Pµblic Monies 1857, p.562.

CHAPTER

PARLIAMENTARY

4

FINANCIAL

CONTROLS:
APPROPRIATION,,
AND

ACCOUNTS

AUDIT

There is that scattereth,
and yet increaseth;
and there is that withholdeth
more than is meet,
but it tendeth to poverty.
(Proverbs, 11:34).
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4.1

INTRODUCTION
This chapter

will

establish

the crucial

role which

extra-

departmental financial controls played in Parliamentary control of
the British Army in the period 1846-1899.

Apart from the exclusive

right

financial

to

tax,

foremost

amongst

the

controls

was

Parliament's right to sanction the appropriation of public money to
particular uses.

This guaranteed Parliament omnipotence over the

size of the army but little else.
guarantee

that

Parliament's

Appropriation could not of itself

wishes

in

any

one

year

would

be

respected for appropriation did not contain the ability to review
expenditure. Not until appropriation was coupled with the demands
that:

i)

detailed accounts
parallel

the

be kept

headings

of

and

arranged to

expenditure

as

exactly

approved

by

Parliament;
ii)

accounts be audited by an external body, the Comptroller
and Auditor-General, answerable to Parliament;

iii)

accounts be presented to Parliament on a regular basis

through its own examining Committee, the Public Accounts Committee,
was Parliament 1 s financial control of the army secure.

Only when

these accounting provisions were met was Parliament able to monitor
both the size and pattern of spending of the army.

This chapter

therefore

in

also

traces

the

introduction

of

audit

military

accounting on behalf of Parliament and consequent developments in
military accounting relevant to the period of this study .
While

this

chapter

is

primarily

occupied

with

financial

controls attention is also directed to general military implications
of these financial controls for rarely was military efficiency the

-91reason

for

financial

development

which

changes.

Consequently,

strengthened

with

Parliamentary

each

new

surveillance

of

military spending the cry frequently arose from within the army that
military performance would suffer.

CONSTITUTIONAL SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF FINANCE IN THE CONTROL

4.2

OF THE ARMY
Finance

and

control

indissolubly linked

in

Crown and Parliament.

of

the

the

military

constitutional

had

always

struggles

been

between

the

Parliament saw its control over the means of

maintaining an army as

a

safeguard against despotism,

won with

difficulty and grasped with unswerving tenacity by Parliament (see
Trevelyan 1960, p.56 and Chapter 2):
purse-strings of the Army,

"The Minister who holds the

. . . will always have the power in his

hands" (Evidence of the Secretary of State for War, Sidney Herbert,
before the Select Committee on Military Organisation 1860, Question
6372; See Arnold-Forster for a criticism of Parliament's financial
role, 1906, pp. 437-438).
Nothing

was

more

important,

argued

Clode,

in

civilian liberty than the question of army finance
p.110):

(Vol. I

1869,

the army must never be allowed near the public purse for,

warned Clode,
under

maintaining

the

p. 265).

"a country ceases to be free when its Treasure is

influence of
of

Control

the army"
finance

(Vol. I

was

1869,

p .186,

consequently

also

based

see
upon

constitutional apprehension and jealousies (see "Observations Upon
the

Memorandum

Exchequer"

by

of
the

Financial

Control

Comptroller-General

by
of

the
the

Chancellor
Exchequer,

of

the

Select

-92Committee on Public Monies 1857, Appendix I, p. 562;

Wellington's

"Memorandum on the Report of the Howick Commission (1837)" and his
memorandum to Lord Melbourne ( 1838) as cited in Clode 1869, Vol. II,
pp.759-763). Parliament had recognised very early that the ability
to raise and control finance was the foundation of authority in
government and for the legislature the most effective instrument
against executive tyranny (Carter 1972, p.111; Hughes 1934, p.122).
"Vast, almost beyond description", commented the Quarterly Review,
"is the power ... of a Minister who controls the finances of a great
country ... " (Vol. 166, January to April 1888, p. 515). Thus it was
not surprising that
from the very outset after the Revolution Parliament
endeavoured to establish and maintain close financial
control over the fighting services in general and over the
army in particular (Einzig 1959, p.118).
To give the army ready access to the Public Treasure was, in
Parliament's view,
anarchy

and

leaving the way clear to a reversion to the

oppression

of

the

Interregnum.

Parliament

was

especially ruthless with 'vipers in its own bosom' who attempted to
deny and circumvent Parliament's wishes in respect of the army.

For

example, articles of impeachment were prepared in 1686 against the
Parliamentarian Edward Seymour for providing money for the support
of

the

army

disbandment.

after

a

date

Parliament

had

stipulated

for

its

No off ender was beyond Parliament's rage, even Lord

Treasurers (see Clode 1869, Vol.I, pp.66-67).

-93Liberty, described by Peter Wentworth in 1576 as a thing of
"value beyond

all

inestimable

treasure"

(quoted

in Elton

1963,

p.317), was seen by Parliament as inseparable from control of the
army and finance.

Gladstone referred to the control of finance as

a powerful lever for English liberty (cited on the title page to
Einzig

1959,

also

p.18;

see

also

Lord

Randolph

Churchill

as

reproduced in Churchill 1906, p. 132). Control of the public purse
was not infrequently regarded as being sacred (Westminister Review,
January to April 1876, New Series p. 167). Whoever controlled the
Nation's finance controlled, amongst other things, the army. Members
of Parliament thus had a tendency to become unsettled when the Crown
appeared

to

restrictions.

be

given

too

much

money with

not

enough

apparent

In particular Votes of Credit, 1 either during peace

or war, were widely distrusted for the latitude they afforded the
executive

(Speech in the House of Commons, February 11 1740, Cited

in Einzig 1959,

p.146).

Affirmation

in

the 1689

constitutional

settlement of the Englishman's right not to be taxed without his
consent and Parliament's right to be solely responsible for raising
taxes cemented a long established practice dating from the Model
Parliament of Edward I in 1297 and Magna Carta 2 (see Robinson 1924,
p. 142;

Elton 1963, p. 67, Phillips and Jackson 1978, p. 45):

No scutage nor aid shall be imposed on our Kingdom, unless
by common counsel of our Kingdom
(Chapter 12 of Magna
Carta).

1.

These were 'blank cheques' given by Parliament
expenditures, usually during national emergencies.

2.

Even earlier argues Einzig (1954, p. 34).

to

meet

-94This did not stop however, the Crown from attempting to usurp
Parliament's

authority.

Thus

the

Commons

frequently

found

it

necessary to restate their claim to the right to control taxation
(see Elton 1963,

One of

p.68).

the

strongest declarations

of

Parliament's position was in 1404 when a resolution was passed by
Parliament declaring
Anyone collecting subsidies with the aid of letterspatent, tallies or in payment of the King's debts, before
granted by Parliament is guilty of Treason (Rolls of
Parliament III.568, Cited in Einzig 1959, p.48)
Parliament was very careful how and to what degree it granted
financial assistance to the Executive not solely because of its
distrust of the Executive but also because it knew that once the
money had been appropriated to the uses sought by the Executive
Parliament's

ability

to

interfere

(Phillips and Jackson 1978,

pp.

and

control

14, 31-32). 3

became

fettered

The appropriation

procedure therefore assumed importance in an inverse manner to the
level of Parliament's administrative control, especially prior to
the 19th century in an environment of underdeveloped and inadequate
government accounting.

3.

Westminster Government is based on the separation of powers
between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. While
the legislature and executive have different areas of authority
the executive is still responsible i.e. answerable, to the
legislature which in turn is ultimately answerable to the
electorate.
There is thus not a strict separation of powers.
Cabinet members are also members of the legislature. The Lord
Chancellor, as head of the Judiciary and a Cabinet member, moves
between all three arms of government.
(Phillips and Jackson
1978, pp. 31-32).
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4.3

THE MECHANISM OF APPROPRIATIOff4
Parliamentary

financial

control

of

approved

executive

programmes was limited to review and criticism as long as executive
policies conformed with law.

Parliament could prod and interrogate

both prior to spending and immediately after when and if accounts

4.

For a detailed exposition of Parliamentary Appropriation see
the Select Committee on Public Monies 1857, second session
Appendix 1. Briefly and in general, appropriation in the 19th
century involved the following in the British Army:
1.

The Secretary of State for War, in concert with the
Commander-in-Chief, the minister's prime adviser, decided
on the size of the army.
2. Estimates were framed with
the assistance of all
departments in the War Office.
3. The estimates were passed to the War Office Finance
Department for consolidation and refinement.
4. The detailed estimates were then given to the Secretary of
State for War.
5. Unlike estimates of other departments those of the Army
were usually presented in Parliament by the Minister and
not the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
6. The House would study the estimates, although usually this
was a most cursory exercise.
7. Supply to the Army was voted, supply being tied to purposes
by Appropriation Acts.
,
8. The Treasury was authorised to issue money at its own
discretion.
9. Authorities to issue money were scrutinised by the Treasury
which compared the authorities against Parliamentary
grants.
10. The Bank of England received notice to transfer credits
from the Consolidated Fund to Paymaster accounts.
11. The Account-General issued warrants for the Paymasters to
draw money.
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were

Control

before Parliament . 5

over expenditure by the

legislature after revenue had been raised was therefore bounded, and
"necessarily and properly so" argued Durell, for administration is
the exclusive constitutional prerogative of the Executive
p.19).
in

Any legislative interference while ever the executive acted

accordance

unjustifiable,
harmful

(1917,

with

its

approved

considered Durell,

programme

was

but also harmful

only

not

(1917,

p.20);

to · the separation of powers and responsibilities of the

Executive and Legislature (see also Mill, Representative Government,
Chapter 5).
Through

the

mechanism

of

appropriation 6

Parliament

was

guaranteed the opportunity to review proposed expend! tures of the
Executive.

The

Revolution,

Sir

James

Mackintosh

reminded

the

Commons, ushered in
a new system in the history of finance, for it was not
until
then
that
the
system
was
established
of
appropriating all parliamentary grants, by the authority
of Parliament,
to services previously approved by
Parliament, which gave reality and energy to all the
constitutional principles respecting the power of the
purse, created a constant and irresistible control over
the public purse in this House... (Quoted in Clode Vol. I
1869, p. 95).
Parliament took the "right of appropriation as the immediate
and logical consequence of the right of levying supplies" ("Select

5.

The production of annual accounts only became general practice
for all government departments after the Exchequer and Audit
Departments Act (1866) became fully operational in 1870 for the
year 1868-69.

6.

The first recorded instance of appropriation by Parliament was
in 1353 for military purposes. Use of appropriation procedures
by Parliament continued to be spasmodic until systematised
after the revolution of 1688 (Chubb 1952, pp.7-8).

-97Committee on Public Monies" 1857, p . 563).

Grants of supply would

only be forthcoming when the legislature was sufficiently convinced
of the desirability of the expenditures proposed by the executive
and

as

detailed

in

departmental

estimates

or

budgets. 7

This

principle was confirmed in the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act
of 1866 (hereafter the 1866 Audit Act) which stipulated that "Ways
and Means shall have been granted by Parliament" (section 15) .

This

was to be a final say, nothing could be done by outside agencies to
alter or enlarge sums agreed to by Parliament without Parliamentary
permission

(see the Statement by the House of Commons in Clode

Vol.I, 1869, p . 119, Phillips and Jackson 1978, p . 27) 8 .

From the

1688 Revolution to at least the 19th century the primary goal of the
process of Parliamentary approval was to satisfy Parliament that the
army raised by the Crown (under the annual Mutiny Acts) did not
exceed the judicious level approved by Parliament (Einzig 1959, p.
143).

Indeed, concluded Lord Welby,

"the great financial charge

made at the Revolution related to the charge of the Navy and Army"
("Select Cammi ttee on National Expenditure", 1902 Appendix 13, p.
228).

7.

The purpose of budgets, argued the Chancellor of the Exchequer
in 1857, was to satisfy Commons
that the public income to be raised in the year will
be sufficient. and no more than sufficient to meet
the expenditure for which the Government proposes to
incur during the year . . . ("Memorandum of Financial
Control", Select Committee on Public Monies 1857,
second session Appendix I, p.519) .

8.

Dicey stated that "no person or body is recognised by the law
of England as having the right to override or set aside the
legislation of Parliament" (quoted in Phillips and Jackson
1978, p . 51).
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by means of the appropriation of money on the basis of detailed
departmental

estimates

and

in a

framework

of legal,

policy and

instructional constraints utilised the 'fund' as its centrepiece .

A

fund, or sum of money set aside for a particular purpose, proved to
be best adapted to the
conducted

by

requirements

the

immense and diverse range of activities

government

governing

these

and

the

perplexing array of

activities .

Funds

for

legal

military

purposes did however, differ in one substantial feature from those
for civil uses (see James 1950, p.307).

Movement of money between

army funds or votes, technically known as virement, was permitted in
the period of this study by the Appropriation Act of ·1846 (9&10
VICT. C.116,
Acts 9

s. 24)

and section 4 of the subsequent Appropriation

(see evidence before the Select Committee on Army Estimates

1888 , Fourth Report, Questions 5380-5388 , 5416). The onus was on the
army however, to show that virement was "indespensably necessary" in
that injury would be sustained to the Public Service "if the same
were delayed until provision could be made for it by Parliament in
the usual course"

(Appropriation Act 1846, s.24;

Evidence before

the Select Committee on Army Estimates 1888 , Fourth Report, Question
5237).

Virement was not allowed with civil votes.

Because

virement

represented

a

diminution

control it was strictly hedged in by controls:
only body

empowe~ed

of

Parliamentary

the Treasury was the

to authorise virement and retrospective approval

could only be given if the Treasury had been informed in writing

9.

For example see Section 4 of the 1887 Appropr ia ti on Act as
reproduced in the Fourth Report of the Select Committee on
Army Estimates 1888, PP . ix.
Also question 5380 of evidence
before the Select Committee on Army Estimates.
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and before the actual transfer (Treasury Minute 13 January 1846 as
quoted in the "Extract of the Sixth Report of the Committee of
Inquiry

into

the

Department",

System

British

of

Account

Parliamentary

and

Audit

Papers

in

the

1846,

Ordnance
539) .

p.

Appropriation of public money to military purposes was by way of two
grants composed of

several votes or divisions.

Up to

1856-57

virement was allowed only between votes within the one grant.
1858 however,
permissible

virement between votes in different grants
(See

the

"First

Report

of

the

Public

Committee", British Parliamentary Papers 1873 Vol.VI,

In

became

Accounts

p.5).

Not

until 1856, despite the recommendations of the 1849 Committee into
Army and Ordnance Expenditure, was an additional clause inserted in
the Appropriation Act which made it mandatory that any virement
authorised

by

the

Treasury

be

presented

before

Parliament.

Parliamentary scrutiny and control of virement in military votes was
further tightened in 1862, upon the recommendation of the Public
Accounts Committee, when the Treasury was no longer authorised to
"signify Her Majesty's Pleasure" as the final authority in virement.
Any approval granted by the Treasury was now only a preliminary step
to

ultimate

Parliamentary

sanction

(Public

Accounts

Committee

-100see also Public

Treasury Minute 27th January 18063; lO

1862;
Accounts

Committee

1878-79

Appendix,

p.143).

Finally,

the

Monk

Resolutionll of 4th March 1879 required Treasury to present to the
House of Commons details of any virements within three weeks of the
exercise of such Treasury powers ("Memorandum of the Auditor General
on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Exchequer and Audit Departments
Act,

1916,

Vol.17,

p.147). 12 The rigidity and close scrutiny of

virement regulations demonstrated that Parliament took its powers of
financial

supervision

very

seriously

(see

the

rigour

of

the

questioning over the Major Watkin case of virement in Evidence

,,

before the " Select Cammi ttee on Army Estimates 1888, Fourth Report,
Questions 5192 to 5594).

10. "The 26th Clause of the Appropriation Act (1862) does not confer
on this Board the power, which was granted by a similar clause
in former Appropriation Acts from 1846 to 1861, of finally
appropriating surpluses on some grants to cover deficiencies on
others within the same department; but it merely enpowers the
Treasury to authorise the temporary use of surpluses to meet
deficiencies, in order that such proceedings may be submitted
for the sanction of Parliament ... " ("Copy of any Minute issued
by the Treasury with the object of giving effect to the
Recommendations of the Committee of Public Accounts ... as well
as to the Requirements of the Appropriation Act 25 & 26 Viet.
c. 71, s. 26", British Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 29, 1863, p.
173).
11.

The Monk Resolution stipulated that "it is desirable that a
statement of every case (of virement) . . . in which the Naval
and Military Departments have obtained the sanction of the
Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury to the application of
an actual or anticipated surplus on one Vote to meet a
deficiency on another Vote within the financial year, be laid
upon the Table of the House within
three weeks after such
.
sanction shall be given
"
(Select Committee on Army
Estimates 1888, Fourth Report, Question 5441).

12.

For an example of a Treasury Minute informing Parliament of
Virement for the ,,army see Evidence before the~Select Committee
in Army Estimates 1888, Fourth Report, Question 5440.
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indicated virement between army votes did not reflect a decline in
Parliamentary regard for financial surveillance.

Virement rather,

recognised the peculiar nature of the army in comparison with civil
departments. The British Army had tentacles which extended to many
parts of the world which consequently made the task of framing
up-to-date, accurate and detailed estimates very difficult . 13

In

addition most armies experience at times unexpected and sometimes
unpredictable
incidents

periods

of

invariably call

intense
for

and

violent

activity.

These

additional expenditures which,

if

avoided or postponed until Parliamentary approval is obtained may,
in

the

circumstances,

prejudicing
Committee

the

1862,

army's
p.209).

prove

contrary

performance

to

the

public

good

(see

the

Public

Accounts

Procrastination

without

penalty

is

by

not

normally an option available to an army confronted with a problem
that demands immediate attention and solution .

Delay possibly means

lost advantage and a withering of the opportunity for success (see
The Contemporary Review December 1886, p. 775).
Virement was attractive to Parliament in the case of the army
because it had the potential to be instrumental in the furtherance
of economy.

The prospect of being able to transfer excess money

between votes to meet shortages partly allayed mill tary fears of
insufficient money and was therefore expected to moderate demands
for

money,

via

the

estimates,

which

might

otherwise have

been

13.

For the further details of the difficulties involved in framing
army estimates see Field-Marshall Lord Roberts' evidence before
the Brodrick Committee 1898, Questions 163, 164, p. 164;
also
see Clode Vol. I 1869, p. 188.
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saw virement

as

consistent

with

affairs through the War Off ice:
civil departments,

were still

the

administration of

transfers between votes,

transfers within the same

military
unlike
service

(Evidence before the Select Committee on Army Estimates 1888, Fourth
Report, Question 5389). The Comptroller and Auditor-General argued
that when movement of surplus money between votes was contemplated
by the Appropriation Act of 1846 (and subsequent Appropriation Acts)
the reference was to surpluses genuinely derived from savings and
not artificially generated by the postponement of expenditure. The
Public Accounts Committee,
with

the

instead

judgement
saw

a

of

surplus

especially that of 1878-79, disagreed

the
from

Comptroller
either

and

cause

Auditor-General
as

transferable

and
if

postponement of expenditure would mean savings by paying one bill
now and the other later (Public Accounts Committee 1878-79, second
report p.75, para.78).
Conditions that regulated virement for the army were designed
to ensure virement was never taken to extremes.

To unleash erratic

virement would have effectively meant not merely the erosion but the
destruction of Parliament's ability to sanction and thus to control
army finance .

The actions of James I I were not to be forgotten.

Appropriation using what were normally 'watertight compartments', or
votes, helped to ensure that appropriations were directed to their
authorised uses while the progressive breakdown of army votes in the
18th and 19th centuries into smaller and smaller subdivisions, or
headings, further enhanced Parliament's supervision.

14.

More headings

This was all very nice in theory but more frequently proved to
be only wishful thinking in practice (see Section 5.2).
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enabled a finer and much closer scrutiny of proposed and actual
expenditures and

reduced the

spending discretion of

departments

which otherwise would have undermined and circumvented the intrusion
of Parliament.
Important as votes were to Parliamentary control of spending,
up

to

the

mid-19th

century

there

was

no

reliable

means

at

Parliament's disposal for ensuring spending in any one year had not
exceeded the total amount appropriated. 15

Nor could Parliament be

certain that spending had followed the pattern as embodied in the
votes.

This situation improved markedly however,

throughout the

latter half of the 19th century as the following section examines.

4.4

ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT
Parliamentary control of finance is greatly enhanced by the

use of audits, 16 a right which the Commons declared for

itself

immediately after the 1688 Revolution as "a necessary dependence of
this right of giving money and granting aids" (Conference in 1691
with

the

House

of

Lords,

Cited

in

Clode

1869,

Vol.I,

p.112).

Commons was however, slow in putting this right into practice, even
in the case of the army,

being content to exercise control over

military spending through The Appropriation Act and discussion of
the estimates.

Parliament appeared to regard these

"securities

15.

Treasury controlled the issue of money as provided for by
Parliament.
The army, as shown later, could circumvent
limitations on money in any one year by ordering material this
period and paying the following period. With cash accounting
as used in government accounts accruals would go unnoticed.

16.

The first Audit Acts passed after 1689 were 2 William and Mary
(session 2), C.11 and 7 and 8 William III, C.8 (Clode 1869,
Vol. I. p. 133).

-104sufficient ...

(and) dispensed with all further inquiry or control"

("Extract from the Sixth Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the
System of Account and Audit in the Ordnance Department" 1846, p .
519;

See

also the

"Memorandum

Fiftieth Anniversary of the
1916", p.144, paragraph 1;

of

the Audi tor

General

on

the

Exchequer and Audit Departments Act
Campbell 1965, p.141). This meant that

in the absence of careful, regular and authoratitive scrutiny of
accounts, however poor they may be, their usefulness for control is
impaired for, argued Durell, effective control rests primarily on
the ability of Parliament to see that "its will is carried out"
(1917, p.10). According to Durell this aspect of control far exceeds
in importance
constitutional and parliamentary procedure and practice
in the sense that strictness of granting would be
rendered nugatory by laxity or deficiency in accounting
whereas strictness in accounting would greatly
mitigate the drawbacks of laxity in granting (1917, p.10;
see also Einzig 1959, p.86).
It is axiomatic that all public officials to whom public money
or property is given in trust be always liable to explain their
actions (see the Lawrence Committee 1924, p.720).

Public servants,

no matter their avenue of occupation, are accountable; 17 they can
be

required

responsibilities

to

justify
(see

the

Pritchard

way

they

1910,

discharged

pp.29,

119,

their
125).

Responsibility in the last resort must reside and be known to reside
in specific individuals for

17.

As already discussed at some length, accountability for the
army was more than just concerned with checks on money flows
but rather it was a check on the power these flows potentially
afforded the army.

-105responsibility is null and void when nobody knows who is
responsible.
Nor even when real, can it be divided
without being weakened.
To maintain it at its highest,
there must be one person who receives the whole praise of
what is well done, the whole blame for what is ill (Mill
1861, p. 242; see also the Public Accounts Committee 1~87,
p. 96; Normanton 1966, p.66).
Audit of departmental accounts by an external and independent
body

would

therefore

appear

to

be

important

for

effective

supervision of responsbilities.
A reliable audit of spending presupposes an established and
accurate
control

system
by

the

of

recording

British

However,

expenditure.

Parliament

which

financial

incorporated

a

well

developed system of accounts and accounting was a phenomena of the
second
Lord

half
Welby's

of

the

19th century

comments

in

his

Expenditure Committee" 1902). 18
early 19th century the

(see

Gordon

evidence

1935,

before

pp.233-234;

the

"National

Throughout the 18th century and

paucity of government accounts 19 served,

amongst other things, to dilute Parliament's financial control, not
that

it

against

went unrecognised
its

seeming

by Parliament which frequently

impotence

and

Commission into Government Accounts"
p. 172;

ignorance
1829,

p.

(See
88:

the

raged
"Royal

Einzig 1959,

"Second Report from the Select Committee on Finance", 1817,

pp. 381-408).

18.

It was not until 1879 that compulsory audit for limited
liability companies was introduced into the UK Companies Act.

19.

The prevailing view, as expressed by an anonymous 18th century
contemporary, seemed to regard demand for accounts as an act of
bad manners and an unnecessary interference. "Could ministers
carry on the business of the public if any gentleman in this
House had a right to call for such an account?
It would be
impossible,
the public service can never be advanced by
calling for accounts which destroy your confidence in them".
(quoted in Roseveare 1969, p. 91).
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is

the

purpose

of

the

next

section

to

follow

the

development of government auditing in the 19th century as it related
to the structure of financial control of the army.

Most important

in the development of the audit of military accounts on behalf of
Parliament were the 1846 Audit Act and the 1866 Audit Act.
4.4.1

The Evolution of Military Audit in the 19th Century
The Government in 1785 recognised in appointing 'Commissioners

for Auditing the Public Accounts' from the ranks of the Treasury the
inadequacy of the then present financial control procedures and the
importance of accounts in the cycle of financial control (An Act for
Better Examining and Auditing the Public Accounts, 1785, 25 Geo.III,
c.52) . 20

Initially this body, which was concerned primarily with

"ascertaining that ... payments were made (by the Exchequer) under
proper authorities",
Parliament. 21

reported solely to the Treasury and not to

According to

the Select Committee on Finance in

1817 an audit along these lines was deficient largely because:
examination of Public Accounts by Off ice rs

"An

. . . entirely dependent

upon the Treasury ... (and avoiding Parliament) could at no time be
considered as constituting an efficient check on the irregularities
of Public Expenditures" ("Second Report from the Select Committee on
Finance",

1817,

p.

383).

If

the

Treasury

acted

upon

any

recommendation it would be doing so in its own cause because, after

20.

For a very detailed background to the 1785 Act, in particular
dissatisfaction with the state of public audit, see the Second
Report from the Select Committee on Finance 1817, pp.
383-387. The 1785 Act was subsequently revised by 45 Geo. III.
c. 91 and 46 Geo. Ill c. 141.

21.

For details of the audit performed see the "Report of the
Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Mode of Keeping the
Official Accounts" 1829, p . 343;
Also "Select Committee on
Public Accounts" 1830-31, p. 209-217.
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money through the Exchequer . (Howick Commission 1837, Appendix G,
Memorandum from the Audit Board, p. 95;
the Treasury in the Treasury Minute,

see the recommendation of
February 15,

1858,

in the

"Report of the Select Committee on Public Moneys", 1857- 58 , p . 385,
Therefore, the 1817 Select Committee on

Section VI, clause 26).
Finance

urged

"immediately

the

establishment

responsible

of

an

audit

Parliament"

to

section which was
398) .

(p .

This

recommendation remained dormant for another fifty years.
Some

improvement

in Parliamentary surveillance had occurred

when, in 1802, annual Finance Accounts were introduced which had to
These accounts, however, continued to

be laid before Parliament .
show

only

the

money

issued

by

the

Exchequer

as

Parliament's

'Paymaster'. There was no indication that the money was used as
intended by Parliament, nor until 1841 any sure check on the total
amount spent (Evidence before the "Select Comm! ttee for Army and
Ordnance Expenditure", Vol. IX 1849, Question 8603,
Army

Audit

Office).

Parliamentary

continued to be far from perfect.

financial

W.G. Anderson,

control

therefore

Lord Welby, Permanent Secretary

to the Treasury in the late 19th century, in his evidence before the
1902

"Select

Cammi ttee

on

National

Expend! tu re"

ref erred

to

Parliament in the early 19th century being under the "illusion that
it could control expenditure by putting checks on the issue of money
from the Exchequer instead of ascertaining how the money had been
spent" (Appendix 13, p. 230).
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made

in

the

audit

of

government

accounts

from

the

point

of

ascertaining that money had been spent as intended by Parliament in
the various votes.

Thus audit of the

total amounts spent was

superseded by audit of the categories of expenditure i.e. votes.
After the Navy, Army accounts in 1846 were amongst the earliest
government

accounts

to

be

audited

externally

and

directly

for

Parliament on a vote by vote basis 23 when Parliament passed An Act
to provide for the Preparation, Audit and Presentation to Parliament
of annual Accounts of the Receipt and Expenditure of the Naval and
Military Departments (9 & 10 Victoria C.92, 1846), 24 hereafter the

22.

Audit of navy accounts on a yearly basis by an external body
answerable to Parliament was initiated in 1832. the First Lord
of the Admiralty, Sir James Graham, sponsored a Bill (later the
Act, 282 Will, Ch. 40) authorising the Commissioners of Audit
to undertake an annual audit.
"I propose", he concluded, "to
convert a nominal into a real responsibility on the part of the
Admiralty and a nominal into a real and efficient control on
the part of the House of Commons" (Quoted in Robinson 1924,
p .143).
Sir James had been prompted by the frequency with
which navy funds were "applied to other purposes than those
specified in the Appropriation Act" (Evidence of Sir John
Barrow before the Howick Commission 1837, p. 17). The Navy was
required to present annual accounts showing actual expenditure
listed under votes as defined in the Appropriation Act.
The
Commissioner of Audit compared the accounts with vouchers and
then laid the accounts before the House. For the history of
navy audit see the "Extract from the Sixth Report of the
Committee of Inquiry into the System of Account and Audit in
the Ordnance Department", British Parliamentary Papers, Vol.
XXVI, 1846, pp. 520-521.

23.

A formal recommendation for an independent audit in mil! tary
accounts had been made by the Treasury in 1840 (Treasury Minute
27 November 1840, "A Statement of the Changes in
Bookkeeping since
1832", Appendix 27, p . 732 British
Parliamentary Papers Vol. 32, 1844).

24.

See Appendix 2 for a copy of the Act.

-1091846 Audit Act.

Prior to 1846 and since 1703 audit of army accounts

had continuously been supervised for the army by Comptrollers of the
Treasury within the Army's finance section but with the object of
checking that departmental financial procedures had been followed,
all expenditures were correctly authorised and that total spending
had not exceeded the total amount appropriated by Parliament and as
issued by the Exchequer (see Clode Vol.I, 1868, pp.190- 193; also
see Cl ode Vol. II,
establishing the
Treasury

and

pp. 668-669 for
off ice of

the

duties

a

copy of the

Letters Patent

Comptroller of Army Accounts in the

of

the

Comptrollers;

Commission 1837, Appendix 28, pp. 185-188).

Also

the

Howick

After the introduction

of the provisions of the 1846 Audit Act the army was informed by the
Treasury that the present departmental audit would
continue to be conducted by and on the responsibility of each
department; but now also there will be a higher and more
general description of Audit, the object of which is to
ascertain and report whether grants of Parliament have been
duly applied to the purposes to which they have been
appropriated by the Annual Appropriation Act (Treasury Minute
13 January 1846, "Extract of the Sixth Report of the Committee
of Inquiry into the System of Account and Audit in the
Ordinance Department", 1846;
Also the Baring Committee, 1856
as referred to by Lord Welby, Appendix 13 to "Report of the
Select
Committee
on
National
Expenditure",
British
Parliamentary Papers, Vol. VII, 1902, p. 229).
Despite the improvement made to Parliamentary surveillance of
categories of military expenditure, initially the accounts required
by the 1846 Audit Act "did not attract much notice" outside the army

,,

(Lord Welby, Appendix 13 to the Report of the Select Committee on

,,

National Expenditure 1902, p.
with

government

widespread

accounts

support

for

the

229).

reached
audit

By 1866 however, discontent
the
of

point
all

where

there

departmental

was

accounts

-110similar to that of the army and navy.

Largely because of Gladstone,

in 1866 the 1846 Audit Act for the audit of army accounts (and navy
accounts) was repealed and most ofits principal clauses subsumed by
the 1866 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 25 (29 & 30 Victoria C.
39) which also amalgamated the off ices of Comptroller General of the
Exchequer and the Board of Audit

,,

(see Lord Welby's Comments, "Select

Committee on National Expenditure 1902, Appendix 13, p. 230). 26

The

full weight of the 1866 Audit Act, which the Treasury stated ushered
in a "revolution in public accounts" 27 (Treasury Minute 20 March
1876,

cited

in

the

"Report

of

the

Public

Accounts

Committee"

1876, p.140) was not felt in army accounting until 1876 after the
audit of other government departments under the Act had been firmly

25.

See Schedule C of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act
(1866). A copy of the Act appears in Appendix 1.

26.

Provisions of the 1866 Audit Act not only owed their existence
to the 1846 Audit Act but also to the recommendations of the
Public Moneys Committee of 1857 (Correspondence Concerning The
Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866, Sir William Dunbar,
Comptroller General to the Treasury 14 December 1866, p. 16).

27.

Not until the passing the 1866 Audit Act, judged Gladstone,
.could it "be fairly said that the off ice of the House as the
real
author! ta ti ve Steward of public moneys had been
discharged" (cited in Einzig 1959, p.233). For a contradictory
view on the importance of the 1866 Audit Act see Trevelyan
1960, p.183). The 1866 Audit Act also gave the Treasury, for
the first time, statutory control as opposed to a de facto
control over expenditure.
The Act effectively brought all
Government department accounts within Parliament's direct
gaze.
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established28 and audit procedures and principles in the context of
the army had been thoroughly revised (see the "First Report of the
Public

Accounts

Committee",

Vol.VI, Question 1432, p.129;
Committee",

British

British

Parliamentary

Papers

1874,

"Third Report of the Public Accounts

Parliamentary

Papers

1875,

Vol.VIII,

p.122

paragraph 9). This delay in the application of the 1866 Audit Act to
the military reflected the already advanced nature of army audits as
compared to other government departments. Consequently, it was more
important to establish the provisions of the 1866 Audit Act in other
departments

first.

Army

auditing

followed

substantially

the

provisions of the 1866 Audit Act anyway, the 1846 Audit Act being
the model for the 1866 Audit Act.
The

1866 Audit Act

required all

government departments

to

render to Parliament detailed accounts that had been certified by an
'accounting officer'

within that department

(section 35). 29

In

28.

On the 16 January 1873 an Order in Council was issued which
established formal accounting requirements for all departments
(Public Accounts Committee 1873, First Report Appendix I). The
year previous to 1873 ~ saw the appointment of two Treasury
Officers
of
Accounts
to
replace
the
Public
Accounts
Commissioners appointed with the 1866 Audit Act.
The Senior
Officer was a member of the Treasury.
Unlike the Senior
Officer who was appointed primarily on administrative ability
the Junior Treasury Officer of Accounts was required to have a
thorough knowledge of accounts and to maintain constant contact
with government departments. Both were to ensure a high degree
of
conformity
between
accounts
over
government
departments("Memorandum of the Comptroller and Auditor General
on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Exchequer and Audit
Departments Act" 1916, p.145).

29.

1868-69 was the first year the 1866 Audit Act was fully
complied with. That year marked "the commencement of a new era
in our financial history" ("Report of the
Public Accounts
Committee", British Parliamentary Papers 1870, Vol.X, p.3).

-112addition,

as

Parliament's

representative,

the

newly

created

Comptroller and Auditor-General was responsible for the inspection
of all prepared accounts once they had left the accounting officer,
after

1872

the

permanent

non-political

(Treasury Minute 14th August 1872). 30

Head

of

a

department

The Accounting Officer was

not an accountant but rather the 'accounting' in his title referred
II

to his duty to answer to Parliament (Memorandum of the Comptroller
and Auditor- General on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Exchequer and
II

Audit Departments Act 1916, p.145) .
The audit of army accounts as laid down in the 1866 Audit Act
was,

like that established in the 1846 Audit Act, still only an

appropriation audit;

the means by which Parliament could verify

whether money had been used as intended by Parliament and that the
annual votes had not been exceeded (evidence before the "Select
Committee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure", Vol. IX, 1849, Question
8611,

to

W.G.

Anderson,

Army

Audit

Office).

The

audit

the

Comptroller and Auditor-General and his department were authorised
to conduct was of bookkeeping accuracy, appropriation and authority;
that is regularity and legality (1866 Audit Act, Sections 21, 25-27,
29-30;

see also Treasury Minute 20 March 1876 as reproduced in

the "Report of the Public Accounts Committee", British Parliamentary
Papers

1876,

Vol.VIII,

p.140;

Evidence

Committee 1867, Question 2063, p.135.

before

the

Strathnairn

See also earlier work in the

Treasury Minute of February 15, 1858 on the "Report of the Select

30.

Prior to 1872 there was no uniform system of appointing
Accounting Officers. Not until the Public Accounts Commitee in
its Second Report of 1872 emphasised the desi reabil i ty of a
system of appointment common to all departments was the
Permanent Head the nominated Accounting Officer ("Memorandum of
the Comptroller and Auditor-General on the Fiftieth Anniversary
of the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act" 1916, · p.145) .

-113Committee on Public Moneys", 1857-58, p.385, Section VI, Clause 26;
Explanatory notes and queries in the audit of military accounts by
the Treasury and Commissioners of Audit, "Accounts and Papers: Army,
Navy, Ordnance", British Parliamentary Papers 1847-8, Vol.XL!, p.1).
There was no provision in the Act to disentangle considerations of
economy and efficiency from the purely formal and prime objects of
regularity and legality.31
When army accounts in 1876 came under the provisions of the
1866

Audit

Act 32

the

Treasury

again

took

the

opportunity

to

emphasise the appropriation nature of the audit required by the 1866
Audit Act for audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General would be
limited to seeing
that a stated sum has been expended, and he receives the
explanation
of the Department that it has been
expended on a certain subject. He satisfies himself that
Parliament has provided money for that object, and that
this particular sum has been charged to the Vote in which
such a provision has been made . . . as set forth in the
Estimates laid before Parliament (Treasury Minute of 20
March 1876, in the "Report of the Public Accounts
Committee", British Parliamentary Papers 1876, Vol.VIII,
p.141).

31.

This did not stop the Comptroller and Auditor-General extending
what he perceived as his mandate.
In this he always had as a
powerful ally the Public Accounts Committee which considered
"it is open to him . .. to state his opinion to Parliament on
any points which he may think necessary ... in his Report upon
the Army Appropriation Account" ("Public Accounts Committee",
British
Parliamentary Papers,
1877,
1st Report,
p.15,
para. 100).

32.

For details regarding dissatisfaction with the audit under the
1846 Audit Act see the "Report of the Public Accounts
Committee", British Parliamentary Papers 1876, Vol .VIII,
pp.140-141.

-114Another thing the 1866 Audit Act did not change was the detail
covered by the audit.

The audit affected in army accounts in 1876

by the 1866 Audit Act was not an i tern by i tern audit but rather
continued the policy of a test audit followed previously by the
Board of Audit.

Test auditing had been provided for by section 29

and Schedule B of the 1866 Audit Act. The 1866 Audit Act had stated
that any Departments placed in Schedule B of the Act would be exempt
from a detailed audit by the Comptroller and Auditor-General.
Comptroller

and

Auditor-General

could

accept

the

accounts

The
of

departments in Schedule B (the defence departments) on the evidence
of departmental examination.

The Treasury was therefore content to

allow the Comptroller and Auditor-General to base his investigations
on
the evidence of the Departmental Examining Officer
and upon the faith of that evidence he certifies that the
money has been expended upon the services for which
Parliament voted it (Cited in the "Report of the Public
Accounts Committee", British Parliamentary Papers, 1876,
Vol. VIII, p.141).
The overwhelming number of transactions conducted by the army,
as with most government departments, made anything but a test audit
by

the

Comptroller

and

Auditor-General

out

of

the

question.

Investigations by the Treasury in 1876 revealed that a detailed
audit would entail an outlay of £40,000 annually, double the cost of
a test audit.

In addition to the added expense of anything but a

test audit, a detailed audit of army accounts by the Comptroller and
Auditor General was regarded as superfluous.

The War Office already

conducted a 12.5% test audit 33 when the audit of the Comptroller and

33.

Even a 12.5% audit was later considered too burdensome by the
Broderick Committee which recommended a 5% audit of accounts
( 1898, p. 131).
This recommendation was not approved by the
Secretary of State for War.
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Auditor-General was added in 1876 (Treasury Minute 20 March 1876,
reproduced in the "Report of the Public Accounts Committee", British
Parliamentary Papers, Vol. VIII, 1876, p. 142). The Comptroller and
Auditor-General could select any items, votes or sub votes to audit.
He was expected however, to cover all votes over a number of years,
usually around six years ( "Memorandum of the Audi tor-Generals on the
Fiftieth Anniversary
1916", p.146;

of the

Exchequer and

Audit Department

Act

Also the Treasury Minute 20 March 1876, reproduced in

the "Report of the Public Accounts Committee", British Parliamentary
Papers 1876, Vol.VIII, p.142).
Reliance on the War Office's enquiries did not undermine the
vigilance of Parliament or the Comptroller and Auditor-General for,
reassured

the

Department

in

Treasury,
the

War

the

Accounts

Off ice

was

Branch

completely

of

the

separate

Finance
from

the

spending departments. Accordingly,

the Accounts Branch (which was

completely

"no

expenditure"

civilian
(cited

manned)
in

had

the

"Report

inferest
of

the

or

voice

Public

in

the

Accounts

Committee", British Parliamentary Papers, Vol. VIII 1876, p.141).
The

Public

Accounts

Committee

was

especially

disinclined

to

recommend a detailed audit because anything but a test audit would,
with
the inquiries instituted by this numerous staff suddenly
installed in the War Office ... hardly fail to impede the
current business of the departments, and the result would
engender a spirit of opposition to the audit staff (1876,
p.142).
Thus, subsequent to the revision of army auditing in 1876 audit
of army accounts was carried out on three levels, for in addition to
the central audit by the War Off ice and that of the Comptroller and
Auditor-General there was also the long-standing audit at the local

-116level by the regimental Paymaster 34 (See Evidence before the Select
Committee on Army Estimates, British Parliamentary Papers, Vol. IX,
1888, Fourth Report, Questions 4885 to 4892, p. 74).

The audit at

the local level and at the War office had the advantage, argued the
Accountant-General Sir Ralph Knox in 1898, of encouraging exactitude
in accounting and in the performance

of duties.

The local audit,

it was stressed, improved the efficiency of accounting because those
in the local off ice could readily correct any errors which,
detected higher in the chain of audit,

if

could produce volumes of

reports and correspondence over what might be essentially trifling
details. Queries by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, because of
the gravity with which they were regarded and dealt with, · would have
meant that unless otherwise insignificant errors were dealt with at
the local or War Office level an unwarranted degree of publicity
would

arise

(Evidence

of

Sir

Ralph

Knox

before

the

Brodrick

Committee 1898, Question 878, p.190).

4.4.2

Stores Audit
Restriction of audit to only cash receipts and cash payments

is an undully narrow audit.

A truly comprehensive military audit

should also encompass stores;

"the real expenditure ... is what you

issue from your storehouses", wrote Harris in 1911 (p.73; see also
Durell 1917, p.209).
required

"more

Major-General

34.

Nothing in the military was more important and

minute

Balfour

looking

(Evidence

into"

than

stores,

argued

before the Strathnairn Committee

For details of the audit at the regimental paymaster level and
subsequent audits see "Evidence before the Select Committee on
Army Estimates", 1888, Questions 4960, 6638-6661).

-1171867, Question 2445, p.188).
Although the cash account may be in order the stores purchased
with the money approved by Parliament may not have been used as
intended by Parliament.

In addition a surplus on the Appropriation

Account may have been obtained by using stores

on hand at the

beginning of the period while annual spending could be bolstered by
exhaustion of current stocks.

On the other hand, a department which

finds itself with a large surrenderable cash surplus at the end of
the financial year (the end of March for the army) may be tempted,
in the absence of a stores audit, to consume this cash surplus in
the current period in the purchase of more stores.

These stores

could then be run down the next period thus inflating the potential
expenditures

of

the department.

Although

these practices

were

apparently well known, no attempt seems to have been made prior to
the implementation of the provisions of the 1866 Audit Act 35 to have
the value of stores consumed by the army laid before Parliament 36
(Evidence of Major-General Balfour before the Strathnairn Committee
1867, Question 2445, p.188;

"Extract from the Sixth Report of the

Committee of Inquiry into the System of Account and Audit in the
Ordnance Department", p. 531). This however, was consistent with the
exclusive concern throughout all army store accounts for quantities
and not the money represented in the stores

(see Notes on Cost

35.

Stores were mentioned in the 1866 Audit Act by way of an
oblique reference in section 40.

36.

It was also widely held that cash and stores audit required not
only different expert knowledge but different qualities on the
part of the auditor. Thus audit of stores and cash should be
conducted by two different divisions of the War Office Audit
department (Edvidence of Major-General Balfour before the
Strathnairn Committee 1867, Question 2449).
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Accounting 1918, Section II, paragraph 14;
Commission 1906, p. 64;

Report of the Farewell

Evidence before the Select Comrni ttee on

Army and Ordnance Expenditure Vol. IX, 1849, Questions 8695, 8710,
8779, J. Trenow, Examiner of Stores).
Consequently,

spending levels

set by Parliament meant

very

little if the army had recourse to large stocks on hand (see Durell
1917, p. 219).

The 1887 Appropriation Act noted with concern how

"irregularity in the disposal of public stores is equivalent to an
illegal

appropriation

of public

p.208).

The store requirements of a defence department such as the

army are however, peculiar.

money"

(quoted

in Durell

1917,

An army will not always have the time

to build up its material needs when an emergency occurs;

large

stocks are therefore imperative if the army is to be in a state of
readiness for combat.

Consequently, the issue of stores audit was

to become especially important in the 19th century for the British
Army with its huge reserves of all nature of material so necessary
during war.
As with most

'intrusions' by civilian War Off ice departments

into military affairs, 37 audit of stores was widely resented within
the army.

The Chief Audi tor and the Audit Section of the War

Off ice's Finance Department were criticised by the army for being
overzealous and prepared to sacrifice the efficiency of the army
"merely for the purpose of auditing the accounts'' (Evidence of J.C.
Caffin before the Strathnairn Committee 1867, Question 2061, p.134).
Not until 1878 did the Comptroller and Audi tor-General raise,

for

the first time, the issue of an army stores audit by his department.
In the following year the Public Accounts Cammi ttee commended an
37.

See Chapter 5.

-119army stores audit but at the same time argued that to introduce
another new requirement, as this would be, too closely on the heels
of the new audit system inaugurated in 1866, introduced in the army
in 1876 (Public Accounts Committee 1876, p.122) and thus still very
much at an experimental stage, was too much to expect of the army
(Public Accounts Committee 1878-79, 2nd Report p.77, para. 95). 38
Between 1846 and 1866 store accounts of the army were examined
by the Board of Audit 39 which reported directly to the Treasury. The

38.

Public Account Committee reports over several years after 1876
expressed dissatisfaction with delays in auditing army cash
accounts (see 1877, First Report p. 14, para. 94; 1878, Second
Report p. 78, para. 22; 1879, Second Report p. 74, para. 66).

39.

The Comptrollers of Army Accounts up until 1836 audited army
store accounts but reported directly to the Treasury and
therefore by-passed the Board of Audit and Parliament (Treasury
Minute of 13 March 1835, reproduced in the Report of the Howick
Commission 1837, p. 73).
Thus, in the early decades of the
19th century cash accounts and store accounts were audited by
different bodies; the former by the Commissioners for Auditing
the Public Accounts (Audit Board) at Somerset Place and the
Comptrollers of Army Accounts responsible for store accounts
(Report of the Commissioners appointed to Inquire into the Mode
of keeping the Official Accounts, 1829, p. 105, p. 343). The
ultimate recipient of audit reports in both cases was the
Treasury.
The Treasury was however, unhappy with the dual
system of audit and recommended in 1835 the return to the
system of audit which had operated between 1785 and 1806 when
the Comptrollers of Army Accounts were part of the Board of
Audit (Treasury Minute 13 March 1835, Report of the Howick
Commission 1837, p. 73). The Treasury sought to
put an end to the system under which these two sets of
accounts (cash and stores), each of which,
in a
considerable degree, has reference to the transactions
exhibited in the other, have hitherto been examined, and
finally audited, by different departments (Treasury Minute
13 March 1835).
Amalgamation of the audit function was subsequently carried
out by the Treasury Minute of 3 March 1836 (see the
evidence before the "Select Cammi ttee on Army and Ordnance
Expend! ture" 1849, Questions 8041 to 8057; "Report of Messrs.
Annan, Kirby, Dexter and Co., Chartered Accountants", Appendix
to the Report of the "Royal Commission on War Stores in South
Africa", Vol.III, p.10, paragraph 47 and p.21 paragraph 105).

-120Audit Section of the War Office 40 checked accounts of stores against
the stores but usually to demonstrate compliance with regulations.
(Sir Ralph Knox 41 in Evidence before the Brodrick Cammi ttee 1898,
Question 928, p. 193, also see Questions 933 and 935).

It was no

part of the work of Stores auditors, or anyone else it appears, "to
show the application of stores to the purposes for which they were
used" ... (Evidence before the Select Committee on Army and Ordnance
Expenditure Vol. IX, 1849, Question 8710, W.G. Anderson, Army Audit
Office).

Audits of stores were unquestionably carried out in the

army for

personal protection against the great

carried

by

responsible

officers

and

men.

responsibilities

Audits

continued to

fulfill this role while ever store accounts were used · mainly to
"ensure stores are brought on charge" and "to see that all stores
written off are properly vouched" (Sir Ralph Knox in Evidence before
the

Brodrick

Questions

933

Committee
and

1898,

935;

Also

Question
the

928,

evidence

p.

193,

before

also

the

see

"Select

Cammi ttee on Army and Ordnance Expenditure" 1849, Question 8056;
Garnsey 1924, p.138).
In 1880 and again in 1882 the Comptroller and Auditor-General
referred the matter of army stores audit to the Public Accounts
Committee

(Chubb 1952,

p.

51).

Finally,

relying on the powers

conferred upon it by section 40 of the 1866 Audit Act the Treasury,
via a Minute dated 13 November 1884, called upon the War Office to

40.

In 1866 audit of store accounts within the War Off ice was
transferred from the Military Store Department to the Chief
Audi tor of Army Accounts (War Off ice Circular 953 of 2 April
1866).

41.

Sir Ralph Knox was Under Secretary of State for War in 1897
(See Biddulph 1904, p. 56).
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compile

an

annual

account

of

stocks

for

the

Comptroller

and

Auditor-General so that the Treasury might judge the efficiency with
which store regulations were implemented and carried out (Public
Accounts Committee 1884, Second Report as quoted in the Report of
the

Public

Accounts
Still,

p.212).

not

Committee
until

1938,

1886

p.163;

did

the

also Durell
Treasury

1917,

require

the

Comptroller and Auditor-General to carry out a government-wide audit
of departmental stores on a regular basis. Even so, recognising the
immense problems anything but a test audit would cause, the Treasury
directed

the

Comptroller

and

Auditor-General

to

limit

his

investigations to whether existing regulations which governed stores
were

satisfactorily

followed

(Chubb

1952,

p.52). ·Under

no

circumstances, directed the Treasury Minute of 15 November 1886, was
the Comptroller and Auditor-General to interfere in the stock-taking
procedures of government departments.
the

Comptroller

and

The minute made it clear that

Audi tor-General's

duty

was

limited

to

ascertaining the regularity of accounts according to regulations
and thereby

to ensure officers responsible for stores took their

responsibilities seriously:
the department that administers a store service is
responsible for the
stores
cost, quality and
quantity, for their safe custody ... and for their being
used for the right objects, so long as they remain within
its jurisdiction. The public is not concerned with where
the stores are ... (Treasury Minute, 15 November 1886 as
reproduced in Durell 1917, p.215).

-122As if to meet potential opposition to the Stores audit in the army
the Comptroller and Auditor-General was careful to emphasise in his
reports pursuit of the limited objectives laid down.

In his first

report of 1889, the Comptroller and Auditor-General established his
investigations

and

reports had

only

sought

to discover

whether

existing regulations gave sufficient control over the receipt and
issue of stores and whether they had been enforced.

4.5

THE IMPACT OF APPROPRIATION AND AUDIT
As already noted in this chapter, appropriation was not without

its problems as a form of financial control.

Under the system of

appropriation which evolved after 1846 the army's administration
became locked into an organisational and reporting pattern according
to

th~

form and content of the departmental estimates submitted to

Parliament

each

year

(see

the

Lawrence

Committee

1924,

p.718;

Regulations for the Commissariat and Transport Staff 1881, Section
1, subsection I II, Paragraphs 46-48).

It was on the basis of the

di visions or heads in the estimates, as laid down by Parliament,
that Parliament appropriated monies for military uses and upon which
Parliament after 1846 expected the military administration to report
(see the 1846 Audit Act Sections II, VI;
23,

24).

From

1846

in

the

1866 Audit Act Sections

Appropriation Accounts submitted

to

Parliament actual expenditures were to be matched against grants and
differences had to be explained (see 1846 Audit Act Section VI; 1866
Audit Act Sections 26, 27; Evidence of Sir Richard Hamilton before
the Ridley Commission 1887, Appendix, p. 425).

-123To enable the army to meet these requirements the process of
categorising expenditures according to votes and vote headings had
to commence at the earliest recording of expenditure.
more

clearly

demonstrated

than

with

the

This was no

Commissariat.

When

Commissariat Officers entered receipts

and issues in their

books

beside

they

were

to

place

a

number

each

entry

cash
which

corresponded to the vote under which the issue or receipt was made
(see Regulations and Instructions for the Guidance of Off ice rs of
the Purveyors Department of the Army 1861, Paragraphs 116,

126,

The vouchers pertaining to these entries would be bundled

142).

according to the vote numbers as used in the cash book, and the
estimates, and then forwarded to that section of the War Office to
The accounts were then

which the relevant expenditures related.

recast into the required Parliamentary form at the War off ice by the
Accountant-General's
comments

on

this

Department
process

in

(see
Evidence

Sir

Charles

before

the

Trevelyan's
Strathnairn

Committee 1867, Question 2679, p.208).
Because votes were to be administered separately within the War
Off ice,

separate

administrative

departments,

reflecting

the

organisation of votes, developed.

This produced a fragmentation of

administration with

departments,

the

numerous

for all

practical

purposes autonomous of each other and not tied together by a central
co-ordinating authority, issuing their own plethora of regulations
and operating their own systems of administration (see the "Select
Cammi ttee into Army and Ordnance Expenditure" 1849, Questions 8789
to 8798, pp. 593-594:

Public Accounts Committee 1917-18,

p.

10).

-124This departmental organisation within the War Off ice which was a
response

to

'political

considerations'

(Dawkins

Committee

1901,

p.182) was however, shown both in the Crimean and South African wars
to be inconsistent with military efficiency and economy .

It was

inevitable, concluded the Royal Commission on Civil Establishments
(1887)

that

administration

of

the

army

on

anything

but

sound

administrative and military lines would be hampered by delays and
confusion

engendered

by

the

uncertain

authority

and

differing

departmental opinions (see the Hartington Commission 1890, Appendix

c, p.60;

Florence Nightingale as cited in Gordon 1935, p.53 ;

as cited by Sweetman 1971(b) , p.121;

Hume

Evidence of Sir Ralph Knox

before the Brodrick Committee 1898, Question 1387, p.212) ;
A

further

substantial

appropriation and required
assuring an

shortcoming

of

the

mechanism

of

reporting, from the point of view of

efficient and

effective military

force,

and

aiding

Parliamentary surveillance of expenditure was the concentration on
cash and the emphasis on appropriating to 'subjects' of expenditure.
The Appropriation Account in both the 1846 Audit Act and 1866 Audit
Act was envisaged as nothing more than a cash account; bookkeeping
on a single entry basis for stewardship purposes.
the

body

of

the

Appropriation

Accounts

of

Recognition in

non-cash

items

precluded by both Audit Acts ( 1846 Audit Act, Section I II;
Audit

Act,

Section

exclusiveness
non-cash

of

24).

The

Audit

Act

of

the Appropriation Accounts,

information

to

be

appended

in

1866

reaffirmed

was
1866
the

although permitting

notes

to

the Accounts .

Section 25 of the 1866 Audit Act empowered the Comptroller and
Auditor-General to demand from government departments balance sheets

-125or

statements

showing

"the

actual

Disposition

of

the

Balances

appearing on the annual Appropriation Account".
Parliament was very guarded in the 19th century (and earlier)
in the use of accrual accounting.
were

therefore determined

to

For example,

Parliament.

Parliamentary finance committees

pursue very closely the wishes of

in 1873 the Public Accounts Committee

judged the disallowance by the Comptroller and Audi tor-General of
(9,538 for stores not delivered as "in accordance with practice";
the Comptroller and Audi tor-General had every right to treat the
stores as

"imprests,

and not final

payments"

(Parliamentary

Papers 1873, Vol. VI, p.5 of the First Report). Exceptions that were
in the public interest were however,
Committee",

British

Parliamentary

recognised ("Public Accounts

Papers,

1874,

Vol.

VI,

First

Report, p.18).
Accrual
ability

to

accounting was
obscure

attributed,

Parliament's

by Parliament,

superintendence

of

with

the

government

expenditure ("Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into
and to State the Mode of keeping the Official Accounts" British
Par 1 iamen tary papers,
p.400;

Hewgill 1980,

accrual

accounting

complication and

1829 ( 290)
p.3).

introduced

VI,

p.

89;

See Durell 1917,

It was apparent to Parliament that
what

was

regarded

as

unnecessary

increased the opportunities for malversation in

public finance. Cash accounts on the other hand, had the virtue of
simplicity which was widely held to be of

-126great importance for the security of the public;
it
assists punctuality, and it prevents also the hiding out
of any improper payment; misdirection or misappropriation
of money is much more easy under a complex system, under
which the accounts are continually in arrear (Evidence of
Sir William Power before the Strathnairn Committee 1867,
Question 2673, p.208).
Cash accounts were "in a form",

remarked Sir Charles Trevelyan,

"which permits no mystification or disguise"
Strathnairn Committee 1867,
failed

to

see

that
in

Question 2684,

accounts
fact

constructed

give

a

clearer

(Evidence before the
p.209). 42

on

Parliament

accrual

picture

accounting

principles

would

of

military

spending.

As previously shown, the military could easily overcome

cash shortages towards the end of any financial year, and thereby
exceed Parliamentary appropriations, by ordering material · to be paid
for out of next year's appropriations.

Accounts disclosing cash

items only would miss this information.
Appropriation, and therefore accounting, was directed towards
major

headings of

expenditure or

salaries, as stipulated by 9
entirely

consistent

&

with

subjects

such as supplies and

10 Viet. C. 92.

concern

primarily

Such a system was
for

financial

accountability although not with efficient, economical and effective
administration

(see

Evidence

of

Sir

Ralph

Knox,

Accountant

General, before the "Select Committee on Army and Navy Estimates",

42 .

Contemporary opinion on the preferability of cash accounting in
government was far from unanimous, least of all amongst the
Government and Parliament's own Committees.
The Select
Committee on Public Monies (1857) rejected outright cash
accounting in favour of the universal adoption in government
accounts of a commercial system of accounts i.e. accrual
accounting (p.499 of the Report;
see also Murray 1862;
Treasury Minute, February 15, 1858; Select Committee on Army
and Ordnance Expenditure 1849, Questions 8593, 8032, 8033,
8076, 8565-8611;
Sir Charles Harris' Evidence before the
Select Committee on National Expenditure 1908; Grimwood 1919,
p.114).

-127First

Report

1887,

Vol.VIII,

Question

Knowledgeable witnesses before the

31,

p . 12

of

evidence).

Select Committee on Army and

Ordnance Expenditure in 1849 roundly condemned accounts for being
organised under Estimate headings and therefore for being oblivious
to the efficient use of money granted by Parliament (Question 8638,
W.G. Anderson, Audit Office). According to Sir Charles Harris this
could only be achieved by appropriating to 'objects'
("Evidence before
I

the Select Committee on National

1908; Hewgill 1980, pp.5-6;

or purposes
Expenditure"

see also Grimwood 1919, p.114).

Accounts formulated on an

'object' basis had the ability to

tease out and analyse departmental functions,

results and costs;

something not possible nor sought under the traditional 'subject'
mode of appropriation accounting (see the Evidence of Sir Ralph Knox
before the Select Committee on Army and Navy Expenditure,

1887,

First Report , Questions 34 and 1134; Harris 1911, p.64; Grosland,
Director

of

Army Finance,

Pritchard 1910, pp.28-29).

Notes

on

Cost Accounting 1918,

p.8;

Accordingly, the Accounts Branch at the

War Office took little interest in military expenditure apart from a
thorough examination of the legality and regularity of expenditures
(Evidence of Sir Ralph Knox before the "Select Committee on Army and
Navy Estimates" 1887, First Report, Question 31, p.12; Evidence of
Sir Ralph Knox before the Brodrick Committee 1898, Question 1355,
p. 211; Evidence of Sir Charles Harris before the Public Accounts
Committee 1918,
administration

p.173).
of

votes

Certainly it did not
within

military

interfere in the

departments

("Evidence

before the Select Committee on Army and Navy Expenditure" 1887.
Questions 426, p.39 and 428, p.40).

-128Another weakness of accounts and estimates based on subjects of
expend! ture was the di ff icul ty of ascertaining the total cost of
particular government services,
military manoeuvres .

for example the cost of mounting

Instead of the salaries , cost of supplies etc .

required for a military manoeuvre being accumulated;

the costs

wotild remain part of the total for all salaries for the army and
contribute towards the total supply cost for a year .

As Chairman of

the

Lord

~rmy

and

Navy

Estimates

Committee

in

1887

Randolph

Churchill asked the Accountant-General of the Army whether it was
possible to determine, from the military Estimates, a simple matter
such as the increase in expenditure for certain services.
assured

the

Accountant-General,

"would

have

This,

been . extremely

difficult" (quoted in Churchill 1906, Vol . II p. 320;

see also the

Q!!arterly Review Vol. 165, July to October 1887, p. 269).
To disregard, as the form of the accounts encouraged , whether
the money spent achieved its avowed purpose or did so at the least
cost was, argued Sir Charles Harris, not financial control but an
inducement to financial delinquence (1911 , pp.65, 67;

Harris 1938,

p. 314; Evidence of Harris before the Select Committee on National
Expenditure 1908;

Grimwood 1919,

p.114;

Evidence of Sir John

Bradbury before the Sub Cammi ttee on the Form of Public Accounts
1918).

Army

finance

expert

Questions 484-487, p.21)

(see

the

Brodrick Committee

Lieut. Churchill also denounced the army's

financial and accounting systems.

It was difficult to imagine, he

claimed, a system that could possibly be worse (1895, p.36;
also Ormsby 1908, p. 836).
II

1898,

see

These were also the sentiments of the
II

Select Committee on Army and Navy Estimates ( 1887) (Questions 34,

-129953-979,

1134)

and Amery who

Parliamentary financial

many

years'

to

the

whole

control as anachronistic,

"cumbrous safeguards" (Vol.
after

referred

service

2 1902, p. 41).
at

all

levels

system

of

consisting of

Sir Charles Harris,
in

army

accounting,

confessed that "we in the army hardly know what accounts are" for
management purposes (1911, p.64; Ellison, Notes on Cost Accounting
1918, p.5).
When compared to the accounts of even smal 1 businesses the
army's accounts were widely regarded by experienced administrators
as nothing but rudimentary and mechanical, despite the acknowledged
complexity and extent of British Army administration.

Colonel Sir

John Keane dismissed army accounts as valueless for control;

of no

use for ensuring efficient and economic administration (Concluding
Address,

Grimwood,

Imperial

Defence

May

1919).

Conference prior

Similarly,
to World

participants
War

at

an

I

lamented that

accounts had never shed any light on the economy,

efficiency or

otherwise of military administrators (noted by General Anderson in
Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers 1914-15-16-17, Vol.II, p.166).
Obsessive concern for
responsibility (for example,

financial

accountability and personal

see Regulations for the Commissariat

and Transport Staff 1881, Section I, subsection I, paragraphs 9 and
17) and the plethora of financial regulations spawned by civilian
finance sections at the War Office (Evidence of Sir Ralph Knox, the
Brodrick Committee 1898) continued to deny army accounting a wider
role to well

into the 20th century .

Concentration on financial

accountability and personal responsibility had the effect in the
army of inducing a self protective langour

(see Regulations for the

-130Commissariat and Transport Staff 1881, Section VI, subsection II,
paragraphs 199, 200, 202;
1861, paragraph 116).

Regulations for the Purveyors Department

For example, Mr. Stafford before the Roebuck

Commission (1856) referred to the difficulties he encountered when
•
he attempted to organise the cleaning of lavatories at his hospital
at Scutari. Because no instructions, money or authorisation had been
specifically
authorise

provided

the

for

necessary

this

purpose

expenditure.

no

one

Anyone

was

who

prepared

took

up

to

this

unscheduled task on his own initiative was, Stafford assured the
Commissioners, at risk.

They could be made to pay for the work out

of their own pocket (see Woodham-Smith 1977, p.131; See also the
Evidence of William Sargent, Agent for Commissariat Supplies, before
the

1833

Commission

to

Report on

Consolidating the Departments

Related to the Civil Administration of the Army, referred to by the
Howick Commission 1837, p. 108}.
Compounding

the

problem

of

a

myopic

military

accounting

function were the accounting personnel at the War Off ice who were
selected not because of their accounting and financial prowess or
business ability but because of their knowledge of regulations and
their capacity to follow orders (Evidence of the Accountant-General
before

the

Strathnairn

Committee

1867,

Question

2690,

p.210).

Originality and initiative were not commendable qualities for army
accounting.

This was necessarily so while ever military accounting

was responsible primarily for ensuring all claims for payment were
correct as
Appendix VI

authorised
to

under

Evidence

Question 2751, p.243).

the Estimates

before

the

and

Regulations

Strathnairn Committee

(see
1867,
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CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
The first task of this chapter was to examine the crucial role

of appropriation in Parliament's financial control over the army.
Through the mechanism of appropriation Parliament's control over the
existence of the army was assured.
however,

there was

little

or no

Until

the mid 19th century

scrutiny by Parliament of

pattern of spending of appropriated money.
to

the

neglected

condition

of

the

This was primarily due

government

accounts

and

audit

procedures.
From 1846

on

there

was marked

monitoring of military spending.

improvement

in

Parliament's

Both the 1846 Audit Act and the

1866 Audit Act introduced tighter appropriation accounting and audit
while the establishment of the Public Accounts Commi.ttee in 1862
provided

Parliament

with

direct

and

informed

contact

with

appropriation accounts.
Unfortunately, improved Parliamentary surveillance of military
spending

only

contributed

appropriation accounts.

to

the

narrow

stewardship

use

of

Individuals accountable for money or stores

invariably had little choice but to regard their accounts as a means
of protection against personal liability.

This is most consistent

with a system of financial surveillance directed not towards rewards
but punishments.

Accounting practices, instead of being valued for

their ability to assist in the implementation of programmes and the
achievement of goals became significant of themselves.

All that

seemed to

fulfilled

matter was

that

Parliamentary

through the accounting requirements.

demands were

- 132 -

This introduced a rigidity and routineness to army accounting
and

sapped it

Indeed,

the

of any vitality as it proceeded ritualistically.

great

challenge

in

army accounting was

to

find

balance between a deficiency of routine and regulations,
excess
and

which

futile

denied

formality"

initiative:
(Sir

Charles

"between
Harris,

financial
Foreword

a

and an
disorder

to

Durell

1917).

Improvement in Parliamentary accounting and audit was reliant
upon

the

work

unfortunately,

of

knowledgeable

civilians.

a very chauvinistic civilian presence

was to be the source of much antagonism.
discloses,

this

For

resulted

in

the
in

army

finance

As the following chapter

inconvenient financial

resentment and ultimately military financial

jealousy and

imprudence~

CHAPTER

5

CIVILIANS AND ARMY FINANCE

"The control of Parliament, the interference of
Parliament, the jealousy of Parliament for its
rights and privileges, these are the stock
arguments in favour of an adherence to the main
lines of our present system of
military
administration."

(Lord Randolph Churchill, Memorandum
Hartington Commission 1890, p.xv).

to

the
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INTRODUCTION
To this point the main concerns have been:

to detail within

the Crimean War the major repercussions on army performance of

the

structure of financial control as it existed towards the beginning
of

the

period

under

study;

to

outline

the

reasons

for

Parliamentary obsession with control of the army's finances;

to

examine appropriation and government accounting as a

means at

Parliament's disposal to ensure control of the army's finances; and
finally to provide an overview of the essential weaknesses of the
financial weapons in Parliament's armory of financial surveillance.
The

task

of

this chapter

is

to

examine

both

the

role

of

civilians in military financial administration as a means by which
Parliament gained additional leverage in military finances, and the
military reaction to its civilian masters.

5.2

MOTIVES FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF MILITARY FINANCE
Civilians were essential, in Parliament's view, to Parliament's

constitutional supremacy in military affairs;

civilians would ever

be guided by the public interest and ensure that the Army was never
its

own

master

(see

Moncrieff

1909,

p.390).

Because

of

the

constitutional safeguard civilian control of finance would perform,
no military personnel, no matter what their experience, were allowed
to occupy prominent civilian financial positions at the War Office
(see Churchill 1895,

p. 37).

The War Office Finance Department,

staffed entirely by civilians, 1 was really a financial check placed
1.

Sir John Brodrick (Earl of Midleton) recalled that at the time
he became Secretary of State for War the War Office was "a vast
establishment of 1500 civil servants (Midleton 1939, p. 146;
Also Fortnightly Review, Vol. CCLV, New Series March 1888, p.
305).
Trevelyan referred to the War Off ice as "this monster
establishment
(Trevelyan to Hamil ton, 31 December 1858, in
Hart 1900, p. 105).
11

11

-135Civilians at the War Off ice

on the Army by the Cons ti tut ion.

therefore, were almost exclusively occupied with the examination of
accounts

(Evidence before the Select Committee on Army Estimates

1888, Questions 4883, Fourth Report p. 74).

While all other areas

of military administration passed into military hands in the late
19th century the civilian monopoly of finance remained firm as the
constitutional rock upon which Parliament carried out its control of
military finance (Fortescue, Nineteenth Century, December 1903, p.
917; Nineteenth Century, No. LXIX, September 1882, p. 523).
the

civilian

constitutional

presence

in

securities

military
"be

administration

adequate

against

Whether

and

other

that

most

unmanageable instrument of power, a Standing Army, may be doubted",
suggested Sir James Mackintosh, "but no Statesman ever thought ...
(they) were more than enough" (quoted in Clode, Vol.I 1869, p.v).
War Off ice 2 civil servants were at the one time guardians of the
public's money and sentinels of their freedom. 3
Viscount

Hailsham

referred

to

the

"problem

of

reconciling

military efficiency with civilian control" as the dominant feature
of the British War Office (Introduction to Gordon 1935, p.v) while
the Esher Committee similarly argued that "civilian control over
military policy and administration" was at the root of military

2.

Prior to 1857 it was called the War Department.

3.

Another reason why civilians were thought best in army finance
was related to the routineness of their work.
No military
knowledge was required to carry out the great bulk of the
finance work;
only "industry and regular! ty" were required.
Military personnel would therefore be wasted
(First Report of
the Royal Commission into Civil Establishments~ Vol. XIX, 1887,
p. xii) .

-136inefficiency (1904, Part 2, p.1 of the report).
Major Carter R.A.S.C., 4

Inescapably, wrote

the Civilian Financial Branch in the War

Off ice came to be regarded
more or less in the nature of a Delphic Oracle, that
occasionally was guilty of mysterious utterances,
which
invariably breathed blame and religiously eschewed praise.
Thus it came about that the civilian branch developed into
a sort of bogey, which everybody outside the War Off ice
disliked in idea and sometimes even feared (1907, p.527).
In the view of the Esher Committee Parliamentary concern over
military finance had been transmogrified in the 19th century from
motives

owing

apprehension
report;

their

origin

to financial

to

political

and

(1904,

Part 2,

sentience

constitutional
p.15 of the

see also the Evidence of the Duke of Connaught.before the

Brodrick Committee 1898, p.169, Questions 324 and 325).

According

to some commentators, given the accepted view of the army as
populated by guiltless spendthrifts,

being

this made a closer civilian

presence even more essential in military finance (Edinburgh Review,
Vol. CXXXIII January to April 1871, p. 234).

Earlier constitutional

fears however, still made their presence felt in the perpetuation of
mechanisms of financial control established by Parliament.
The Esher Committee attributed the economic motive for control
of the army to the steadily increasing focus in the 19th century on
the affectionately held assumption of civilian

administrators "that

military officers are necessarily spendthrifts" because of their
concern for effectiveness which was widely seen as contradictory to

4.

Royal Army Service Corps.

-137economy (1904, Part 2, p. 15 of the report; Also Alison 1869, p. 52;
see

also

Questions

2641

Strathnairn

Committee"

continued,

there

and

1867,

was

on

2642

of

p. 204).
the

the
As

part

"Evidence

such,
of

before

the Esher

both

the

Report

government

and

administrator alike, "an unwillingness to trust the soldier in his
capacity as administrator",

insisting that "their actions must be

controlled in gross and in detail by civilians"

(1904, Part 2, p.15

of the report; see also the "Final Report of the Brodrick Committee''
1898; Arnold-Forster, 1906 p.439). The Northbrook Committee in 1887
had also found a want of "reasonable confidence" in the military's
financial integrity (Third Report, p. x).

This was not unreasonable

given that the financial demands of soldiers were, to the nation,
insatiable (Northbrook Commitee 1870, first report, p.3). No amount
of money was ever enough to meet the ghosts of war conjured by the
military:

"If you believe the doctors", parodied Lord Salisbury at

the turn of the century, "nothing is wholesome: if you believe the
theologians,

nothing is

innocent:

if you believe the soldiers,
In the early

nothing is safe" (quoted in Huntington 1972, p.66).
19th century Pell warned that

if you adopt the op1n1on of military men, naturally
anxious for the complete security of every available
point; naturally anxious to throw upon you the whole
responsibility for loss in the event of war suddenly
breaking out
you would overwhelm this country
with taxes in time of peace (Cited in Morely 1903,
Vol.II, p.47).
According to Huntington to err on the side of caution is a natural
and

understandable

repercussions
powerful

in

stimulus

facet

war
to

of

of

the

military

overstatement

military

psyche,

improvidence
(see

Dixon's

in

for

peace

Comments

the

are

a

1978,

-138While politicians concern themselves with intentions, the

p. 21).
military

man

is

worried

more

by

the

capabilities

of

others

(Huntington 1972, pp.66-67). Capabilities are not so easily masked
by a spirit of bonhomie.

The goal of any spending on armies, argued

Arnold-Forster, must ever be to ensure victory in battle (1906, p.
3).

"An army which will win", assured Arnold-Forster,

"is worth

an army which will not win is worth nothing at all"

paying for;

(1906, pp. 12, 429).
Another reason for mistrusting the financial abilities of the
army's

officers,

civilians

in

and

finance,

therefore
was

another

their

reason

financial

for

relying

on

Sir Guy

ignorance.

Fleetwood Wilson, Director General of Army Finance in the 1890's,
In his view

dismissed the military as incompetent administrators.
he

had

only

met

administrators"
background
financial

of

three

(Fleetwood
most

military

men

who

were

Wilson

1922,

p.

104).

British

abilities were well

officers

"first
Given

complaints

founded.

class
the

against

their

British officers,

being

drawn almost exclusively from the aristocracy,

had little or no

exposure to finance prior to entering the army (Otley, 1970).

Not

only were they, as a class, bereft of financial skills but also the
British

Officer

deficiency.

(and

the

army)

made

no

attempt

to

remedy

the

To do otherwise would have been to betray their class,

the leisure-class. The British army officer dedicated himself to the
pursuits of leisure, to cultivating the

1

virtues 1 of the amateur

being "an amateur born and bred, with an amateur's lack of training,
an amateur's contempt for method, and an amateur's ideal of life"
(Sir W.
1900,

p.

Broderick,
524;

The Nineteenth Century No . CCLXXXIV,

The

Contemporary Review,

December

October

1886).

The

officer's life was therefore a daily round of social events and

-139sporting activities,

the routine of army life being left to the

non-commissioned officers.
Mistrust of the military with access to money was difficult to
break,

even

allowing

apprehensions
determined.

upon

for

which

weakening

control

of

of

army

constitutional

finance

had

been

Parliament mistrusted the army because of the army's

lack of financial experience;
overcome

the

Parliament's

the army sought financial autonomy to

financial

dictatorship

but

was

unable

to

convince Parliament of their ability to manage financial affairs.
Parliament

would

give

no

peacetime

financial

freedom

without

evidence of ability but ability only developed with practice and
training.

Practice

required

autonomy

which

Parliament

was

not

prepared to give.

5.3

THE CIVILIAN HEADS OF ARMY FINANCE
In 1890 both the Hartington Commission and an Order of Council

reaffirmed the by then entrenched constitutional principle (and the
findings of an earlier Committee in 1860), "that the Authority of
the Sovereign over the Army (through the Commander-in-Chief)
could only be exercised, in the same way as any other power of the
Crown, through a responsible minister" (cited in the Report of the
Hartington Commission 1890, p.xxv, also p.xxiv).

This responsible

minister was the Secretary of State for War. The Secretary of State
for

War 5 as

a

minister of

Parliament and

a civilian

was the

governing head of the Army, although in peace his influence in army

5.

Colonies were added to the portfolio in 1801 but deleted in
June of 1854 by 18 & 19 Vic. C. 117 to create the first full
time Ministry of War.

-140administration was unspectacular. His greatest administrative powers
were activated by war.
for

War were :

to

The main duties of the Secretary of State

the Crown,

to ensure the armed forces were

'efficient'; to Parliament, to ensure estimates were formulated with
regard to economy but more especially that expenditure accorded with
votes;

to the Treasury,

established Regulations

to ensure money was spent according to
and

principles

(Goodenough

1893,

p.390;

" Royal Commission on Warlike Stores" 1887, p.viii).
Under normal circumstances the Secretary of State for War did
not

communicate

directly

with

the

Commander-in-Chief,

certainly

never in person, conferring instead with the Secretary-at-War (to
1855)

who

would

Commander-in-Chief.

convey

the

wishes

Communication

of

superior

his

difficulties

were

to

the

magnified

between the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief by
the geographical separation of their off ices.

Prior to 1870 the

Commander-in-Chief had his offices at Pall Mall while the Secretary
of State resided at Whi tenall.

The Northbrook Cammi ttee in 1868

regarded the different locations of the Commander-in-Chief and the
Secretary of State for War with some

unease.

According to

the

Committee the separation engendered the view they were two distinct
departments which tended to "antagonism on the part of the military
men

against

3789-3790).

the

supremacy

of

the

civilian

powers"

(Questions

The geographical separation of the two offices however,

was not unusual in military affairs at the time for, as Haldane
relates in his auto-biography,

the German Army had historically

housed its administration and command in separate buildings that had

-141to be, by regulation, at least a mile apart (1929, p.22). 6
the

War

Office

Act

1870

when

the

Constitutional

After

supremacy

of

civilians in the command and administration of the army was once and
for all clearly asserted opposition by the military to the Office of
Secretary of State for War intensified.
Objections to control of the army residing in the Secretary of
State

for

War

invariably

ignorance of

civilians

argued,

a

was

were

directed

at

in military matters.

complex

organisation

the
The

with

'necessary'
army,

its

own

it

was

peculiar

terminologies and procedures which required many years of military
association to understand.
army

intimately

properly.

Sir

and

No civilian could ever hope to know the

therefore

Thomas

could

Hastings,

never

Principal

manage

its

Storekeeper

affairs
to

the

Ordnance, prophesied in the late 19th century calamity for a system
"which places ... military departments in the hands of a civilian
ignorant

of

military

197l(b), p.204).

requirements

"

(quoted

in

Sweetman

This was especially so in the case of politicians

who occupied ephemerally the position of Secretary of State for War,
normally for periods of less than two years (Quarterly Review Vol.
131, 1871, pp. 523:--549; Q.!!_arter ly Review, Vol 165, 1887, p.

270;

Nineteenth Century, December 1903, pp. 908, 914; Nineteenth Century
Vol. XXX, 1891, p. 17;
There

were

of

civilianisation

6.

course
of

the

Quarterly Review Vol. 157, 1884, p. 514).
very

strong

office

of

proponents
Secretary

of
of

the
State

continued
for

War

The physical and administrative isolation altered with the War
Off ice Act of 1870 which required the Horse Guards to move from
Pall Mall to Whitehall.

-142(Nineteenth Century No. CCLXXXIV, 1900, p. 525; Fortnightly Review
June 1892, p. 847).
The work of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was
reinforced by the duties of the Secretary-at-War to 1855.

The

Secretary-at- War, another civilian, was to oversee army expenditure
in the interests of the public and to ensure that money voted by
Parliament was used expressly for the purposes authorised (Clode
1869, Vol.I p.225;

384 Anne, C.5;

Ward 1957, p.6;

pp. 39-40; Hartington Commission 1890, Appendix C,

Gordon 1935,

p. 60). 7

Lord

Palmerston saw the Secretary-at-War as a barrier between the army
and civilians by providing a
expenditure

(Atlay

1909,

pp.

"constitutional check"
243-244).

Lord

on military

Hardinge,

then

Commander-in-Chief, upheld in 1837 the Constitutional principle that
the head of the army should have no authority over army finances
when he reaffirmed that "the exclusive control over public money
voted for military purposes rests with the Secretary-at-War" (cited
by the Hartington Commission 1890, p.xxiv).

The Duke of Wellington,

formerly a Commander-in- Chief of the Army, confided in 1828 that it
was "much better that the Secretary-at-War should be the person to
regulate (finance)

7.

. . . than it should be in the hands of off ice rs

Sidney Herbert as Secretary-at-War in 1854 provided, what was
at that time, one of the first clear statements of the duties
of the Secretary-at-War:
"The Secretary at War is strictly a financial officer;
he exercises a control and check over all expenditure,
and no alteration even in matters of promotion and
discipline which necessitates any increased expenditure
can be carried into effect by the Commander-in-Chief
without his sanction . . . . He has also the preparation of
the Mutiny Bill and the Estimates"
(quoted in Stanmore
1906, p. 225).

-143connected with the army" (Hartington Commission 1890, p.xxiv).

The

office and duties of Secretary-at-War were amalgamated with that of
Secretary of State-for-War in 1855 and it was abolished in name and
practice by 26 & 27 VIC. C. 12 in 1863 (Goodenough 1893 , pp.391-392;
Hartington Commission 1890, p.xxiv). Subsequent alterations to the
office of Secretary of State for War are covered in section 6.6 of
this work.

5. 4

MILITARY

OPPOSITION

TO

A

The British Army had a well

CIVILIAN

PRESENCE

IN

FINANCE

ingrained dislike for civilian

meddling in any aspect of the military arising from several sources:
the purported ignorance of civilians in military lore which could
only

be

remedied

by a

lifetime of

close study and

experience;

civilian isolation from the army as a social class and the "delicate
and

obnoxious

duty

(of

civilians)

of

checking

extravagant

tendencies, of acting as a Remembrancer of regulations

II

(Lord

Haliburton 1875, Quoted in Atlay 1909, p. 37) .
Friction

between

the

military

and

civilians

was

endemic ,

occupying a large part of the military's time in meeting civilian
objections

to

military

proposals

comments in Atlay 1909, p. 41;
192).

If nothing

else,

(see

the

Duke

of

Cambridge's

Quarterly Review Vol. 193, 1901, p.

suggested Major-General

Balfour,

simply

belonging to the civilian or military 'class' guaranteed that two
differing views would be brought to bear upon most questions, for
each approached the issues from different directions.
epithets

'civilian'

and

'military'

were sufficient to

Use of the
produce a

-144-

counterproductive

polarisation

of

views

(Evidence

Strathnairn Committee 1867, Question 2457, p.191).
characteristics
intramural

of

military

loyalties,

life;

before

The predominant

extreme discipline,

authority

which

was

not

the

exclusive

determined

by

democratic processes, social and professional isolation, dependence
on the
forces

civilian for

their very existence and

of violent coercion,

development

of

the

army

alienation from society.
complete

antithesis

of

to

a monopoly of

the

all combined with the constitutional
breed

in

the

military a

feeling

of

The army was in a very acute sense the
civilian

society

yet

it

was

given

the

responsibility of ensuring the continuance of a social system and
social mores which the army could never accommodate within its own
organisation (See Abrams, no date given).
In

these

circumstances

military values,

it

was

not

to

be

unexpected

not generally revered by society at large,

be jealously and zealously protected by the military.

that
would

Members of

the military were moulded to regard themselves as a distinct caste
and the military ethic as the embodiment of that which was good,
normal

and

pure.

environment of

In

the army

the

closed,

it was

monastic

easy for

and

self

the military to

themselves as the repository of that which was desirable;
must by implication be eccentric.
military the more important
about its values (See Abrams).

it was

laudatory
regard

all else

The greater the threat to the
for the army to be obsessive

-145The dissonance of military and societal values and the mere
toleration and not reverence of the army convinced the military that
the only way it could ensure the continuance, in an undiluted form,
of the values

it regarded most highly was by vigorous defence.

Internally this defence could take the form of,
pedantic attention
military ethics,

to

the

the

intricacies of

ritual

of

amongst others,

discipline

the mess

and the

to

sharpen

regiment,

reverence for military accomplishments of the past

and

(See General

Fuller 1935, p. 15).

These also allowed the military to meet in a

non-threatening form

the potentially self depracating alienation

from membership of civilian society (See Abrams).

The army could

'embalm' itself through tradition and thereby cut itself . off from a
social reality none of its concern (General Fuller 1935, p. 16).
So extreme was the antipathy of the army towards its civilian
financial administrators that it was implied, and expressly stated
on

more

member
War

than

of

one

the

Office

occasion,

military

was

that

with

tantamount

to

the

zealous

co-operation

civilian

departments

professional

suicide.

by
at

a
the

Speaking

during the debate on administrative reform of the army in June 1855
Layard indicated that army reform by civilians was a very prickly
problem. Certainly the army resented civilians interfering.

Yet,

Layard questioned "whether any but a civilian can touch the army?
Why,

a

military man

civilian

may

overwhelming
military,
involvement.

make

mistakes

number

there

dare not

was

touch

when

the

it

came

of

regulations

no

alternative

Correspondence

Layard

army".

had

to

while

a

understanding

the

undergirded

the

that
but

For,

to

received

have
from

civilian
a

high

-146ranking army officer made it unmistakably clear to him thaf ' the
civilian could not expect to be "able to receive open assistance and
evidence, which would probably be the ruin of any military man who
might volunteer

to

enact

such a

Curtan part"

(Hansard

3/CXXX

VIII/2040-2063).
While

the

majority

of

officers,

though

by

no

means

all

officers, 8 may not have actively and openly opposed civilians in
their duties they did little to make the civilians' work easier
(see Evidence before the Strathnairn Committee 1867, Question 1843,
p.118;

see Trevelyan's Comments on the Horse Guards 1922, p.305).

Communication between civilians in administration and the military
was punctilious in the extreme with personal contact normally out of
the question.

Al 1 discussion was by letter, even when the Horse

Guards were located within the War Off ice (Hartington Commission
1890, Appendix C, p.60), which resulted in "a mass of correspondence
out

of

all

(Major-General

proportion

to

the

Sir William Butler,

work

which

evidence

has
before

to

be

the

done"

Brodrick

Committee 1898, Question 1499, p.218; see also Wheeler 1914, p.196;
Gordon 1935, p. 231;

"Report of the Select Cammi ttee on Military

Organisation" 1860, p. xvi of the Report).

When Cardwell forced the

Horse Guards to Whitehall by the War Office Act of 1870 he was at
once able to reduce the flow of correspondence by 30,000 letters a
year.

Despite this, while ever the division between civilian and

military,

8.

between

financial

administrator

and combatant,

existed

See Major Carter, who mourned the rift between military men and
civilian administrators
(1907,
p.527) and Lieut.-Colonel
Goodenough (1893, p.397).

-147there continued an aversion to speaking together 'sufficiently' in
preference to
Evelyn Wood

"writing backwards
before the

and forwards"

Brodrick Committee

(Evidence of

1898,

Question

Sir

1125,

p.201).
According to Major Churchill and Major Carter, making civilian
administrators and the military geographically closer, as did the
1870 War Off ice Act, only exacerbated the administrative problems
'created' by the civilian control of finance for the system meant
that when a civilian is in doubt he (might consult) ... a
military man who is probably inexperienced in finance.
The consequence is that we suffer from a combination of
evils, for civilians who have no practical experience of
the army, and military men who have no knowledge of
finance, are likely to mislead each other (Churchill 1895,
p. 39) .
Military off ice rs characterised the civilian administrator as
undependable
Power

before

(Evidence
the

of

the

Hartington

Commisary-General-in-Chief,
Committee

1864,

Question

Mr.

W.

2735),

obsessive and captious about money and economy and not caring about
the army (Evidence before the Brodrick Committee 1898, Question 502,
p.175;

The Nineteenth Century, December 1903, p . 917).

Sir Guy

Fleetwood-Wilson seemed to epitomise the civilian administrator as
criticised by the army.

As Director-General of Army Finance Sir

Guy Fleetwood Wilson only succeeded in strengthening the accusations
of the Military against the civilians inveterate concern for saving
money at the army's expense. According to Fleetwood Wilson he saw
his duty
to insist on a shilling being sufficient when it could be
made to produce the same result as half-a-crown ... (Thus)
I was constantly employed in pricking bubbles and pointing
out weak spots in military 'adventures'
(1922, p.114) .

-148Economy to the House of Commons and the Treasury, stressed
Arnold-Forster, meant "nine times out of ten , . . . the demand for a
reduction"

(1906,

p . 429;

see

also

the

Earl

conversation with the Chancellor of the Exchequer in
p. 124).

of

Midleton's

Midleton 1939 ,

Economy to the military on the other hand, was sufficient

spending to ensure victory and not a penny more or less. 9

Army

finance and administration implied to the military mind nothing more
than "a reduction of every consideration or object to the level of
pounds, shillings and pence" (Carter 1909, pp.371-372).

According

to the military the application of the financial preening-hook to
the army forced
practices

the army to often relinquish the best military

in favour

"lessons of

of

those

that could

the past fade away

efficiency of the army suffered

"

be afforded ,

(Alison · 1869,

p. 9)

Thus

the

and the

("Observations of Lord Panmure",

February 1855, Panmure Papers 1908, p. 47) .

The civilian, persisted

the military, was intent on hampering military administration and
performance at every turn (Fortnightly Review, Vol CCCXCVI I,

New

Series 1900, p. 2).
Churchill reflected the almost patriotic regard the army had
for resisting financial measures aimed at economy when he indicated
that it was
perfectly certain that regulations which emanate from
(civilians) will be unpopular with military men ;
while in
their attempt to economise these civilians far from receiving
the co-operation of officers, have frequently to contend with
the dead weight of inert opposition (Churchill 1895, p . 43; see
also Evidence of Sir Ralph Knox before the Brodrick Committee
1898, Question 901, p. 191).

9.

"The military way is marked by a primary concentration on men
and materials or winning specific objectives of power with the
utmost efficiency, that is with the least expenditure of blood
and treasure". (Vagts 1959, p. 13).

-149Best results were only possible as long as
the 'business' of the army be in the hands of the army . . .
(for) then Army officers will be 'business' men in their
own particular line. They, and they only, can know how to
produce in the Army the much desired combination of
efficiency and economy (Pritchard 1910, p. 221;
see also
Ormsby 1908, p . 842).
The army characteristically closed ranks to resist,

if only

passively, any influences that could be debilitating for the army.
There was,

noted Lord

continuous

"battle

Panmure in a

between

letter

parsimony

to Prince Albert,
(by

civilians)

patriotic economy .. . by the military" (February 28, 1857;
Papers 1908, p . 359).

a
and

Panmure

Constitutional alienation of the army from

the rest of society, the way it had traditionally been handled at
arm's-length "sundered from the main stream of national life" (Amery
1902 Vol.2, p.3) certainly ensured in time of organisational crisis
that military loyal ties would be directed inwards.
Review

referred

to

this

esprit de

corps

as

The Edinburgh

the

"soul"

of

the

military, sustaining it in difficulty (Vol. CLXI January to April
1885) .
Revered traditions and mores, developed in the military (Amery
1902 Vol.2, p.3)

to meet the antipathy of the outside community,

continued in the 19th century, despite the waning of constitutional
mistrust,

a

most

military relations

intractible

impediment

(See Amery

1902 Vol.

feeling in the army throughout
apparently was to

to
2,

improved
p.

3) .

civilian-

The

general

the latter half of the 19th century

'do the War Off ice'

(Evidence of Lieut. -Colonel

Churchill before the Brodrick Committee 1898, Question 502, p.175).

-150Certainly there was little admiration for the work of the civilians
(Earl of Midleton 1939, p. 98). 10
This

esprit

de

corps

financial

policies

aimed

means

defence,

or

of

Evidence of

was

at

even

a

formidable

financial
audit

of

Sir Ralph Knox before

Questions 1373 and 1374, p.212).

hindrance 11

rationalisation
its

activities

to

of

the

(see

the

the Brodrick Committee 1898,

In the case of audit, with the

provisions of the 1866 Audit Act about to be applied to the army in
1876, the Treasury and the Public Accounts Committee, recognising
the army 1 s distaste for examination by civilians,

felt compelled

to caution the Comptroller and Auditor-General and warn him of the
'delicacy' of his task:
Your Committee recognise that the introduction of the
proposed Test Audit must be conducted with care,
discretion and mutual forebearance
(No}
interdepartmental difficulties (must be allowed) ... to delay
the application or impede the smooth working of an audit
of Army Accounts
(Report of the Public Accounts
Committee 1876, p.122;
see also Normanton 1966, pp.104105).
The relationship between civilians and military was never free of
mutual suspicion.

The army was unable to shed its

loathing of

civilian authority which emanated from the Commons, which the army
was only too eager to admit

was the real thorn in the army's side

(see the Evidence of Sir Ralph Knox before the Brodrick Committee
1898, Question 1382, p.212; Fortnightly Review, Vol. CCCXCVII, New
10.

There were
Comptroller
105-107).

frequent conflicts between the army and
and Auditor-General (see Norrnanton 1966,

11.

In other circumstances Arnold-Forster referred to the military
esprit de corps as "a most valuable force
" ( 1906, p.
363}.

the
pp.

Arnold-Forster was Secretary of State for War from October 1903
till December 1905. See also Arnold-Forster 1900, p. 4.

-151Series

1900,

p.

9).

Like

most

individuals

irksome to have to dance to another's tune.

the

army found

it

Restraint in whatever

form it may take is universally despised.

5.5

THE ORGANISATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE AND CIVILIAN COMPETENCE
What particularly irritated the military and strengthened the

antipathy of the civilian and military departments was the apparent
supercilious arrogance of the civilians at the War Office. Not only
was it 'clear' to the army that civilians knew very little about the
military

but

the

civilians

generally

refused

to

accept

any

assistance, advice and the expertise the army might have and was
prepared to offer (see, for example, the case of Sir Walter Ogilvey
of the Army Pay Corps in Evidence before the Brodrick Committee
1898, Questions 508 and 509, p.175;

Alison 1869, p.52).

The Select

Committee on Army Estimates (1888) noted there was not so much as
one military clerk in

the Department

(Evidence, Question 5895).

of the Military Secretary

This also applied to the Accountant-

General's Office (Evidence of Ralph Knox, Accountant-General before
the

Royal

Commission

into

the

Commission) 1887, Question 906).

Civil

Establishments

(Ridley

For civilians to remain ignorant

in the presence of a bounty of advice and knowledge was nothing but
mischevious, suggested Lord Randolph Churchill (Churchill to Lord
Goschen, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 4 March 1888, cited in Elliot
1911, p. 149).

Indeed, little or no attempt was made by the finance

section of the War Off ice to involve the military in any financial
discussions affecting them and frequently no indication was given by
the Finance Department of the path it followed in its deliberations .
In these circumstances, with the army receiving little more than a

-152yes or no from civilians on finance, it was not unreasonable for the
army to argue that civilians at the War Off ice love "darkness rather
than

(and)

light

prefer

bureaucratic

closeness

to

open

discussion" (Edinburgh Review Vol. CXLIII, 1876 , p . 36).
Accusations of civilian ignorance and therefore incompetence
in military matters were countered by well supported charges of the
military' s

own

prized

ignorance

of

military

science

and

General Fuller upon joining the British Army in

administration.

1898 was "appalled by the ignorance which surrounded me and the
immense military value attached to it.

The off ice rs I met were

ignorant of everything beyond the most rudimentary elements of their
profession"
secretary

(Fuller
to

Lord

1935,

p.

Cardwell

Biddulph,

53).
in

1871 ,

had

who

been

was

private

surprised

and

disappointed at "how little ... (was known) by officers generally of
the principles of army administration (1904, p. xii).

Discussion of

military matters in the mess was strenuously discouraged as being
It was also 'bad form' to study to improve military

'bad form'.

expertise and there were no procedures to test the knowledge of an
officer on active service.
His

Wife,

p.

anachronistic,12

64).

(Rankin 1901, A Subaltern's Letters to

Education

pr oded

by

of

officers

fright

continued

every

so

to

remain

of ten

e.g.

Franco-Prussian War and Crimean War, to introduce minor changes.

12.

The well educated officer in the mid 1850's was required: to
be able to translate Livy's History of Rome; know the names of
all European capital cities;
to have read Caesar's
Commentaries, Plutarch's Lives, Alison's Life of the Duke of
Wellington,
Yates'
Elementary Treatises in Tactics and
Strategy, Napier's History of the War in the Peninsula and
Wellington's Dispatches (The Pattern Military Officer, Quoted
in Turner 1956, p. 198).

-153Differences in the tenure of office of civilian and military
personnel at the War Off ice was a fertile source of antagonism.
Whereas the civilians employed in the War Off ice or Treasury might
spend their entire career in either department the military at the
War

Office

(after

Review,

Vol.

little

or

1870)

were

rotated

frequently

LXVII, July to December 1895, p.
no

movement

of

civilians

between

(Contemporary

330).

There was

each

government

department, each department regarding itself as distinct from all
other departments and not part
(Finer 1937,

of a single,

p.29; Campbell 1965, p.14,17).

correlated service
However,

immobility

within the Civil Service had serious implications, especially for
the Treasury, such that "the internal arrangements and regulations
of the different departments ... (were) very imperfectly understood
at the Treasury ... " (Sir Charles Trevelyan 1875, in The Nineteenth
Centur-y, Vol.XX July to December 1886, p. 500).
For much of the 19th century, certainly until 1870, civilian
appointment to government departments was very much dependent upon
political

favour

("First

Report

of

the

Commission", 1875, pp. 5 & 7 of the report).

Civil

Service

Inquiry

It was accepted within

government that one of the rights of political ascension was the
ability to bestow favours in the form of providing secure government
positions.

Not all politicians looked upon this with favour because

the clamorous beseechings by anxious relatives could be an annoyance
occuping a great deal of their time (Quarterly Review, Vol. 133,
July

to

October

appointments,

1872,

p.

243).

The

result

of

nepotitic

concluded Northcote and Trevelyan in 1854 was that

-154government departments became refuges
for the unambitious, and the indolent or incapable
Those whose abilities do not warrant an expectation that
they will succeed in the open professions
and those
whose indolence of temperament or physical infirmities are
unfit for active exertions
The comparative lightness
of the work, and the certainty of provision in case of
retirement owing to bodily incapacity,
furnish
strong
inducements to the parents and friends of sickly youths to
endeavour to obtain for them employment in the service of
the Government.
The result
naturally, is that the public
service suffers both in internal efficiency and in public
estimation (Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil
Service, Vol. 27 (1713) 1854, p. 4 (Trevelyan-Northcote
Report); Also Quarterly Review Vol. 133 July to October 1872,
p. 243).
John Bright referred to the Civil Service as "a gigantic system of
outdoor

relief

for

younger

sons

of

the

landed

(Nineteenth Century, No. CCLXXXIV, 1900, p. 532).

aristocracy"

The Westminister

Review indicated that at the time of the Trevelyan-Northcote report
the

Civil

Ser~ice

had

weakness of the nation",

"become

the

epitome

of

the

intellectual

being inhabited with a liberal dose of

aristocratic dolts (January to April 1876, New Series Vol. XLIX, p.
467).

Having obtained

a

sinecure

dismissal was almost unheard of,
(Q.!!arterly

Review,

Vol.

133,

in

the government's service

especially for

July

to

October

'mere'
1872,

stupidity
p.

243;

Trevelyan-Northcote Report 1854, p. 5).
The investigations of Trevelyan 13 and Northcote, instigated by
a Treasury Minute of the 12 April 1853, discovered little of merit

13.

Examination of letters written by Trevelyan between 1840 and
1859 indicated to Hart that the ideas presented by Trevelyan in
the 1854 report were the product of a gestation period of at
least fourteen years.
Thus despite the report's brevity, 34
pages, it was not the result of a hurried and superficial
consideration of the civil service as was claimed by its
critics (Hart 1960, p. 106).

-155in the organisation and
thereby

indirectly

operation of government departments and

added

veracity

to

the

civilian incompetence and inefficiency
Quarterly

Review,

Vol.

168,

military's

claims

(see the Comments of

January

to

April

1889,

p.

of
the

453).

Predictably, the observations in the final report were met with a
storm of protest and personal vilification from prominent officials,
among them Sir Thomas Fremantle, and Sir George Lewis, and from some
sections of the press.

The Under Secretary of the Home Department

called the report a collection of "unjust and unfounded imputations"
which created a case "for the purposes of prejudice, rather than of
a fair and impartial statement ... " (quoted in the Quarterly Review,
Vol. 108, July to October 1860, p. 577).
Because of the obvious opposition of senior civil servants the
government was loathe to implement all the recommendations of the
Trevelyan-Northcote report.
recommendations,
was

the

The most contentious of the report's

which received only diluted government approval,

selection of

lower grade

civil servants by examination

after consideration of the "age, health, and moral fitness of the
candidates"

(Trevelyan-Northcote

Report

1854,

p.

11).

As

the

first step in implementing the examination proposal, by an order in
Council

on

the

21

May

1855

Civil

Service

Commissioners

were

appointed to examine the fitness for employment of all applicants to
government departments.

The Commissioners could make success in an

examination set by them a precondition for employment but only if
agreed to by the relevant government department.

Each department

was still free to hold its own examinations or to dispense with them
altogether.
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Despite

strong

opposition

to

the

extension

of

compulsory

examinations 14 to all departments and conducted by a central body,
Orders

in Council

examinations

on

the

4 June

obligatory appointment

departments . 1 5

1870

and 19 August 1871 made

assessment

criteria

for

all

The Orders in Council also created three divisions

of Civil Servants:
casual basis, 16

writers, who were in the majority appointed on a
and two grades of clerks, Class I and Class II.

Both classes of clerk were to be recruited principally on the basis
of examination results, although there were exceptions permitted for
Class

I

appointees.

intellectual

Class

abilities

and

I

clerks were

represented

a

recruited
select

insulated from the mundane routine of government:

for

group

their
to

be

they ·were to be

an elite (First Report of the Civil Service Inquiry Commission 1875,
p.

6

of

the

report).

The

selection

examination

for

Class

I

emphasized higher learning while that for Class II examined the more
mechanical

abilities

of

the

applicants

(For

details

of

the

exmainations see The Nineteenth Century, Vol. XX, July to December
1886,

pp. 492-493).

The different examinations effectively closed

access to the higher division for applicants of humbler origins and
possessing

the

barest

of

educational

achievements

(See

the

criticisms of the Quarterly Review, Vol. 133, July to October 1872,
p. 248). Further,

subsequent movement between the two classes after

14.

See page 157 for some of these objections.

15.

Some positions were still exempt from the requirement of
sitting an examination if recommended by the Treasury
(Superannuation Act of 1859, p. 4).

16.

Writers were treated in a very hard fashion, rece1v1ng very low
pay and no pension, however long their service (See ''Evidence
before the Select Cammi ttee on Army Estimates'~ 1888, Fourth
Report, Questions 4828 to 4831).
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impossible and any

change to this was strongly

resisted (Quarterly Review, Vol. 168, January to April 1889, p. 458;
Evidence of Sir Reginald Welby, Permanent Secretary to the Treasury,
before the "Royal Commission on Civil Establishments," 1887, Question
76).

Stating somewhat the obvious, the Playfair Commission in 1875

argued this dual and prejudical

system of employmnent tended to

"promote discontent" (1875, p. 9 of the report).
Objections

to

the

new

Civil

Service

organisation

and

recruitment changes focused on the emphasis given to examination
performance

in

the

examinations would:

selection

process.

It

was

argued

that

not be able to separate those who were morally

unfit for public service;

narrow school and university curricula to

allow students to swat and cram for the Civil Service examinations;
fill the Civil Service with young men who were bright but would also
be

bored

with

the

mechanical

therefore become troublesome

of

most

of

the

work

(Edinburgh Review January to

1874, Vol. CXXXIX, pp. 334-357;
October 1872, pp. 247-261;

nature

and

April

Quarterly Review Vol. 133, July to

Quarterly Review Vol. 168, January to

April 1889, p. 455; see also Fleetwood Wilson's experience of the
examinations in 1869, 1922, p. 45;
pp.

547-549 and October 1902, pp.

Westminster Review, May 1901,
462-466;

Evidence before the

Select Committee on Army Estimates 1888, Questions 4518-4521, pp.
50-51).

Subsequent experience with

'Playfair men'

doubts and criticisms to be unfounded.

prove,d

these

Ralph Knox could not detect

any deterioration in the character of the men recruited into the
Accountant-General's
notice

an

office

improvement

in

in the

War Office,

ability

(Evidence

although he
before

the

did

Royal

-158Commission into the Civil Establishments 1887, Questions 943 and
948).
Despite the rapid advances made since the Trevelyan-Northcote
report in 1854 the Civil Service remained a Civil 'Service' in name
only.

There was

almost no

integration of positions throughout

government departments whilst movement between departments was an
exceptional occurence.

Each office, remarked the Quarterly Review

in 1889, was "a little family coterie in itself '', a law unto itself
(Vol. 168, January to April 1889).
With each Civil Servant channelled into one department for his
entire working life with the government 17 the result was, remarked
the Trevelyan-Northcote report, the encouragement of
narrow views and departmental prejudices ... (as well as)
considerable inconvenience . .. from the want of facilities
for transferring strength from an off ice where work is
becoming slack to one in which it is increasing ... (1854,
p . 8).

The Terms of Reference of the Playfair Commission 18 in 1874 ("Civil
Service Inquiry Commission")
attention

of

the

into the Civil Service directed the

Commissioners

to

this

autonomous

nature

of

government departments when they stressed the need to investigate
unification of the civil service and therefore the need to determine
the principles upon which
men should be transferred from Office to Off ice
(3) The possibility of grading the Civil Service as a
whole .
17 .

Adding more weight to military criticism of civilians in the
War Off ice was the fact that the Treasury and Foreign Off ice
were preferred by the brightest recruits while the War Office
was the least preferred and thereby inhabited by the least
talented appointees . For example see the First Report of the
Civil Service Inquiry Commission 1875, p. 18.

18 .

For a discussion of those immediate events and forces which
prompted the Playfair Commission see the evidence of Sir
Richard Hamil ton before the Royal Commission into the Civil
Establishments 1887, p. 422 .

-159The Playfair Commission therefore was the first significant
attempt

to

investigate

majority of the
Gladstone's

government

for

of

the

Civil

Commission's recommendation's

August 1889, p. 465).
competition

unification

(Quarterly

Review,

Service,

being accepted

Vol.

168,

January

the
by
to

Most significantly there was now to be open

positions

in

all

departments.

By

allowing

departmental mobility Civil Servants were to be encouraged to see
themselves as serving interests wider than those of their immediate
superiors and their departments, and to view fellow Civil Servants
in other departments less as competitors and more as colleagues
sharing a common esprit de corps (Westminster Review, New Series,
Vol. XLIX, January to August 1876, p. 488).
However, despite the marked improvements in the Civil Service
following on from the Trevelyan-Northcote report and the Playfair
Commission, to a very large extent Civil Servants, despite being
civilians, continued throughout the second half of the 19th century
to see themselves as isolated from the community because of the
nature of their work.

Also, although opportunities to move between

departments were created after the Playfair report the parochial
exclusiveness of the service with its consequent narrowing of the
field of vision to a single department continued (Evidence before
the Select Committee on Army Estimates 1888.

Questions 5003, and

5005 of the Fourth Report refer to the absence of any movement
between

the

War Office and

the

Treasury).

Civilian government

departments resented interference from other departments.
Thus the longevity and permanence of civilians 19 in office gave
19 .

Appointment as a civil servant was to a secure position for
life unless. notes Campbell, "guilty of some heinous offence"
(1965, p.19). Dismissal for inefficiency was almost unknown.

-160them an aura of authority and proficiency which was resented by the
more ephemeral military at the mercy of financially knowledgeable
civilians (see Clode 1869, Vol.II, p.514). Because of their intimate
knowledge of the great mass of details which characteristed the
army's financial business, and which were largely unintelligible to
the uninitiated,
presumptious,
1869,

the civilians,

argued Galton,

tended to

denegrating military contributions

Vol.II,

p.512;

Churchill

1906,

p.

become

(cited in Clode
It was

179).

not

surprising that the Duke of Cambridge, an implacable foe of any
incursion by civilians in military affairs, treated the War Office
as an inconvenient rival;
Midleton 1939, p. 168;
Even

more

something he shared with Edward VII (See

Atlay 1909, p. 41).

serious

in nurturing

the

hostility

of

the army

towards its civilian administrators were the accusations made by the
army that civilians in finance
questions

(see the report of the Dawkins Cammi ttee 1901,

See Howard 1978,

p.21;

"has

hitherto

p .182;

also Bond's comments on Wellington 1961,

p.617; Blake 1978, p.28).
what

interfered in technical military

been

The army argued that this contravened
understood

that,

the

Army once voted,

Parliament ought not to interference with its arrangements"

(The

Duke

of

Also

Lord

Salisbury's

Cambridge

1837,
comments

Quoted
in

in

Gordon

Roseveare

1935,

1969,

p.

p.

45;

184).

Prince

Albert predicted that increasing civilian interference in military
matters would "finally cause the ruin of our army" (Prince Albert
to Lord Clarendon, September 17 1855, Panmure Papers 1908, p. 393).
After intensive investigation of the 38 Volumes comprising Sir
Charles Trevelyan's letters between 1840-1859, Hart notes how he was
impressed by the magnitude of Trevelyan's interference in military

-161matters.

Trevelyan,

as Chancellor of the Exchequer for most of

these years, does not seem to have been able to leave the War Office
alone.

His

intrusions

were

"constant"

(1960,

p.

97).

The

verisimilitude of the accusations of civilian interference was also
attested to by the Esher Committee which directed doubters to War
Off ice papers which "teem with minutes proving the clerks of the
Finance Branch freely express their opinions on matters of military
policy" 20 (1904, Part 2, p.15 and see also p.17). This should not be
regarded

as

unusual

for

most

so

called military questions

probably be reduced to a financial level.

can

It was obvious to the

Esher Committee however, that the intrusion of civilians into the
hallowed area of military policy was because the civilians were
unable to divest themselves of the distrust they had of the army in
questions which even remotely were likely to produce a decision on
finance (Esher Committee 1904, Part 2, p.15 of the report).
interference of

the civilian administrators

in

This

'purely military

matters' was strongly condemned by the Esher Committee which firmly
concluded

that

it

"fully

accounted

for

the

administrative

inefficiency at the War Office" (1904, Part 2, p.17 of the report;
See also Edward VII's comments on civilian interference in Benson's
Life of King Edward (1903) as cited by Midleton 1939, p. 168).) 21

20.

Sometimes the interference was unavoidable due to military
administrative deficiencies (see the experiences of Sir Guy
Fleetwood Wilson, Director General of Army Finance, in
Fleetwood Wilson 1922, p. 72).

21.

The Crimean War which highlighted the
civilian controlled offices had already
Government after the Crimean War to
civilian administrators
(See Lord
Parliament, February 21, 1856 as found
1908, footnote 1 p. 118-120).

maladministration of
forced the Palmerston
tighten control over
Panmure' s speech to
in the Panmure Papers

-162Viewed

in

the

context

of

the

neglected

findings

Trevelyan-Northcote report , and later findings,
military against the

inefficiency,

intrusion,

of

the

the claims of the
ignorance and self

interest of their civilian masters appear less the obsessive and
unfounded
civilian

harpings

of

involvement

the
in

guilty .

military

In

addition,

administration,

criticism
especially

finances, was not restricted to the self interested military.
letter to Lord Goschen,

of
its

In a

the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Lord

Randolph Churchill's successor,

on the 4th March 1888 Churchill

indicated that he
had long been of opinion (sic) that the civilian
management of the Services has completely broken down
and has landed ups in heavy expenditure ... Your civilians
are mischevious, for they cannot have the knowledge to
fulfill the duties which they insist on retaining in their
hands (Quoted in Atlay 1911, p . 149; See also Fortescue's
criticisms of civilian incompetence in military finance,
The Nineteenth Century December 1903, p. 917).
The Northbrook Committee (1869) recognised the adversary nature
of

the

relationship

between

financial

adminstrators

at

the

War

Off ice and military off ice rs but also made it quite clear that it
thought both parties were at fault (1870, First Report, p.3;
Third

Report,

p.

In

X).

common

with

later

commissions

Also
and

committees the Northbrook Committee was unable to dismiss the need
for

a

civilian

Success! ve

presence,

if

not

monopoly,

of

army

investigations of military administration

finance.

in the 19th

century argued that the then present organisation of army supply and
finance

could

not

be

isolated

from

the

position

constitution and by Parliament which demanded a
presence.

Still,

taken

by

the

strong civilian

the Northbrook Committee (1869) was critical of

-163the way that the financial officials at the War Office carried out
their constitutional role and spent most of their time
merely checking, criticising and watching the expenditure
of the ... military officials while the latter conceived
that their object in life was to get as much out of the
former as they could conveniently do. There were in fact
two rival organisations, one endeavouring to spend all it
could, while the other was conspicuous for its cheeseparing proclivities (Quoted in Striedinger 1909, p.202;
see also Hutton, Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers Vol.II
1904, p.297; the Lawrence Committee 1924, p.712).
The

result was

that efficiency and economy were

'at war'

for,

lamented the Northbrook Committee
the expenditure which should be directed solely to secure
efficiency tends to generate into extravagance, and
economy, which should check waste to result in incomplete
efficiency (1869, First Report, p.3; See also the
Quarterly Review Vol.
129 July to October 1870,
pp. 282-283) .
Criticism was also levelled at the Finance staff, especially
that

of

described

the
by

Accountant-General 22 ,
the

Accountant-General and

Esher

at

the

Committee

as

indeed his

War

who

were

'promiscuous'.

The

whole staff

Office

were

called

into

question not only because of their suspect accounting credentials
but also because of the department's avidity for self aggrandisement
(1904, Part 2, p.15 of the report).

Paradoxically an Accountant-

General, Sir Ralph Knox, had earlier also alluded to the civilian
administrators'
(Evidence

22.

need

before

the

to

"have
Brodrick

everything
Committee

in

their

1898,

own

hands"

Question

See Chapter 6 for details of the Accountant-General and his
department.

857,

-164p.189). 23

Therefore, military fears of unreasonable and peremptory

financial measures and suspicion of the motives and actions of the
army's

finance

departments appear

to

have

been well

justified,

especially on the part of the Treasury.

5.6

THE MILITARY, THE TREASURY AND THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMY
Civilians working in military finance were looked at askance by

the army (See Turner 1912, p. 297).

An invisible "di vi ding line"

existed between them (Dawkins Committee 1901, p.184), because not
only were civilians seen as

interlopers,

dilettants in military

matters but as agents of the Treasury acting as watchdogs over the
State's

money

but with

only

"shadowy

responsibility" · for

their

actions (see Sir Ian Hamilton's Report, Commonwealth Parliamenta.!:_Y
Papers 1914, Vol. I I, p .150;

see also Evidence before the Brodrick

Committee 1898, Question 502, p. 175). 24
approached

as

'spies

and

strangers'

Civilians in finance were

(Higgs

1924,

p.127).

Sir

Charles Harris, Head of the Finance Department at the War Office,
gave some idea of the basis of the military's apprehension when he
recounted how
as a junior official in (a finance branch)
I was
taught to consider myself an 'outpost of the Treasury', in
the sense of being bound to resist anything contrary to
the letter or spirit of Treasury instructions (1931,
pp.318- 319).

23.

In 1828 the Select Committee on Finance noted how "each
department naturally endeavours to exalt its own importance,
and wishes to promote its general efficiencey;
... hence the
desire to secure those objects rather than the exigency of the
public service
" (Referred to by the Howick Commission 1833,
p. 109).

24.

Sir Ian's comments were the distillation of years of experience
in the British Army in the late 19th century.

-165According to one head of Treasury in the late 19th century,
Goschen, the Treasury for its part gave as good as it received, 25
there being a
uniform and almost constant attitude of positive hostility
in language taken up by various officers of the Treasury
towards
Military Officers generally
(Quoted in
Roseveare 1969, p.208).
In January 1900 Lord Salisbury,
political

furore

with

his

then Prime Minister,

comments

relationship with the British Army.

on

the

created a

Treasury

and

its

He alleged that the Treasury

used its "power of the purse" to interfere in "all decisions of
administrative authority and policy" which resulted in "much delay
and many doubtful resolutions" (Quoted in Roseveare 1969, · p.183; See
also Churchill 1906, p. 180).

In the case of the army, he concluded

that ''the exaggerated control of the Treasury has done harm" (Quoted
in Roseveare 1969, p .184;

See the Chancellor of the Exchequer's

reply in Hicks Beach, 1932 Vol.
Salisbury

Lord

Secretary for

was
War,

also
the

2 pp. 116-117).

expressing
Earl

of

the

problems

Midleton, 26

who

In his comments
faced
had

Treasury "ruthless and dominant" (Midleton 1939, p. 123).

by

his

found

the

Midleton

found money was only prised from the Treasury by "unending struggle"
(1939,

p.

126).

Robert

Hamilton

also

referred to

clashes with the Treasury (Hamil ton to Gladstone 1865,

"perpetual"
in Wright

25.

Roseveare argues the discordant posture adopted by the Treasury
was out of impotence and thus spite, as much as anything
( 1969).

26.

Sir John Brodrick, later the Earl of Midleton, served as
Financial secretary to W.H. Smith and Stanhope from August 1886
to August 1892. He then assumed office as Under Secretary of
State with responsibility for War Off ice business from July
1895 to October 1898 . He became Secretary of State for War in
November 1900 (to October 1903).

-1661969,

p.

344).

To

avoid

the

struggle,

as

much

as

possible

departments frequently asked for much more than they needed hoping
to get what they required after their requests had been paired by
the Treasury (Evidence of Sir Richard Hamil ton before the "Royal
Commission

on

Arnold-Forster

Civil
in

Establishments"

the

same

year

1887,

Appendix

Lord

Salisbury

as

p.

425).

made

his

announcement also denounced the Treasury as "that wicked department''
which had nothing better to do than prevent "the War Office from
following

its own noble impulses"

( 1900,

p.

100;

see also Lord

Haliburton's views in The Times 11 February 1900).
The
finances

adverse
was

view

also

Arnold-Forster.

of

Treasury

voiced

much

interference
earlier

than

in

the

army's

Salisbury

and

The Civil Service Commission in 1886 indicated that

the evidence taken
by the Commissioners affords abundant proof of the harm
by the present
done,
and
the discontent caused,
unsatisfactory control in the hands of the Treasury (cited
in the Quarterly Review Vol. 168, January to April 1889,
p. 479).
The Contemporary Review in 1895 criticised the arrogance of the
Chancellor of The

Exchequer and Treasury heads who appeared to gain

pleasure at making the army wait impatiently for financial approvals
(Vol.

LXVIII,

Nineteenth

July

Century

to

December

Vol.

XXIV,

1895,
July

p.

to

See

also

1888,

p.

331;

December

Comments of E. Cecil, former Surveyor-General;

The
113,

Also Hart's comments

on Sir Charles Trevelyan's long and bitter battles with the War
Office as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1960, p. 104).
Churchill

in

1886

had

also

appreciated

the

need

Lord Randolph
for

greater

-167constraint over the Treasury, preferably through the Comptroller and
Auditor General and the Public Accounts Committee (Churchill Vol II
1906, p. 151).
Contrary

to

more

extreme

views,

Treasury

control

of

Parliamentary votes was not unfettered but depended upon negative
powers which came into effect only when the Treasury received an
application to exceed a Parliamentary Vote.

Thus, according to Lord

Welby, in the absence of requests for more money Treasury control of
military finance was more imaginery than real (Royal Commission on
Civil Establishment 1887, First Report XIX, pp.1-9).

Nevertheless,

Welby later sought to commend the "needful control" of the Treasury
(Select Committee on National
231).

Far

Treasury

to

from

having

demands

to

Expenditure'',

unlimited
exceed

powers

Votes,

Appendix 13,
the

1902 p.

response

according

to

of

the

Wright

and

Roseveare, was very much determined by a large number of factors,
not the least of which was the esteem held in government for the
Secretary of State for War and the prevailing political and economic
climate (Wright 1972, p. 198; Roseveare 1969).

This was seen no

more clearly than in the case of Lord Randolph Churchill.
In

1886 when

appointed

Lord

Lord

Salisbury

Randolph

Churchill

formed

his

Chancellor

second cabinet he
of

the

Exchequer.

Churchill had long believed that Britain should curtail its military
activities overseas, in particular in Turkey. He was therefore, as a
staunch disciple of Gladstonian economics (though not of Gladstone),
an energetic advocate of retrenchment in military expenditure (Lord
Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury 22 December 1886,
Church! ll 1906,

p. 239).

Quoted in

Under Lord Randolph Churchill Treasury

-168efforts to reduce military estimates came to a head in 1887.

The

Treasury as usual was presented with the Army's estimates and as
frequently happened in the past sent them back to the Army with the
request that the Army examine ways of reducing the estimates.

In

the past when reductions were called for and subsequently carried
out Treasury wishes had more often than not received the backing of
Parliament.

In this instance however, not only did the Secretary of

State for War, W.H. Smith, refuse to consider any reductions but
when he appealed to Cabinet for adjudication on the matter Cabinet
also refused to see the urgency for reductions (W.H. Smith to Lord
Randolph Churchill 16 December 1886, in Churchill 1906, p., 230).
Therefore Cabinet rejected Treasury recommendations.
Lord Randolph, relying on what he thought was public support
for his position and that of the Treasury,sought to embarrass the
Government and thereby reconcile it to his views and tendered his
resignation (Lord Randolph Churchill to Lord Salisbury 20 and 22
December 1886, in Churchill 1906, pp. 235,239).

Unfortunately, for

Lord Randolph, he had seriously misjudged public sentiments at a
time when colonial possessions had given Britain not only wealth but
pre-eminence in world affairs, and when French and German interests
were threatening this posi tion 27 (Fortnightly Review Vol. XLI New
Series January to June 1887,
rapidly accepted

27.

by Lord

pp.

150-155).

Salisbury and

His resignation was

Lord Randolph

Churchill

The threat had existed for some time, at least since 1884.

-169having learnt the lesson
matters

was

tethered

that Treasury intervention in military

by

Government

support,

passed

into

the

contrary,

and

political wilderness.
Despite

incessant military complaints

to

the

notwithstanding ministerial pronouncements, the Dawkins Committee in
1901 was unable to find any substantive basis for the "exaggerated
impression ... that Departmental Treasury control has been exerted
to an

extent

and

in a

manner

that has

seriously hampered

the

administration, and efficiency of the Army": the Treasury had only
ever carried out Parliament's wishes (p.188 of the Report).

Lord

Welby before the Ridley Commission (1887) had pre-empted these later
findings when he referred to Treasury control as a "purely financial
check instituted for purely financial purposes" (Quoted in Wright
1972, p.201).

5.7

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
The civilian finance officer saw his function as "imposing an

external control on an unwilling (department) ... whose disposition
to extravagance could only be curbed by heavy handed restraint"
(Waldegrave 1931,

p.259).

Army finance therefore amounted to a

"system of control of army expenditure" (Harris 1911, p.60;
also Gordon 1935,

p . 231).

see

Little wonder the army conceived army

finance as dominated by concern for criticism.
Such

an

anomolous

situation

could

not

but

create

serious

difficulties and not solely because of communication problems caused
by the organisational separation of command and administration .

The

-170environment created was conducive to problems, in no small measure,
because of

the potential

for

personal

conflict as

well

as

the

antagonism that was bound to be generated between the military, as a
spending department, and civilians charged with the responsibility
of overseeing expenditures.

The paranoia of

the army in these

circumstances was not inconsiderable.
The military were,

in the interests of military performance,

content to give administration to specialists but only those from
its own ranks and certainly never to civilians whose specialist
knowledge

of

technical

military

matters

was

most

doubtful.

Parliament however, saw the partitioning of financial administration
and

command

in

constitutional

and

economic

terms.

· Therefore

conflicts of opinion and practice were inevitable.
Not only did civilians control all matters of military finance
but the great majority of finance work was concentrated at the War
Office.

Therefore, of especial interest in the next chapter are the

expressed implications for military efficiency and effectiveness of
the highly centralised system of military financial administration
operating

between

1846

to

1899.

Also

examined

is

financial

decentralisation as the favoured means both to overcome most, if not
all, the professed deficiencies of extreme decentralisation and the
means

to

ameliorate

the

antagonism

between

the

military

and

civilians.
In the late 19th century however, anachronistic constitutional
influences continued to dominate the structure of financial control
and hamper moves for change.

CHAPTER
CENTRALISATION

OF

6
ARMY

FINANCE

Your
Commandant
tells
me
that
you
show
independence of judgement, willingness to accept
responsibility, intelligence and self reliance.
All of these drawbacks you will, in time learn to
correct.
(Comments, according to Field Marshall Haig, of a
distinguished
Inspecting
Officer
addressing
students at the Staff College in the 1890's.)
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INTRODUCTION
Administration

of

army

finance

was

highly

centralised

and

tethered by the devices of control essential to, and instrumental
in ,

centralised

supervision.

financial

administrative

No

department, claimed Buxton in 1883, was more centralised ( p. 211).
Centralisation had been a
constitutional
military's

response both to Parliament's earlier

misgivings

financial

and

honesty

Parliament's
and

financial

mistrust
acumen

of

(see

the
Field

Marshall Lord Montgomery's comments in The Times, March 19, 1957,
p.9;

Evidence

of

Major-General

Sir

William

Butler

before

the

Brodrick Committee 1898, Question 1499, p.218). Consequently, a very
inert

system

of

financial

checks

and

balances

developed

culminating in improvements to government accounting in the second
half

of

the

19th

with

century

one

department

authorising

expenditure and another making expenditures (see Lord Palmerston's
comments,

1828,

as

referred

to

in

the

CXXXIll, January to April 1871 p. 237;

Edinburgh

Review,

Vol.

also 1855, Vol. Cl, p . 538).

Throughout the second half of the 19th century however,
became

increasingly

exclusively

civilian

recognised 1
military

that

finance

the

highly

function

1t

centralised,

favoured

British Parliament had become increasingly inappropriate.

by

the

It was

held that highly centralised financial control was incompatible with
efficient military operations

in the field and conducive to the

delinquent dissipation of financial and other resources.

1.

Culminating in the financial recommendations of the Brodrick
(1898), Dawkins (1901) and Esher (1904) Committees.

-173It is the task of this chapter to examine the arguments raised
against

the

extreme

centralisation

of

military

finance as

it

existed in the second half of the 19th century in the British Army;
to

detail

the

avowed

merits

of

the

diffusion

responsibilities throughout the military;
which were

to eventually bring about

of

financial

to determine pressures

financial

decentralisation

after 1900 and to discuss the means pref erred in bringing about the
decentralisation of army finance.
At the close of the period covered by this study the structure
of

financial

control

remained

commencement of the period.

largely

as

it

had

been

at

the

To contrast the seeming imperturbable

nature of army finance with other areas of administration the latter
part

of

this

chapter

administrative reform.

will

detail

the

major

episodes

In particular attention will focus on:

of
the

Cardwell reforms of 1870 which strengthened the civilian role in
army finance;

the recommendations of the Ridley Commission of 1887

which brought little change to military finance but did result in a
concentration

of

military

administration

in

the

person

of

the

Commander-in-Chief; the adjustments made to military administration
in 1895 which again brought no improvement in military involvement
in finance.

6.2

OBJECTIONS TO THE EXTREME CENTRALISATION OF MILITARY FINANCE
The most serious objections to a highly centralised military

finance function were cogently expressed by the venerated military
finance expert Sir Charles Harris who alluded to the

-174congestion of regulations and correspondence about details
(which) ... submerges offices, multiplies routine clerks
and absorbs the time and energy of men who ought to be
free for constructive thought
(There results) a
paralysing effect on the whole race of officials who soon
learn to think that their sole duty is to secure exact
compliance with regulations or to submit to higher
authority for a fresh ruling, with the result that their
sense of responsibility and power to act for themselves
suffer atrophy. On these lines work is done over and over
again in the offices through which it passes on its way up
to the centre (Sir Charles Harris 1931, p. 320;
also
Durell 1917, p.258, p.475).
The Select Committee on Army Estimates had recognised in 1888
that

to

supervise

financial

too

closely

responsibility

Individuals

cosseted

(see

by

removed

personal

Questions

3068

numerous

financial

initiative
and

and

5869-5877).

regulations

and

guidelines could be induced to abrogate their sense of personal
responsibility

in

preference

to

punctilious

financial

accountability, as demonstrated to an unfortunate and exaggerated
degree in the Crimean War (see Chapter 2).

The Contemporary Review

lamented that "the soldiers do not feel it their duty to point out
in what way the object can be gained with the

least cost

II

(Contemporary Review Vol. LXVIII, July to December 1895, p. 332).
Lamentable as this may have been, in a highly regulated environment
attention tends to become focussed on details which have a direct
personal

impact

Consequently,

rather

to take any

uncharacteristic

of

than

on

overall

or

corporate

goals.

interest beyond immediate concerns

financial

control

devoid

of

reward

is
for

initiative.
In the context of war,

as a major part of this study has

demonstrated in relation to the Crimean War, a highly centralised
system of financial control was both "futile ... and ruinous ... "
(Esher Committee 1904, Part 3, paragraph 9).

Control that is highly

-175centralised

is

Centralisation

intended
can,

to closely regulate

additionally,

give

rise

subordinate
to · a

action.

multitude

of

obstacles and hazards not originally intended (see, for example, the
Evidence of

Sir Ralph Knox before

the Brodrick Cammi ttee 1898,

Question 1499, p.219). Thus, fluidity of operation is denied as the
actions of subordinates are retarded by the control hurdles they
must negotiate (see Sunbury 1924, p.132).

There results a "maximum

of friction with a minimum of efficiency"
Part

2,

p.15

of

the

report);

a

(Esh er Committee 1904,

consistent

outcome

of

control

mechanisms which measured performance not by results but instead by
success in an intricate game of artificial hazards (or
regulations) and forfeits having little connection with
practical requirements or ends (Harris 1931, p.315). ·
Focalised control, such as that which characterised the finance
departments

of

the

Commission 1898,
accede

to

or

War

p.127,

deny

Off ice

the

paragraph 2),

requests

hierarchy of control

in

19th

century

(Brodrick

required some authority to

presented

by

others

(Fortnightly Review Vol.

lower

CCLII,

in

the

New Series,

December 1887, p. 773):
First, there was a large expenditure of pens and ink ...
One gentleman would write a minute upon any subject to
a gentleman, his friend, in the next room, and after the
repetition of the process the matter would at last get
to the hands of the Secretary of State for War, who,
(Lord
(was then) advised by his financial friends,
Wolseley, The Ti~. Saturday 21 May 1887).
This
labour,

of

necessity

produced

"reams

multiplied

clerical

of

correspondence"

futile

and

administrative
and

created

frustrating and what can amount to, for an army, dangerous delay.
The Select Committee on Army Estimates in 1888 scathingly criticised
the overcentralisation of army finance for

-176It has been conclusively shown that the maintenance of the
present large staff at the War Off ice is necessitated by t~e
system now adopted of examining accounts with great and
needless detail and repetition, several instances of the
minute and superfluous detail which characterises the daily
work of the War Office, will be found in the evidence. In one
case an inquiry as to the expenditure of 42s. 7d. bore eight or
nine signatures upon it
("Fifth Report from the Select
Committee on Army Estimates" (1888))
According to one leading magazine at the time, such checks had well
outlived their original purposes and now only served to ensure there
were jobs for civilians in military finance

(Fortnightly Review,

Vol. CCLV, New Series, March 1888, p. 305).
Concentration of financial

authority at the War Office was

dangerous to the well being and performance of the army. An over
abundance of detail and "interminable'' written reports could not but
help occupy

the

efforts

and

time

of

superiors,

both civil

and

military, at the War Off ice 2 (see the Evidence of Field Marshall
Lord Roberts before the Brodrick Committee 1898;
Review, Vol.
Hamilton

31

circumstances
broader

193, January to April
December
time

military

accumulation
necessary for

of
a

1858,

for

policy

issues,
mutinae

in

time
and

successful

1901,

Hart

p.

1960,

examination
to

gain

rise
the

Also see Quarterly

p.

105).

or
above

breadth

and cohesive

Trevelyan to

192;

In

these

consideration
the
of

of

quickening

understanding

military programme

was

always at a premium (Dawkins Committee 1901, p.182; also James 1901,
p.711;

"Evidence before the Select Cammi ttee on Army Estimates"

1888, Fourth Report, Questions 5871 to 5873, 5886).

2.

Cardwell's reform of the army had moved, the Horse Guards (the
military) in 1871 from Whitehall to Pall Mall to be under the
same roof as the civilians.

-177There was unfortunately, little encouragement that the present
system

would

questioning

change

House

in

of

principle.

Commons

you

While
cannot

ever

get

"you

rid

of

have

a

returns",

concluded General Sir Evelyn Wood, "you must always be prepared for
them" (Evidence before the Brodrick Committee 1898, Question 1090,
p.200).

The demands of Parliament were ever to be the sole arbiter

of what was sufficient or excessive (see "Evidence before the Select
Committee on Army Estimates" 1888, Fourth Report, Question 4884, p.
74).

The Dawkins Committee recognised that persistent and possibly

mischevious

Parliamentary

demands

for

financial

details,

which

reinforced the need for a centralised financial department where
information was concentrated and could be assembled mo{'.e quickly,
were

excessive

("Report

of

the

Committee

on

War

Off ice

Reorganisation", 1901, Vol. XL, p. 2 of the report).
Reference to undesirable military repercussions flowing from
centralised financial adminstration was made well before the Esher
Committee so scathingly criticised the system in 1904 (for example,
see the Howick Commission 1837;
1870, p. xiii).
flowing

from

initiative,

Northbrook Committee 3rd Report

The Edinburgh Review in 1896 saw a number of evils
"intolerable

centralisations":

it

destroyed

rendered "incompetence undiscoverable" and "strangled

progress" (Vol. CLXXXIII, January to April, pp. 185, 203;

See also

Contemporary Review, Vol. LXVIII, July to December 1895, p. 330;
Fortnightly Review, No.
630).
finance

CCLI, New Series, November 1887, pp. 628,

Buxton in 1883 (pp. 212-213) saw excessive centralisation of
as

the

effective army.

single

greatest

impediment

to

an

efficient and

Pursuing the point, he argued, and the Brodrick

-178Committee later agreed, that much of the work carried out by the
central administration could and should be done at the headquarters
of districts or corps who would certainly do the work better and
faster (p.61;

see also Florence Nightingale's assessment of the War

Office in Gordon 1935, p.53; Brodrick Committee, Final Report 1898,
p.132).

Not only would the work be done better, argued Buxton, but

also costs would be lower as officials in subordinate centres could
thoroughly work through all matters and only send the "sifted form"
to the central office (p.162 and p . 213;
Part

2,

p.17

of

the

Report).

The

also Esher Committee 1904
great

bulk

of

petty

and

distracting detail which could be thereby eliminated would allow
more time and effort to be devoted to more important strategic
matters (see the Brodrick Committee 1898,
Report) .
that

p. 130, para 9 of the

To hasten the process the Brodrick Committee recommended

over

105

army

returns

and

reports

be

either modified

or

abolished (listed in the Final Report 1898, p.132, para.3) .
Every

small

outlay

gave

rise

to

an

"epistolary struggle"

between the civilians and the military (see Amery Vol. 2 1902, p.
4).

So extreme was the centralisation of army finance that the loss

of one library book or the purchase of a door mat was sufficient
excuse to launch a full report on its way to the Finance Department
at the War Office (Queens' Regulations, Section IX, para.43, Quoted
by the Brodrick Committee 1898, p.xvi;
before

the

Brodrick

Committee

1898,

Evidence of Sir Ralph Knox
Question

1503,

p. 219).

Absurd! ties such as these prompted James in 1901 to refer to the
British Officer as "a return-making animal" and as "an overworked
accountant" (p.711).

-179Major-General

Hutton in

1903 severely censured the

grossly

over centralised system of financial control under which the British
Army had been expected to operate for so long.

It was obvious to

him that the most deleterious consequence of such a system was the
denial of financial responsibility to subordinates, the ability to
judge financial aspects and consequences of an administrative action
and to take the necessary action.

Without this capacity Hutton, and

later General Sir Ian Hamilton, saw that there would be the absence
of careful attention to expenditure, with both economy and military
efficiency suffering
1903, p.83;

(Commonwealth

Parliamentary Papers,

Vol.II,

see also the comments of Fortnightly Review, Vol. CCLV,

New Series, March 1888, p. 327).

Hamilton, drawing on over 40 years

experience in the British Army throughout the world, was also keenly
aware of this unenviable paradox created by centralising financial
control.
Financial control which
authority,

had

to

rely

emanated from a central department, or
upon

clearly

responsibilities and minute regulations
p .127),

the

extreme elaboration

of

designated

individual

(Brodrick Committee 1898,

which

the Dawkins

Committee

blamed on the increasingly suffocating pace of centralisation (1901,
p.188).

Financial regulations were meant to narrow a subordinate's

'area of discretion', to constrain him and draw his attention to the
expectations of superiors.

Financial regulations, as determined by

the Finance Department at the War Off ice and the Treasury,
favoured

as

the

practical

expression

of

accumulated wisdom

were
and

experience and were therefore supposed to facilitate decision making
by the military man on the spot (see Question 951 of the Brodrick

-180Committee 1898, p.194). Regulations 3 not only spell out obligations
but because formal regulations are regarded as the end product of
long deliberations,

the obligations

dimension

authority;

to

their

they detail assume an added

they

are

taken

as

definitive.

Exhaustive financial regulation had long been held, despite evidence
to

the

contrary, 4

responsible
management

as

financial
and

the

best

way

administration

efficient

military

to

produce

in

terms

operations.

and
of

ensure
economic

However,

as

Hamilton saw clearly, centralised financial administration while it
made

individuals

sensitive

to

•
the importance

of

records

and

documentation and the need to meet the requirements of regulations,
produced an increasing
unwillingness on the part of the officers to act on their
own responsibility ... (So that) in the course of time,
the spirit of initiative throughout the army may suffer.
Hence ... the most frightful cause of disaster in time of
war - namely, the collapse of the officer trained for many
years to be frightened to death of a sixpence when he is
suddenly called upon to decide on a matter in which
thousands of pounds may be involved
(Commonwealth
Parliamentary Papers Vol.II 1914, pp.149-150;
also
Lawrence Committee 1924, p. 715;
Esher Cammi ttee 1904,
Part 2, p.9 of the report).
Officers became

"afraid of

their

own

shadows

in

administrative

matters, and dare not incur the smallest expenditure, even for the
purpose of saving money ... " (Fortnightly Review Vol . CCLII, New
Series December 1887,

p. 773).

The Post World War I Army Cost

Accounting Committee also alluded to the deception created
3.

So great and preposterous in number
by the end of the 19th century
General William Butler , the cost of
much as the cost of maintaining an
before the Brodrick Committee 1898,

4.

e.g. The Crimean War.

had army regulations become
that, according to Majorprinting them was almost as
infantry brigade (Evidence
Question 1515, p.219).

-181under the present system of accounting (where) ... attempt
is made to secure economy by regulations which are
admittedly voluminous
and 'excessively complex and
minute' ... (The) present methods and regulations cause an
infinity of trouble and entail constant reference to
higher authority while affording
no record of
Stewardship ... with which to prove economical management
(Notes on Cost Accounting 1918, Section I, para.15).
Officers outside

the Army Pay Corps

were not permitted to

sanction, in peace, funeral expenses over £2, repairs to clothing
which exceeded 3s.6d. for each garment or cab fares over ls.2d. Yet
in

war

they

might

be

responsible

for

very

considerable

expenditures 5 .
While carrying out his duties as a member of the Pay Corps,
Lieut. Colonel Churchill was allowed in war to
instance and on his own authority,

let out,

in one

contracts for £35, 000. During

peace however, he could not pay out, without direct approval from
the War Off ice,

anything in excess of £100

(Evidence before the

Brodrick Committee 1898, p.175, Questions 492 and 511).

Churchill,

fortunately, was able to meet the financial demands of war despite
the absence of any determined preparation in peace.
Concentration of financial control in the hands of civilians,
as characterised the British Army in the 19th century, not only
robbed military officers of the opportunities and training needed to
flex their muscles of financial initiative and innovation but was
also ultimately very expensive (see Esher Committee 1904, Part II,
p .16 of the report;
Colonel

Churchill

Question 522:
unrealistic

5.

and

Grimwood 1919 May, p.157; Evidence of Lieut.
before

the

Brodrick

Committee

1898,

Brodrick Cammi ttee, p. 130, paragraph 14) .
unreasonable,

announced

the

critics

of

p.176,
It was
highly

This was particularly so towards the end of the 19th century.

:....182centralised financial control,

to expect off ice rs (such as Lieut.

Churchill) denied financial responsibility in the relative calm of
peace and who were stifled by a prodigious number of regulations, to
know how

to

handle

large sums

of

money

in

the

tumult

of

war

(Fortnightly Review, Vol. CCLII, New Series, December 1887, p. 773):
"we tie up in tight folds, during peace, the limbs of ... officials
When war comes,

the bonds are suddenly cast off"

(Edinburgh

Review, Vol. CLXI, January to April 1885, p. 211). Not only was the
military officer inexperienced in handling public money but, with a
few exceptions,
accounting

for

overwhelmingly deficient
public

funds

(see

Furse

in skills
1894,

essential

p.95).

Calls

to
for

officer training to include the study of army finance and accounting
however, were not wanting (see Churchill 1895, p. 36;

Furse 1894,

pp.95-96;

before

Evidence

of

Field

Marshall

Lord

Roberts

Brodrick Committee 1898, Question 170, p.164). 6
South African War

in 1899 however,

regard (Evidence of Lieut.

little had

the

By the time of the
improved

in this

Colonel Churchill before the Brodrick

Committee 1898, pp.175-181; Amery, Vol.VI, 1907, p.621).
Certainly, the Esher Committee readily agreed, by
insuring a rigid adherence to elaborate regulations, the
Finance Department doubtless effects small savings, but
does not and cannot receive real economy . . . The theory
that military officers of all ranks are by the fact of
wearing a uniform, shorn of all business instincts has
inevitably tended to induce laxity which it is supposed to
prevent . . . There can be no doubt that in proportion as
officers are accustomed to financial responsibilities the
economy which they alone can secure will be effected
(Quoted by Sir Ian Hamilton, Commonwealth Parliamentary
Papers Vol.II, 1903, p.150).
6.

Officer training had followed the same rigid, and largely
outmoded pattern throughout the 19th century.
Training
typically included: Mathematics, geometry, drawing, surveying,
horsemanship, artillery, French, German, History, Geography,
Chemistry, Geology, Astronomy, Natural History (Blackwood's
Edinburgh Magazine, November 1857, pp. 576-577).

-183Two years before the Esher Committee delivered its findings the
Public Accounts Committee roundly condemned the shortsightedness of
and prolif igate extravagance engendered by the extremely centralised
financial administration of the British Army.

No improvement could

be expected, offered the Committee, until
officers experienced in local audit and taking of supplies on
charge are sent out to accompany troops on the march ... (it is
clear) no such supply officer now exists ... ("Fourth Report of
the Public Accounts Committee" 1902, p.51).
Waste was

not

military officers'

the

only consequence

financial

skills.

of

undernourishing

the

Understandably during war

those individuals with their new financial responsibilities thrust
upon

them

became

cautious

and

indecisive.

In an organisation

obsessed with personal accountability when it came to public money,
seizing

the

financial

initiative

was

to

be

placed

under

what

appeared to be the capricious mercy of financial administrators.
Under these conditions the supply of the army,
depends on a very efficient army chest,

which unavoidably

could only suffer

(see

paragraph 52 of the Memorandum on the Civil Administration of the
British

Army

Strathnairn

by

Sir

Committee

C.

Trevelyan

1867,

p.286;

1855

as

also

reproduced

Question

Evidence before the Strathairn Committee).

by

the

2684 of

the

So important was an

efficient system of military finance to the military effort that
Dundas wrote that "all modern wars are a contention of the purse"
(Dundas

to

Pitt,

9th

July

1794,

quoted

in

Rose

1914,

p.271).

According to Le Mesurier finance held the army together, it was the
'sinews' of war (1796, Part X, as reproduced in Glover 1963, p . 280;
see also Churchill 1895, pp.36-37;

Evidence of Churchill before the

Brodrick Committee 1898, Question 520, p.176;

Ormsby 1921, p. 842;

-184Petrie, Director-General of the Commissariat, British Parliamentary
Papers Vol.XL, 1856, p.45).

6.3

THE INDUCED BEHAVIOURAL RIGIDITY OF CENTRALISATION
By being responsible for financial inputs i.e. money received

as voted by Parliament,
excluded

from

all

rather than outputs or performance, and

financial

encouraged

to

overstate

virement.

After all,

deliberations,

their

financial

the

military

requirements,

were

despite

requests were vetted by so many civilian

officials in the War Off ice (see, for example, Regulations for the
Commissariat and Transport Staff, 1881, Section I,

subsection I,

paragraph 17) and therefore the probability of receiving
amounts

sought

would

be

very

slender.

Once

the

~xactly

request

the
was

authorised by a superior the greater part of the responsibility for
If superiors agreed to financial

the request was removed upwards.

demands presented then this signalled their agreement with the way
the resources were to be used.

If the resources, while they may be

accounted for to the last penny, were used wastefully and for little
purpose the responsibility must lodge only in part with those who
utilise the resources and in part with those who sanctioned their
use

for

those

finance was,

purposes.

This

separation of administration and

according to the Contemporary Review,

a "folly and

wasteful" (Vol. LXVIII July to December 1895, p. 332).
Centralisation of
became

the

inefficiency,

parent

of

financial
most

authority and control therefore

undesirable

offspring;

waste

and

and what is more serious for the army the potential

for ineffectiveness in battle (Esher Committee 1904, part 2, p.15 of

-185the report;
Committee

also Evidence of Lieut. Churchill before the Brodrick

1898,

Question 525,

January to April 1901,

p.

p.176,

191).

Quarterly Review Vol.

193

Denying subordinates financial

responsibility and suffocating their initiative and enterprise with
a

numbing

array

of

regulations

encouraged

subordinates

in

the

military to divorce themselves from the responsibility for their
actions:

"it

regulation,

is

then

better
to

save

to

lose

£100

by

(100
the

strictly
exercise

according
of

to

independent

judgement" parodied Sir Ralph Knox 7 (Evidence before the Brodrick
Committee 1898, Question 1503, p.219).
Because accounts and financial reports were more often than not
employed

in a

punitive fashion,

as a

means

to

bols~er

central

control, the government and its departments were forced to rely on
rigid

control

by regulation

(see Buxton

1883,

pp.206-212).

In

matters of professional technique this amounted to, assures Sir John
Keane,
the non professional telling the professional how best to
do his job. Present control therefore takes somewhat this
form:
'You must do it this way whatever the conditions'
instead of 'You do it the best way your knowledge and
experience suggests and be judged by results' ... (With)
the present form of accounts no other control is
possible
(Chairman's closing address to the Lecture by
Grimwood May 1919, p.158; see also the Lawrence Committee
1924, p.714).
Inflexibility,

obstinately

enforcing

and

adhering

to

regulations governing expenditure was, stressed Harris, more likely
to be counterproductive to economy.

Drawing on his own wealth of

experience Harris indicates that extravagant waste was common in

7.

Sir Ralph Knox was Under-Secretary of State for War in 1897
(see Biddulph's comments 1904, p. 56).

-186military

expenditure

despite

Herculean

attempts

to

prevent

it

Financial regulations which amounted to a steady stream

occurring.

of centralised negations took "all the faculty of contrivance ...
out of the minds of officers" (1924, p.133; Contemporary Review Vol.
LXVII I, July to December 1895, p.

332).

intended,

to

was

left

to

officers

independent of financial

regulations.

Little or no room,

make

financial

as

decisions

The assumption under

the

circumstances was that there was always a financial regulation to
cover every situation.

Independent evaluation of circumstances was

irrelevant and too uncertain.
however,

more certain.

evidence

before

hostile

to

the

the

Detailed financial regulations were

The Secretary of State for War in his

1892

existing

Public
system

Accounts
of

Committee

financial

was

openly

control

which

persistently attempted
to force the administration of the Army into mechanical
consistency with minute rules which ... involve perpetual
reference to the Treasury on petty matters . . . Such a
system is not likely to lead to either economy or
efficiency (Quoted in Chubb 1952, p.72).
Pedantic discipleship
"through

a

system

of

cash

to

financial
accounts"

regulations which worked
(Lawrence

p.714), created a false sense of security.

Committee

1924,

It gave the impression

all was well with the Army and its readiness for war (Chubb 1952,
p.72;

Durell 1917, pp.474, 478).

It was only when the strains on

both financial and military systems were increased, as during war,
that the inherent defects of the system made themselves apparent and
then in the worst possible ways (Lawrence Committee 1924, p.714; see
Chapter 2).
Subordinates could always plead, in absence of evidence to the
contrary, that no matter what the military results they were merely
following the painfully detailed instructions laid down for them.

-187Certainly anyone entrusted with materials and/or money was required
to be accountable.

Their accountability began and ended however,

with a careful rendition of the destination or location of what had
once

been

in,

or

was

at

present

in,

their

trust

through

the

seemingly endless reports and returns required by the regulations
which emanated

from

the

civilian finance

department at the War

Office. The results of the use of resources was not of consequence
to

the

responsible

official,

he

was

assessed

on

'inputs' not the outputs related to those inputs.

the

basis

of

The where and

when, not the how or why of resource utilisation were the concern of
the subordinate.

6.4

THE MERITS OF DECENTRALISED FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION
Coincident with major organisational changes introduced in the

British Army
Parliament
Accordingly,

by Cardwell

to

re-examine

the Northbrook
the

Cammi ttee

organisation

of

( 1869)

military

urged

finance.

the Cammi ttee stressed that it was time Parliament

recognised the military inappropriateness of a system of financial
control

which

criticism.

performed

only

the

mean

functions

of

check

and

Economy and military efficiency under the then present

system, argued the Committee, became two resentful rivals, neither
of which would ever be fully satisfied.

The Committee therefore

pointed the way to a "higher" and "larger" function for military
finance

centred

on

financial

(1869, First Report, p.3).

initiative

for

military

personnel

-188Initiative and independent thought, more important than ever in
modern war, were however, the concommitant outcomes of a system of
financial control which was decentralised and which encouraged the
assumption of responsibi)ity (see the Esher Committee 1904, Part 2,
p. 9 of the report;

Rankin 1901, p.

61).

Unfortunately for the

British Army opportunity for the development of these qualities was
almost

entirely

a

severe

"shortcoming in the training of British Officers"

(1883,

p.67).

Although

the

a

absent.

shortcoming

profession.

The

obedience

above

readiness

and

implemented

It

was,

it

was

British Army
all

else

and

willingness with

as

Buxton

not

remarked,

abnormal

in

military

valued

loyalty and almost blind

judged

actions

which orders

(see Huntington 1972,

p. 73).

according

to

or directions

the
were

The Chancellor of the

Exchequer, Sir Charles Trevelyan, was unable to bring to mind "any
class of men who were more distinguished for exact obedience to
orders than the ... officers of the army;
they are told to do"
1867, Question 2643,

they are sure to do what

(Evidence before the Strathnairn Committee
p.204).

Unfettered self will and initiative

were not easily accommodated in the military in the 19th century
(see Mortimer Merpes 1899 as quoted in Fuller 1935, p. 101).
the

old

discipline

die-hards
as

of

military

mutually

discipline

exclusive

Contemporary Review December 1886,
submergent

of

individuality

sacrificed

in

preference

which
for

p.

saw

military

Indeed

initiative
qualities

and
(The

769). Army discipline was
meant

that

predictabi I i ty

initiative
and

was

conformity.

Mediocrity was exalted while "genius and talent" were "demons to be
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exorcised"

(General Fuller 1935,

p.

16;

see also Captain Slocum

1899, quoted in Amery Vol . 2, 1902 p. 34).
century and
which

had

after

the

revisited

Committee

(1869),

promptings

the

was

findings
it

firmly

of

Not until the early 20th

the Esher Committee

( 1904),

of the much earlier Northbrook
appreciated

in

Parliament

and

military administration that economy and efficiency were directly
proportional

to

the

decentralisation

of

responsibility

and

the

co-ordination of the separate parts of an organisation in pursuit of
common objectives (see the Field Service Regulations for the British
Army Part II,

1909,

pp.22-23;

Brunker 1909,

1904, Part 2, p.10 of the Report;

p.2; Esher Committee

Northbrook Committee 1869, First

Report p. 3) .
Sir Charles Harris was prominent amongst a growing number who
advocated that accounting reports based on objects of expenditure
were the proper vehicle for

encouraging financial

initiative and

financial responsibility and therefore more efficient and · effective
financial control

(also see Lord Haliburton' s comments before the

Hartington Commission 1890 as cited in Hewgill 1980, p.2).
sought

a

system

of

responsibility

accounting

which

Harris

would

give

officers not only the authority but the responsibility to decide
"how, when,

where and to what effect resources were to be used" 8

(Evidence before the Sub-Committee on the Form of Public Accounts,
Select Committee on National
248).

Churchill went so far

accounts

8.

there

were

the

Expenditure 1918,
as

better

Questions 220 and

say the more of these types of
the

military

would

be

served

He was however, opposed to extending to peacetime the great
flexibility in finance given to officers in war (1911, p.75).

-190(Evidence before the Brodrick Committee 1898, Question 544, p.177).
Accounts of this nature, as later argued Colonel Sir John Keane,
enabled
responsibility to be delegated to those .s ubordinates who
know the details and who alone can adjust them to actual
requirements.
By means of the account you can allow a
free hand and judge by results. The delegation of power
which
accounting makes possible develops those
invaluable human qualities of enterprise and resource
(Chairman's concluding address to Grimwood's lecture May
1919, p .158;
see also Dicksee' s comments on accounts
1915, p.43).
It was recognised at the time that accounts would never work in
the interests of economy while ever there existed the multitude of
financial regulations and the accounts were directed towards 'the
subjects' of spending or broad administrative headings (see Section
4.5,

pp.126-127).

These two characteristics of military finance

would continue to strangle initiative.
1865 had,

without much effect,

The Hartington Committee in

alluded

to the unnecessary work

created in the Accountant-General's Department by the overwhelming
number

of

scattered

financial

regulations

as

were

regulations"

they
(p.615).

and

their

"throughout

Financial

absence

numerous

regulations

and

of

system,

circulars
the

and

ponderous

reports they produced had to be reduced if the army's financial
administration was ever to be decentralised, suggested the Dawkins
Committee,

and

their

place

taken

by

evaluation

of

results and

control by inspection (see the Evidence of Lieut. -Colonel Kitson
before the Brodrick Committee 1898).

Inspection, according to the

Committee had the two-fold advantage of performance evaluation based
on results which would in turn ensure money was well spent because

-191of the emphasis in inspection on outputs or results (p.203).
Consideration of the financial dimension of military decisions
under a system of financial control as proposed by the Esher and
Dawkins

Committees

was

thought

more

likely

to

develop

into an

instinctive reaction and not simply remain the unwelcome direction
of a bullying financial authority.

To sustain occasional mistakes

under such a system, recommended the Dawkins Committee, was far more
preferable

"than

a

machine-like

system"

which

could

only

"destroy the sense of responsibility and check all inducement to
economy" (1901, p.130 para.14).

6.5

LIMITS TO DECENTRALISATION
The arguments for decentralisation did not imply that every

decision and every process be moved down and out through the army's
organisation.

Nor was it suggested in the case of the army that it

was desirable or possible to do so.

The army's essential goal of

putting a victorious fighting force

in the field guarantees,

balance,

that

financial

control

will

decentralised (see Downey 1977, p.57).

be

more

centralised

on

than

For example, Percival argued

that responsibility for supply should be centralised, allowing that
some decentralisation is still necessary (1912,

p.199).

Harris,

while a staunch advocate of decentralising financial authority, was
also realistic and experienced enough to acknowledge that the army's
central financial departments would never wither away.

Even though

decentralisation of the finance function of the War Office may be
most attractive and "however decentralised the actual spending of
the money may be the money spent ultimately centralises itself in

-192the columns

of

the War Office

ledger"

(1911,

p.63;

also

the

Lawrence Committee 1924, p.713).
The incessant movement of units of the army between home and
overseas possessions also precluded extensive decentralisation of
financial authority9
1901,

(Buxton 1883, p.213;

Major General

p.199;

Ellison,

also Dawkins Committee

Notes on Cost Accounting:

Addresses and Explanatory Notes 1918, p.7;

Fortnightly Review Vol.

CCLV, New Series March 1888, p. 310).

With regiments continually

moving

regiments

in

and

out

of

districts

the

would

never

be

permanently subordinated to one particular district and thus there
would be no contiguous financial control (Buxton 1883, pp.62-63).
Ultimately the issue of decentralising financial authority was
a constitutional matter.

Parliament

originally centralised finance

in the War Off ice not for reasons related to the performance of the
army in the field but simply to ensure the legality and regularity
with which Votes were administered.

Decentralisation ushered in new

motives of financial control, those of military efficiency, economy
and success,

which up to the end of the 19th century had never

received serious consideration as consequences of military financial
policy.

Successive Parliaments found it also extremely difficult to

grasp that latitude in army finance was not equivalent to laxity and
lassitude.

Parliament therefore continued to resist reform in the

structure of military finance despite the dramatic changes made in
other areas of military administration in the closing decades of
the 19th century.
9.

Operational
authority
would,
of
course,
be
rarely
decentralised:
the actions of a unit of the British Army in
one area could have the severest repercussions for all the
army. Officers were never accorded the right to make decisions
of policy, that was the Government's responsibility .

-193The following section outlines the major changes in military
administration in the period of this study primarily to demonstrate,
in the face of great administrative innovations, the intractability
of

Parliament

in

military

finance.

Discussion

also

shows

how

greater administrative freedom for the military seemed to have the
paradoxical effect of accentuating their financial
thereby increase their resentment

impotence and

of the structure of financial

control.

6.6

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND FINANCE:
DECENTRALISED ADMINISTRATION
Despite

both

covert

and

overt

THE EBB AND FLOW OF

opposition

and

contrary

to

Campbell-Banermanrs cynical remark that the military policy of most
Victorian War Ministers, in deference to the Queen's wishes, 10 was
to "leave the old Army alone and don't make war" (cited in Blake
1978,

10.

p.29),

between

1854

and

1899

there

were

two

significant

Queen Victoria had written during the Crimean War that she
considered authority over the army as one of her "dearest
prerogatives" (cited in Sweetman 1971 b, p.232;
see also
Woodham-Smith 1977, p.149).
The Army was "constantly in her
thoughts as is everything connected with her beloved troops
... " (Queen Victoria to Lord Panmure, March 5, 1855, Panmure
Papers 1908, p. 126) . Indeed, so concerned was the Queen and
so detailed her knowledge of military matters that Lord
Panmure wrote to Lord Raglan, "you never saw anybody so
entirely taken up with military affairs as she is" (March 26,
1855, Panmure Papers 1908, p. 126). According to Raudzens the
Queen's attachment to the Army was far from merely just
sentimentalism but instead the influence of the Crown in the
Army was seen as a means to balance the British Cons ti tut ion
(1979, p.88).

-194attempts at, and numerous investigations into,
administration.

(See The Nineteenth Century,

December 1888, p. 107-109).

re-organising army
Vol.

XXIV , July

to

The Esher Committee noted with dismay

that investigations of army administration had been, unfortunately,
so numerous and
great changes have been so frequent
(that)
stability of administration has never been attained ... no
public department has been so frequently examined or so
scathingly criticised by Commissions and Committees ...
(1904 Part I, p.8 of the report).
Between

1859-71,

reflecting the

Nation's

mood

and

the

cyclical

nature of political interest in the military, the War Office had
come

under

the

scrutiny

of

17

Royal

Commissions,

18

Select

Committees, 19 Committees of Officers within the War Office and 35
Committees of Military Officers (Fortescue 1930, p. 554;

Edinburgh

Review,

Quarterly

January

to

April

1871,

Vol.

CXXXIII

p.

208;

Review, Vol. 131, July to October 1871, p. 543; Westminster Review,
January to April
Barnett

1970,

paradoxically,

1860, p . 423;
p. 334).

were

more

Biddulph 1904, p. x;

The

absurdly

accurately

an

see also

numerous

inquiries,

indication

of

the

superficiality with which successive Parliaments continued to treat
the

army and

Parliament's

lethargic

indifference

to

substantial

change (Fortnightly Review, Vol. CCXCIV, New Series, 1 June 1891, p.
870;

Amery Vol.

2,

1902, p.

45).

The major! ty of the reforms

introduced were predominantly cosmetic; they were "always going to
settle everything" but improved and settled little (Saturday Review,
18 February, 1888 , p . 183; Nineteenth Century, Vol. XXX , July to
December 1891, p. 7;
1870, p . 275).

Quarterly Review, Vol 129, July to October

-195The most outstanding feature which characterised all the major
reforms in military administration , and which weaves between and
through successive inquiries, was the ultimate control (in 1895) by
the army of its administrative departments, with the exception of
one:

to the very last finance remained outside military control.

The Director of Army contracts, Mr. Evan Nepean, in 1888 informed
the Select Committee on Army Estimates that recent reforms had not
in any way altered existing financial control arrangements (Question
6444).

The trend towards greater military control in administration

was however, also greeted with increasing distrust and unease (see
Lord Salisbury to Hicks Beach in Hicks Beach 1932, p. 153). 11 The
Ridley Commission was worried that the various departments appeared
to be escaping independent financial control (1887, p. xxiii of the
report).
By 1899 the military's involvement in its own administration
was checked only by the financial examination and superintendence of
the civilians in the War Office and by Parliamentary authority as
exercised through bodies such as the Treasury and the Exchequer and
Audit Department (see Administrator 1900, p. 360;
Africa
military

pp .

609-610).

administrative

Lord

Haliburton

reform

and

summed

continued

The War in South
up

the

legacy

of

dissatisfaction

by

comparing administration prior to 1855 when "civilians initiated,
controlled, conducted, accounted for and audited Army expenditure",
to

11.

the end of the century when "Army expenditure

is

initiated,

Appearing before the Select Committee on Military Organisation
in 1860 Lord Gray affirmed the need for the House of Commons to
exercise "a great control over the administration of the Army.
It cannot be called on to provide for the expense of the Army
without inquiring in what manner the money granted is applied"
(Question 5314 of the evidence, p. xix).

-196controlled,

conducted and accounted

for

by soldiers".

However,

notes Lord Haliburton in an injured tone,
even these extensive powers are considered insufficient. It is
frequently urged that the Accounts Branch (including Audit) of
the War Office
still under civilian control, should be made
subordinate to the military ... (Quoted in Atlay 1909, p. 258).

6.6.1

Cardwell's Ad•inistrative Reform of 1870

6.6.1.1

Aims of Refor• in 1870

The first significant attempt at financial reorganisation after
the tumult of administrative changes during the Crimean War 12 was in
1869 when the Northbrook Committee was appointed by Cardwell to
examine

the

"Conduct

specifically

the

of

business

Committee's

in

mandate

the
was

War
to

Office".
examine

More

financial

supervision at the War Office with the view to making it both more
efficient and to

"simplify it to the highest degree".

Guiding

Cardwell's reform of the army was also the desire to reduce military
spending;

not however, at the expense of efficiency (see Biddulph

1904, pp. 17, 24).

Lord Cardwell' s administration as Secretary of

State for War 13 ( 1868-1874) marked, contends Captain Striedinger,
"The

true

re-organisation

of

the

army

and

all

subsequent

progress which is likely to last is based on Lord Cardwell's ideas"
(1909,

p.195;

see

also

Gordon

1935,

pp.57-68). 14

Out

of

a

12.

See Chapter 2 for a discussion of the major administrative
changes during the Crimean War.

13.

Lord Wolsely remarked how:
"Never was a Minister in my time
more generally hated by the Army" (Quoted in Wilson 1973, p.
49).

14.

See Table 1 on p. 198 for the organisation
administration after Cardwell's reforms.

of

military

-197"chaotic military administration" (Sir James Graham 1860, Cited in
Bond 1961,
over

the

p.617)
army

expenditure

on

Cardwell

and
a

placed

more

created a

system of orderly control

financial

rational

administration

basis

(see

and

Striedinger

army
1909,

p.211, 15 .
6.6.1.2

The Reorganisation of 1870
The

Northbrook Committee had

recommended that a Financial

Secretary be appointed and the War Office be amalgamated with the
Horse Guards. 16

The War Off ice was also to be divided into three

15.

The military were,
after Cardwell's work,
unambiguously
subordinate to the political executive. By making the Secretary
of State for War the constitutional head of the Army the army
was no longer a Royal Army but a Parliamentary army. This was
by far Cardwell's greatest achievement (Griffiths 1900, p.
218).
The Duke of Cambridge as Commander-in-Chief had
recognised the supremacy of the civilian through the Secretary
of State for War a decade before in evidence before the Select
Committee on Military Organisation (1860, Questions 4105,
6369). Undoubtedly, the most powerful impetuses to Cardwell's
work were the Franco-Prussian War ( 1870) and the collapse of
France, as well as Prussia's successes in 1864 and 1866, which
had demonstrated the merits of detailed preparation in peace
and made it clear that armies could only be improvised at great
risk (see Howard 1978, p.19; Bond 1961, p. 619;
Also the Earl
of Midleton (Brodrick) 1939, p. 80; Edinburgh Review October
1900, p . 272; Edinburgh Review 1875, p. 537).

16.

This had been recommended in 1828 by a government finance
committee but had been strenuously opposed by civilians and the
Duke of Wellington, who feared the domination of civilians and
the loss of independent constitutional check by having the
powerful military in such close proxirni ty ( Q!!arterly Review
Vol. 129, July to October 1870, p. 262) . The Select Committee
on Military Organisation [(1860, Vol. XXII, p. xxi] also
ref erred to the advantages of amalgamating the Horse Guards and
the War Office.
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branches: a military department, a supply and ordnance department
and a financial

department

(Third Report,

p.

x), as shown below.

Table 1
ORGANISATION OF THE
BRITISH ARMY SUBSEQUENT TO ORDER
IN COUNCIL JUNE 23, 1870

Secretary of State for War

I

Commander-in-Chief
(Command)

The

military

Civilian
Surveyor-General

department

was

to

be

Civilian
Financial
Secretary

concerned

with

"military

questions of a political nature" ("Comments of the Royal Commission
on Warlike Stores" 1887, p.viii).

The head of this department, the

Commander-in-Chief, remained in charge of combatant personnel of the
regular forces,

by Order in Council June 23rd 1870.

By the same

Order in Council the off ice of Surveyor-General of the Ordnance was
created and was charged with "providing, holding and issuing to the
Army . . . food,

forage,

fuel and light,

exercising strict control over
(Hartington Commission 1890,
recommendations

of

Lord

munitions

clothes

the expenditure of such

p.xix).

Northbrook's

supplies"

Referring to the supply
Committee,

Alison

in

1869

optimistically and misguidedly praised the proposals that will "unite
under

one

independent

head

all

branches

departments for

the
of

numerous,
the

great

costly, semi-hostile,
supply

and

and

administrative

-199it will introduce an order, economy, promptitude, and
simplicity hitherto unknown to our military administration
(and eradicate the) perpetual confusion, obstruction,
and reference on the most trivial points to headquarters
... The numerous supply branches of the army will, for the
first time, be worked in unison, on one principle and with
one object (1869, p . 53).
Not everyone was as certain as Alison about the success of the new
arrangements.
office

The Edinburgh Review received the creation of the

of Surveyor-General

with great

scepticism

(Vol.

CXXXIII,

January to April 1871, p. 237).
6.6.1.3 The Accountant-General and the Financial Department after
the 1870 Reforms
The supervision of all cash transactions was now the
responsibility of the Financial Department at the War Office, headed
by the Financial Secretary.

The Financial Department received and

disbursed all sums payable and receivable and supervised, with the
exception of the Surveyor-General's Department! 7 army accounts.

The

Financial Secretary, like the Surveyor-General of Ordnance, was a
member

of

business

Parliament

ability.

Secretary and his

As

chosen
well

normally

as

over

of

cash

demonstrated
the

department were also charged with:

expenditure proposed in annual
estimates,

control

because

financial

review

Financial
review of

estimates and the compilation of

of

proposals

for

new

expenditure,

control of manufacturing departments of the army and supervision of
contracts,

and advising the Secretary of State fer War on all

financial matters (Northbrook Committee 1870, Third Report, p. xxi;
see Striedinger 1904, pp.202-203).

Thus the Secretary of State was

in a position to control the efficiency of the army and the economy
of its administration.
17.

See page 201.

-200Prior

to

the

Cardwell

reforms 18

devolved

upon

military

accounts

Financial

Secretary's

chief

all

the

assistant

ordinary

routine

Accountant-General,
and

head

of

the

of
the

Finance

Department at the War Office, the Deputy Accountant-General and the
Assistant

Accountant-General

Accountant-General,
852, 885).

before

(Evidence

of

Knox,

Ralph

the Ridley Commission 1887,

Questions

After the 1870 reforms the Accountant-General however,

had no author! ty to account for the Surveyor-General's votes and
"the whole of

the store accounts

(of the Surveyor-General) are

exempt from his examinations" (Hartington Commission 1890, p .101;
see

also

Buxton

1883,

pp.11-63;

First

Report

from

the

Select

Committee on Army and Navy Estimates 1887, p. xxii of the report and
Questions 791-792).

Any accounts related to the activities of the

Surveyor-General, if they found their way to the Accountant-General
were

weeded

out

and

passed

on

to

the

Surveyor-General

whose

department was responsible for examining the accounts (Evidence of
Ralph Knox before the Ridley Commission 1887, Questions 869, 1026,
1028).

Due to the notoriously short stay of most Surveyors-General

(being

Parliamentary

Officers)

Nepean,

as

Director

of

Army

Contracts, questioned whether any accounts were adequately examined
in these circumstances (Evidence before the Ridley Commission 1887,
Question 1312).
18.

The most contentious and antagonistic reform implemented by
Cardwel 1 in 1871 was the abolition of the purchase system of
army commissions. Opposition both inside and outside the House
of Commons claimed that such a move was constitutionally
dangerous for they could see disappearing what was considered
to be one of the greatest safeguards against a truculent army.
The purchase system, rife as it was with deficiencies (see the
Chapter on the Crimean War) had one great advantage;
it was
off ice red and lead by the same class that governed and owned
most of the country.
Danger of an army coup was therefore
thought to be lessened under the purchase system for army
commissions
(See
Wellington's
"Memorandum
of
Military
Government" in Moyse-Bartlett 1974, p. 228).
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In

1887 7 Sir

William

Ridley's

Commission

into

the

Departments of the War Off ice pointed out the anomaly which

Civil
existed

with the Surveyor-General's accounts and the necessity of bringing
all military departments under control of the Financial Secretary
(pp. xxii and xxiii of the first report;
the Royal
Hartington
Thus,

Commission into

Civilian Establishments 1887",

Commission

1890,

after

implementation

the

See also "First Report of
p.

ix;

p.xx).
of

the

Ridley

Commission's

recommendations in 1887 the Accountant-General was to have
the power to follow the appropriation for all moneys and verify
all balances whether of cash or stores; moreover, he must have
the right to ask, and power to obtain from the various
professional and executive officers, all information necessary
to enable him to lay before the Financial Secretary . a complete
review and critic ism of all proposals ("First Report of the
Royal Commission into Civil Establishments", Vol. XIX, 1887, p.
xxi).
The

Accountant~General's

department,

the

Finance Department

at the War Office, was divided along the following lines:
1.

Accountant-General.

2.

Deputy Accountant-General.

3.

Assistant Accountant-General.

4.

Officers Pay Sub-division.

5.

Non Commissioned Officers and Mens Pay Sub-division .

6.

Examining Sub Division agents accounts.

7.

Computing Section - Computation (Checking) of Vouchers and
Accounting for Accuracy.

8.

Auxil lary Forces Accounts Sub-division
Financial
consideration of questions related to and examination of
accounts Army Reserve, Militia, Volunteers .

9.

Supply Service Sub-division - Financial consideration of
proposals connected with prov1s1ons, forage , fuel and
light . Purchase of horses. Examination of accounts and
contractors
claims
for
these
services
including
correspondence as to the interpretation of existing

Examination of

paymaster

and

-202regulations
accounts.

and

appeals

against

disallowances

in

the

10.

Effects, Savings Banks and Remittances Subdivisions.

11.

Issues and Bookkeeping Subdivision - Issues of money to
Paymasters, Public Department Contractors, and others.
Claims on other departments,
Colonial and Foreign
Governments.
Record of expenditure for Army services,
preparation of Parliamentary Appropriation Account, record
of audit queries, registry of contractors claims.

12.

Army Estimates and Establishment Subdivision - Preparation
of Estimates, Colonial contributions in aid of military
expenditure, disputed balances in Paymasters' and other
accounts,
Inspection of Army Paymasters,
Financial
Instructions.

13.

Land
and
Sea
Transport
Subdivisions
Financial
consideration of proposals connected with Field Allowances
and transport of troops by sea and land. Examination of
claims and accounts for these services.

14.

Works and Barracks - Subdivision.

15.

Armament and Stores Subdivision - Financial consideration
of proposals for supply and expenditure for stores and
clothing. Preparation of priced vocabulary of stores.

16.

Stores and Clothing Accounts Subdivision - Examination of
Paymaster Accounts of expenditure and contractors claims
for stores and clothing. Examination of Store accounts of
store officers and store accounts of the Clothing
Department.
Audit of the Balance Sheet of the clothing
factory.
Preparation for Par 1 iament of an annual Stock
Account of reserves of warlike stores showing their
value.

17.

Manufacturing Accounts Subdivision - Local audit of all
the War Office manufacturing departments. Preparation of
their annual Balance Sheet and the Balance Sheet rates for
the Priced Vocabulary of Stores. Examination of Woolwich
Ordnance Store ledgers.

A great part of the Finance Department's work 19 was concerned
with pay

(Evidence of Ralph Knox,

Accountant General before the

Ridley Commission 1887, Question 874).
Department,·

19.

had

the

responsibility

The sub-department, the Pay
of

receiving disbursing

The following work on the Finance Department
substantially from Buxton 1883, pp. 57-61.

is

and

taken

-203accounting for all army funds under the direction of the Financial
Secretary.

All cash transactions of the Army were the province of

the Paymasters of the

Army.

No one else in the army handled cash

In every military district a District Paymaster fulfilled the role
of Regimental Paymaster and also handled all non-regimental cash
transactions.

Paymasters

in

charge

of

an

office

were

called

accountants while those who were to report to him, i.e. were 'in
account', were called sub-accountants.
Paymasters fell under the discipline of combatant officers but
in their routine duties involving cash and documentation of accounts
they communicated directly with the War Off ice.

Every District

Paymaster rendered monthly accounts to the Financial Secretary with
transactions

classified

in

accordance

with

the

arrangement

Parliamentary Votes and heads of the Army Estimates,

i.e.

of

on a

'subject' basis.
At regular intervals a detailed Statement of expenditure and
receipts called the Pay List was rendered to the War Office.

At the

conclusion of each quarter if no Pay List was presented a summary
account instead, called Account Current, was forwarded to the War
Office.

It was by these documents, concluded Buxton, that

the Accountant-General is able to watch the expenditure of
army funds and to see that every item is charged to the
proper vote;
and, in checking claims and other charges
forwarded by Paymasters for approval previous to their
appearing in accounts, he is liable to carry out the
Financial Secretary's directions on military expenditure .
(1883, p.61)
6.6.2

Organisational Change in December 1887

As part of the Ridley Commission's recommendations in 1887 for
greater concentration of administration in military hands, by Orders
in Council on the 27th December 1887 and the 21st February 1888

-204the

off ice of Surveyor-General

of

the Ordnance was dropped and

instead the Commander-in-Chief of the Army was given authority over
matters of stores and supplies, establishing also that at all times
he

was

to

exercise

Commander-in-Chief

"strict

was

now

control

over

responsible

expenditure''.

for

the

The

preparation

of

Parliamentary estimates (Hartington Commission 1890, p. xx), later
reviewed by the Secretary of State for War, as seen in Table 2 on
page 205.
The ref arms of 1887 were a great blow to civilian control of
army

administration

concentrating,

as

they

responsibility for military administration
Commander-in-Chief.

did,

all

military

in the office of

the

Thus, after the Order in Council 29 December

1887 the War Off ice was divided into two - the civilian and the
military. The civilians in the War Office still maintained absolute
control

in all

matters

Edinburgh Magazine,

of

finance

October 1887,

but little else

p. 567).

(Blackwood's

According to General

Adye the result of the 1887 reorganistion was "responsibility ... on
one

side

(army),

but

(Contemporary Review,

the

July

power

on

to December

the

other

1888,

Vol.

(civilians)"
LIV,

p.

309;

Nineteenth Century Vol. XXX, July to December 1891, p. 633). Because
military

performance

ultimately

hinged

on

money,

Lord

Randolph

Churchill20 and the Duke of Cambridge

20.

Because of the minority comments made by Lord Randolph
Churchill as a member of the Ridley Commission a Select
Committee on Army and Navy Establishments was convened to
clarify the line between civilian and military administrative
responsibilities and powers. The Select Committee was to
recommend a tightening of financial control over the Department
of
the
Inspector-General
of
Fortifications
and
the
Quarter-Master-General
(Fleetwood Wilson 1922,
pp.
70-71
(Fleetwood Wilson was secretary to this Cammi ttee);
order in
Council 21 February 1888).
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Table 2
ARMY ORGANISATION AFTER ORDER IN COUNCIL
27 DECEMBER 1887

Secretary of State for
War and the Colonies
Financial Secretary
I

Commander in Chief
I

I

1. Adjutant
General

I

3 . Military
Secretary

2. Quarter
Master
General

I

5. Director I 7. Directorof Artillery! General of
I Army Medical
I Department

4. Inspector
General of
Forts

I

6. Director
of Military
Intelligence

I

9 . ChaplainGeneral

8. DirectorGeneral of
Army
Education

11 . AccountantGeneral

10. Principal
Veterinary
Surgeon

I

12. Director
of Contracts

13. Director
of Clothing

14. DirectorGeneral of
Ordnance
Factories

-206maintaining civilian control of army finance allowed the military to
avoid all

responsibility.

The Commander-in-Chief's responsibility

was "entirely under the control of the Financial Secretary:

Power

rests with finance ... " (Duke of Cambridge, Nineteenth Century 1891,
Vol. XXX, p. 632).

The army could, and did, argue that they could

not be held responsible for military performance while ever they did
not possess real financial authority.

Their actions were tethered

by decisions of Parliament but more directly

by its representatives

the Secretary of State for War and the Financial Secretary.
6.6.3 The Hartington Coamission
Reorganisation

and Reassessment of the

1887

The Hartington Commission 21 of 1890 in reviewing the work of
its predecessor of 1887, the Ridley Commission, argued that
the object of the changes
is stated to have been to
place the administration of the executive duties of the
Army at the War Office in the hands of the Military
Department
and thus make the military head responsible
for the personnel and material of the Army ... (p.xx).
The 1890 Commission however, demurred from the latter part of this
aim of the 1887 re-organisation for it appeared to
involve an excessive centralisation of responsibility in
the person of the Commander-in-Chief on whom the whole
executive command, administration, and supply of the Army now
devolve" (p.xx).
The

Commissioners

Commander-in-Chief

further
responsible

cannot produce efficiency".

21.

contehded
to

the

that

with

Secretary

of

only

the

State

"it

Instead,

For a discussion of the Cammi ttee' s work and its members see
W.H. Smith's letter to Lord Randolph Churchill, 18 May 1889 as
quoted in Churchill 1906, Vol. II, p. 322.

-207the Professional officers administering Departments at the
War Office should ... be made directly responsible to the
Secretary of
State
for
the
efficiency
of
those
Departments, and for the economical expenditure of the
sums annually allotted to them (Hartington Commission
1890, p . xxi).
Heads of the administrative departments should not be allowed
to

hide

behind

the

Office

of

Commander-in-Chief,

argued

the

Hartington Commission.
The Hartington Commission therefore recommended the abolition
of the rank of Commander-in-Chief and the institution of a General
Staff in its place (p.xxi;
Randolph

Churchill

minority opinion,

as

a

see also Dunlop 1938, pp.9-22).
member

dissented from

of

the

Co~mission,

again

Lord
in

a

the deliberations of the Royal

Commissioners seeking instead greater responsibility in the army's
financial administration for the Commander-in-Chief and abolition of
his superior, the Secretary of State for War (p.xvi).
Churchill,

in

an

earlier

opinion,

denying

the

According to

military

greater

control of their financial affairs caused them to become "listless
and unresponsive to economic management. As a result millions of
pounds were

wasted each

year"

(Lord

Randolph Churchill

to Lord

Goschen 4 March 1888, quoted in Elliot 1911, p. 15). Recommendations
of

the 1890 Commission,

al though not Churchill's recommendation,

concerning the position of Commander-in-Chief were later developed
by

the

1904.

Esher

Committee

(War

Office

(Reconstitution)

Committee)
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Organisational Change 1895
The final act in the drama of military administrative reform

during the period of this study, as summarised -by Table 3 following,
was played in 1895 through the Order in Council 21 November 1895.
This re-enunciated the supremacy of the Secretary of State for War
over

the

army

recommendations

and
of

the

put

into

Hartington

effect

the

Commission,

major! ty

of

the

although

not

the

abolition of the office of Commander-in-Chief . 22
The reforms did not however, in any way affect the structure of
financial

control and thereby demonstrated that the

Parliament was sti 11 intact.

jealousy of

The Financial Secretary, stated the

Order in Council, 21 November 1895,
shall be charged;
with reviewing the expenditure proposed to
be provided in the Annual Estimates for the Army Services, and
with compiling those Estimates for submission to Parliament;
with financially reviewing any proposals for new expenditure,
or for any proposed redistribution of the sums allotted to the
different subheads of the votes for Army Services; with seeing
that accounts of all expenditure of cash and stores are
correctly and punctually rendered; with auditing and allowing
all such expenditure, and rendering the same under its proper
head of service in the annual account for Parliament:
with
issuing of all warrants for the payment of moneys; ... and with
advising the Secretary of State on all questions of Army
expenditure (British Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LIII, 1899, p.
538). 23

22.

The Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley, (who succeeded the Duke
of Cambridge in 1895) complained that the Order in Council, by
setting up four independent military departments - Adjutant
General, Quarter-Master General, Inspector of Fortifications
and Director General of Ordnance, each with direct access to
the Secretary of War, denegrated his office. The heads of these
departments had become the Commander-in Chief's equals in
administration.

23.

These duties were reaffirmed immediately before the outbreak of
the South African War in 1899 by Orders in Council, 7 March
1899.
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Table 3

ORGANISATION OF THE BRITISH ARMY
AFTER THE ORDER IN COUNCIL
21 NOVEMBER 1895
Secretary

of

State
t

t

I
I

Commanderin-Chief

Quarter-Master
General

I
I

Adjutant
General

Inspector
of
Fortification

Director
General
of
Ordnance

-210In addition because the heads of each administrative department were
now made directly responsible to the Secretary of State for War 24
there was no one soldier answerable for army efficiency

(see Arnold

Forster, the Times 11 November 1897). The result, argued critics,
was increasing lassitude in administration:

the Commander-in-Chief

was able to distance himself from inefficiencies by claiming they
did not arise from his responsibilities (Contemporary Review Vol.
LXVIII, July to December 1895;

6.7

p. 329).

THE TREASURY AND ORGANISATIONAL REFORM IN THE LATE
19TH CENTURY
As

demonstrated

above,

despite

the

exceptional

changes

in

military administration the structure of financial control remained
intact.

Fear

comfortable

of and

financial

aversion
practices

to

casting aside

and

traditions,

well

worn

mainly

and

under

Treasury control and exercised through the Finance Department at the
War Office, added to the reluctance for financial reform in the army
(see

"Evidence before the Select Cammi ttee on Army and Ordnance

Expenditure

1849,

p.591,

Question

8763;

pp.13-14) .

Without the Treasury's consent and support any moves

also

Hewgill

1980,

towards decentralisation of financial responsibility to the military
were guaranteed to be still-born (Brodrick Committee 1898,
para. 9).

p.130

The Treasury resisted change which would have threatened

the then present financial control struture which in turn would have
destroyed

24.

the

existing

administratively

based

organisational

The Order in Council of 21 November 1895 (which revoked the
Order in Council of the 21 February 1888) included in the
statement of duties of each administrative head, for example
the Adjutant-General, the phrase "He shall advise the Secretary
of State on all questions connected with the duties of his
department .. . " (Order in Council, 21 November 1895, British
Parliamentary Papers, Vol. LIII, 1899, pp. 537-538).

-211structure of the War Off ice.
the

arrangement

of

This structure stemmed directly from

Parliamentary

estimates

Treasury's responsibility to superintend.

which

became

the

In this regard the very

famous Sir Redvers Buller, the man responsible for organising the
supply of the British Army on modern lines
Vol.I;

(see Fortescue 1931

Melville 1923), scathingly castigated the

whole system of reports and regulations and warrants under
which the British Army now serves ... (for it) has grown
up entirely for the benefit of War Off ice clerks and to
find work at the War Off ice rather than to find control
for the Army... (They) do not like to let go out of their
hands any power derived from the constant tying-up of
Generals more and more by regulation. The result of their
making those regulations in such detail is that unless
they follow out that practice they have nothing to do
(Evidence before the Brodrick Committee 1898, p.194,
Question 950).
For the Treasury to suggest, promote and actively participate
in the implementation of any scheme that sought the reorganisation
of the War Office on lines other than those related to financial
support of the army would have meant a substantial decline in the
Treasury's role in army affairs.

Reorganisation of the structure of

financial control was sorely needed as both the Crimean and South
African

Wars

pedanticism of

were

to

tradition.

demonstrate,
Still,

as

not

withdrawal

long as

into

the

the arrangement of

military financial administration continued to cling to the wreckage
of anachronistic constitutional hostilities it could not help but
perpetuate the deficiencies discussed above.
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6.8

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
Progressively,

segregation

of

responsibilities

in the second half of the 19th century,

and

duties

from

the

administrative

roles

command

was emphasised

less for constitutional reasons.

Instead, the Prussian Wars of the sixties and seventies and the rise
of the German state, which had unsettled Britain with the change in
the balance
separation

of
of

expediency.

power

that resulted

administration

and

The contribution

in Europe,

command

in

of civilians

had couched

terms

of

the

military

as guardians of the

Nation's liberty became less chauvinistic in outlook and demands for
greater military involvement in military administration increased.
Thus 7there were three significant moves to reform m·ilitary
administration

in

the

last

three

decades

of

the 19th century;

Cardwell's reforms commencing in 1870 and the reorganistions of 1887
and 1895.

Despite what appeared to be Parliament's willingness to

give the military a freer hand and thereby allow it to be more
efficient and responsive, Parliament was still not prepared to give
the army complete administrative autonomy.
administrative freedom
parliamentary

of

financial

the

Thus to match increased

military the

officers

were

powers of the major

strengthened.

Because

administrative decisions ultimately were financially dependent this
prompted the army to distance itself from responsibility for any
military failures which could be traced to administrative problems.
Indeed, it is

di ff icul t to avoid the conclusion that many of the

supply problems experienced by the British Army in the Crimea and
later wars can but be traced back along a path that led directly
along

the

corridors

of

centralised

administration to the doors of Parliament.

and

exclusive

financial

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

-214Discontent with the structure of financial control of military
finance gained increasing support in the latter decades of the 19th
century.
the

This dissent was to prepare a fertile ground to receive both

complaints

of

financial

mismanagement arising

from the

South

African War of 1899-1902 and the financial reforms prompted by the
findings of the Brodrick (1899), Dawkins (1902) and Esher Committees
(1904).
The dominant concern of Parliament in its financial relationship
with the army prior to the Crimean War had been to establish checks on
the total amounts spent for military purposes.

By regulating the flow

of money to the British Army Parliament was able to monitor very
closely the size of the British Army.

To Parliament the presence of a

large

always

standing

liability.

army

in

peace

had

been

a

constitutional

Parliament prior to the Civil War and the Revolution in

the 17th Century had seen the Army as the dangerous tool of a powerful
opponent,

the

ruling

monarch.

The

role

of

the

army· in

the

constitutional conflicts of the 17th century only served to confirm
the accuracy of Parliament's misgivings.
So threatening had the army's actions been in the Civil War and
so close had Parliament come to annihilation that it was determined to
reap a terrible vengeance on this potent vehicle of force.

Parliament

must never again find itself at the mercy of any other agency.

Given

that the monarch was to retain the command and headship of the army,
Parliament sought to develop a mechanism of control which could both
tolerate
Parliament

the

loyalty

ultimate

of

the

authority

troops
in

to
all

the

monarchy

military

and

ensure

matters.

The
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surest way to accommodate both these aims was through control

of

military finances.
The Revolutionary settlement of 1689 had guaranteed Parliament
all

authority

in

appropriation.

the

raising

of

government

revenue

and

its

Parliament was financially supreme over the executive.

The amount of money available to the military was therefore beyond the
military's direct determination.

Still, control over the level of

funding of the military by itself was not
measure for Parliament.
not only from the

Whereas

Parliament

constitutionally

Consequently, Parliament severed the military

source of

rigidly circumvented

a sure enough control

access
found

it

their means
the

of subsistence but also

military had

very di ff icul t

lethal force

as

to available
to

trust a

funds.

potential

embodied by the army they could

however, depend more on the fidelity of civilians.

Thus Parliament

used civilians as its ally in the dispensing of military money.
This was doubly galling to the proud military who resented very
strongly any civilian meddling in military matters.

According to the

military no civilian could ever do the military justice because they
did not have the intimate knowledge of the workings
of the army which
,
could only be obtained from a lifetime immersion in the army.
military

to

be

totally

dependent

on

civilians

for

the

For the
level

of

military spending and the direction and rate of spending, was anathema
to the army.

They were completely at the mercy of civilians who were

able not only to directly affect the size of the army but also to
indirectly affect

all

aspects

of

military

operations.

In these

circumstances comradship between the military and civilians was akin
to warm friendship between master and servant.

While ever civilians
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controlled finance, no matter which administrative departments were in
military hands, they were resented by the army.
Perpetuation of rivalry between two antagonistic groups, as were
the military and civilians engaged in military finance, was consistent
with Parliament's initial goal

in its relations with the military:

antagonism denied collusion between civilians and the military, and
therefore largely removed the army as a constitutional threat.

The

financial

and

controls

instituted however,

were

so

single minded

successful in achieving the aim of constitutional security that it was
Difficulties therefore

very difficult to accommodate other motives.

arose in the latter half of the 19th century when additional goals for
financial control of the army rose to prominence.
By

the mid 19th century Parliament had become less concerned

about the army being a constitutional liability and more reflective of
the need for an economic and efficient i.e. cost effective, military
force.

Parliament did not however, alter the structure of financial

control

to meet

the

changed direction of financial

in

appropriation
in

military

financial

accounting,
finance.

feedback
added

Altering

to
the

to

If

In particular major

anything, existing controls were strengthened.
innovations

control.

especially

Parliament,

apparent

civilian

professed

omnipotence

goals of

financial

surveillance without compensating changes in the means of surveillance
ensured the structure of financial control would continue to serve
goals now avowed to be outmoded.
The Treasury, as the major financial adviser to Parliament,
particular was

frequently criticised towards

the

in

end of the 19th

century for its reluctance to encourage change in the structure of
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control of military finance.

The Treasury was accused of perpetuating

the existing structure of financial control largely because of motives
The then present structure suited the Treasury

of self interest.
because
Surrender

of

the

of

considerable

its

pivotal

power

position

and
in

influence

military

it

finance

afforded.
was

not

something the Treasury promoted .
The army argued strenuously that administrative responsibility in
the absence of financial authority could never ensure either economic
or efficient operations as envisaged by Parliament.

Consideration of

economy and efficiency were only possible in the presence of a high
degree of financial autonomy.

Economy and efficiency as goals of

financial control were incompatible with a very rigid, centralised and
civilian controlled finance function.
The

structure

of

financial

control

operating

throughout

the

latter half of the 19th century continued to be directed towards the
detection of mistakes, especially those of an ultra vires kind where
there was a failure to obtain the required Parliamentary approval for
expenditure.

In other words the structure of financial control was

administratively based.
more

importantly,

control system.

It did not have the capacity to discover and,

judge successes

as

would

a management

oriented
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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Evidence of widespread military financial mismanagement during
the South African War of 1899-1902 proved to be the shock necessary
to introduce major change in the structure of control of military
finance.

Investigations revealed that smart civilian contractors, in

their dealings with the army, had been able to perpetrate numerous
frauds.

Some of the losses incurred were due to the connivance of

corrupt military personnel but, what was more startling, many frauds
were

possible

because

of

the

financial

ignorance

of

military

officers.
Thus it is suggested that further study could be directed at
disclosures of financial profligacy made during and after the South
African War and the structure of financial control which emerged soon
after.
As

indicated

in

this

thesis

financial

control

managerially based but remained an administrative tool.

was

never

Not until

1919 was there any concerted effort to harness financial procedures in
the interest of improved management of resources.

Thus, in 1919 the

army boldly introduced, before any other government department, a cost
accounting scheme.

Three years later the scheme was scrapped.

Despite the significance of the cost accounting experiment in the
evolution of government accounting very little has been attempted to
explain reasons for the adoption of the scheme and its subsequent
rejection.
financial

As a significant change in the direction of military
administration,

and

government

accounting,

the

accounting experiment merits consideration for further study.

cost

Indeed,

such research would constitute a natural extension of the present
study.

APPENDIX

1
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~foneys through other Cbann~ls; " the Secretaries· of .the
Treasury" shall include the .A.ss1stant Secretary.
3 • ..A.t any Time within Twelve Months after the passing of Po!'er to Her
this .A.ct it shall be . lawful for Her Majesty, Her Heirs and 11.aJ~ty to
Su~cessors! by Letters P.atent under th~ Great Seal of the ~P~::troller
U mted kmrrdom to nommate and appoint the Person who arid Auditor
. shall at that Time hold the Office of Comptroller General of Gene~" nDd
the Receipt and Is~u~ of Her nfojes~~'s Excheque~·, and Chair- ~~~~!r
~an ~£ the Comu:uss10ners for n.ud1tmg the Public Accounts, and .Auditor, .. ·
fo' be Con:iptroller General ·of the Receipt · and Issue ·:of Her who shall not
.. JU~jesty's . E.x,chequer-and··xu.dit.Or General of Public Accounts; ~~~:'I~1:;r
1
;. in this .Ac~ referred fo as ,, Comptroller and Auditor General,'! Pleasure, nor
and also to nominate 'and ·appoint One of the Persons ' who shall beMembersor
,_- T"m1e hoId t h e 0 ffi ces of Comm1ss10ners
. . . fior au
. a·itmg
. t be Peers
at tu.at
ment. of.Parlia- ·
Public Accounts to be " "Assistant Comptroller and Auditor."
·
The said Comptroller and Auditor General and Assistant ... _
Comptroller and Auditor, shall hold · their Offices dti.ririg .. good ./.:
. Behavio~r;. subject, ho~ever; to . their R~~~-~~~ . .ther~Xr.<??1- by.. , i .. - ·
~~r Majesty, Her. Heirs .and Successors;__o~. an Address from '~~-/
·: the . Two Houses of Parliament; and they shall not be capable ·
of holding their Offices together with any other Office to be
held during Pleasure under the Crown, or µnc1er ·any Officer · ·
appointed by the Cro\vn; nor shall they be _capable while holding their Offices of being elected or of sitting as 1'1embers of
·
the Rouse of Commons; nor shall any Peer of Parliament be
..
ca1lable of holding eit11er of the said Offices.. ·
··
~ 4. Her l\Iajesty mn.y, by such Letters Patent, grant to the Power to Her
Persons therein named the follo'l\ing Salaries; that is to sn.y, :Majesty to .
To the Cornptq>ller ri.ncl Auditor General a Sala,ry of Two ~a:;r~~anes
thousand Pounds per Annum, and to the Assistant Comp- named, and
troller aud Auditor a, Salary of One thousand five hundred also Pensions.
Pounds per A1111um; and such Salaries shall be charged
upon and paid out of the Consoli<latecl Fund of the United
Kingdom or the growing Produce thereof.
It ehall be lawful for Her l\1ajesty, Her Heirs and Snccessors, .
by Letters Pa.tent as aforesaid, to grant to any Person who
shall have executed the Offices of Comptroller and Auditor
General, or Assistant Comptroller and .Auditor, on his ·
ceasing to hold euch Office, an .Annuity or Pension not
exceeding One Half of the Salary of his Office to which
·: -· ' ··· ·
he shall have been entitled immediately before he ceased
to bold such Office, if he shall have held either, or one
after the other, of the said Offices or the Office of Com- .:. · ·;;.
miEsioner of .Audit for. a. Period not less· than Fifteen
Years, and Two Thirus of his said Salary if he shall have
.. . ~- · ..
.;:_ held either, or one after the other, of the saicl Offices for
-·· · ·
-a Period not less than Twenty Years: Provided aht'ays,
·. , ... 1•
that no such Annuity or· Pension shall be granted to eithe~
. : '.'! : ·.,
of the said Officers unless he be Sixty Years of Age at the
· '·
least, or be afflicted with eome · permanent Infirmity dis- · :....; • , ! ·:-;·~·
ablin(]' him from the due Execution of his Office the same· ·· '·' •;: ::, ''?:
... . ~
Y 2
'
to _ .... ,., , . ,,.: . 1

.·

#

--·- -·-

•

•
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to be distinctly recited in such Grant: Provided also, tbnt
nothing herein contained shall prevent either of the said
Officers from receiYing, in lieu of such .Annuity or Pension;
if he shall so elect, the Amount of Superannuation Allowance to which be would have been entitled in respect of
the full Period c1uring which he shall have served in the
permanent Civil Service of the State, uncle.r the Provisions
of" The Snperannuu.tion .Act, 1859."
·
Present Offices
5. On the Appointment as aforesaid of a Comptroller ancl
of Comptroller Auditor _General and an Assistant Comptroller and Auditor,
General of the
E:tchequer and the then existing Letters Patent of Appointments of CompCommissioners troller General of the Exchequer and of Commissioners of
of Audit to be Audit shall be ipso facto revoke<l, n.nd the present Offices of
abolished.
Comptroller General of the Exchequer ancl Commissioners
of Audit shn.11 be abolished, but the Person appointed to be ·..
Comptroller and Auditor General shall . ,have , and p~rform nil,,: .. .
the Powers and Duties conferred or imposed on the Comptroller .. ~ .
General of the Exchequer nnc.l the Commissioners for auditing
the Public Accounts respccti>ely by nny Enactments · relative
to those Authorities respectiveTy ns for as the · same are not '. i
repealecl or altered by this Act or nny other Act of the present
Power to grant Session of Parliament; ancl it shall be lnw.ful for the Treasury
Compensation to grant to each of the said Commissioners of Audit who.se
Allowances to
Commhsioners Offices shall be abolished under the Prorisions of this Act, nn<.l
of Audit -who
who :;hall not be appointed to either of the said Offices of Comp- · /.
are not retroller
and Auditor General or Assistant Comptroller and
appointed.
Auditor, nn annual Allowance, by wny of Compensation, not
exceeding the Sum charged. on the Consolidated Fund ns the
Salary of such Commissioners: Pro>ided always, that any Commissioners who may be _in receipt of Emoluments e::rneecling the
Salary so charged on the Consolidated Fund shall be entitled ::
to receive, in addition to the aforesaid Compensation Allowance, F
such Proportion of the said Emoluments as · the Treasury are ;.,
empowered to grant under the Provisions of" The Superannua- ! ·
tion Act, 1859 ;" and such .Allownnces shall be charged upon ;·
and paid out of the Consolidated Fund qf the United .Kingdom ·i:
or the growing Pro<luce thereo£
·
.
·
On Vncancy
6. On the Death, Resignation, or other Vacancy in the .
in Office of
Office of ·the Comptroller and Auditor General, or of the Assis- . :
Comptroller
tant Comptroller nnd Auditor, Her ::Jiajesty, Her Ff.eirs and
and Auditor
General, &c.,
Successors, may, by Letters Patent as n.foresaicJ, nominate :md
Successor to
appoint
a. Successor,·,,ho shall have the same Powers, Authobe appoiuted.
rities, and Duties, and who shall be paid .the like Salary and
the like Annuity or Pension out of the Consolidated Fund.
7. Anything which under the .Authority of this Act is
.Assistant
Comptroller,
directed to be done by the Comptroller ancl Auditor General
&c. may act in
may, in his .Absence, be done by the .As3istnnt Comptroller
Absence of
Comptroller,
and Auditor, e~cept the certifying and reporting on Accounts
&c.
for the House of Commons.
8. The Treasury_ shall from Time to Time appoint · the .
Treasury to
appointOlficers, Officers, Clerks,. :incl other Persons in the Department of the .
Cl~ks, &c.,
Comptroller
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Comr)troller and Auditor General~ and He.r Majesty by · Order and to regulate
·m Oounc1'l may f rom T"
. 1me to T'ime regu1a t ~ t h e N ?m b ers a~ d Numbers
Salaries••and
Salaries of the respective Grades or Classes mto which the said
Officers, Clerks, and others shall be divided.
'
9. The Comptroller and .Auditor General shall have full The CompPower to make ~rom Time to. Time Or~ers and Rules for the !~~;0 ~~ene
Conduct of the mternal Busmess . of }us Department, and to ral to promote,·
promote~ suspend, or remove any of the Officers, Clerks, and suspend, or
others employecl thereio ; .:' and tO ·prescribe Regulati~ns . and· ';:movedc;erks,
· Forms for the Guidance of Principal and of Sub-Accountants in m~:~~a.;. ·
· ruaking up and renclering ·their periodical .Accounts
Ex:imi.: tions, subject .
· ·nation: Provided always, that all such Regulations· and Forms to Approval.
shall be :ipproved by the Treasury previously to . the , Issue
thereo£ -·
· ·
·
·
·
·. ·. · :. :
10. The Commissioners of Customs, the CommiEsiouers of Gross Reve~· · ·
Inlaud Revenue, and the Postmaster General shall, after Deduc- ~ufutoh be paid
tion of the Payments for Drawbacks, Bounties of the Nature a~d d~l;quer,
of Drawbacks, Repayments, and Discounts, cause the gross Ret11rns to be
Revenues of their reEpective Departments to be paid, at such ::n~ to ~mp
Times and under such Regulations as the Treasury may from A~Af~~n
Time to Time prescribe, to Accounts to be intituled "The General. · ·: ·.Account of ff,er l\Iajesty's Excheque1·," at ·the Banl~ of England
· · -·
and at the Bank of Ireland respectively, and all other Public
:Moneys payable to the Exchequer shall be paid to the same
Accounts, an<l. Accounts of all such Payme:µts i;hall be rendered
to the Comptroller and Auclitor General daily, in such Form as
the Treasury may prescribe: Provided always, that this Enactment shall not be construecl to prevent the Collectors and.
I~eceivers of the said groes Revenues :md :Moneys from cashing,
as heretofore, under the Authority of any Act or Hegulation,
Orders issued for Naval, ::Military, Revenue, Civil, or .other
Services, repayable to the Re-rcnue Departments out of the
Consolidated Fund or. out of Moneys provided by Parliament.
11. All :Moneys · paid into the · Bank of England and · the Moneys to
Bank of Ireland on account of the Exchequer shall be con- ~~~d?;~he
siclered by the Governor and Company of the said Banks Books of the
'respectively· as forming One general Fund in their Books; and Banks of Engnll Orders directed by the Treasury to the said · Banks for ~::~ :;:1 ~r:ble
Issues out of Credits to be granted by the Comptroller and to Exchequer
. Auditor General, as herein-after provided, for th;e. J:>ublic. fa~es. ; · ·
,,- Ser.vice, s~all be s:itisfied out of such genera~ Fund {and . ~vith ./ ~~~~Y~ ." ·.:·.
: a Tie\v to economize the Public . Balances, ..the Treasury shall :. ' :
('restrict the '· Su.ms·· t-0 . be"'. is.sued.'or ·''i~ansfei:red froni.:.Time to
Time
Credit · of Accounts of. Principal .A.ccounta.nt.s·· at
. the saicl Banks; ns' herein-after provided, .to such total Sums' as ~
·they may consider necessary for.· conducting the current Pay.;.
ments for the Public Service illtrt.isted t0 such. Principal ,. ,
.A.ceountants.; ·ind the Sa.id Princi1jal Accountants rriaf consider
.'
the Sums so transferred to their Accounts as constituting Part . · ·;
~.
. of their general drawing Balance appliCa.ble to· the Payment of'.~... : .. ·,: ..::.-·
all the Services for which they
accountable ; but such Sums - -::: : : ·: ~· :·;:

for

to· the ..

'.':<: •

·

are·

Y 3

shall

.! .. :·~.
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· . shall be carried in _the .Book.s of such -Accoiuitall,bi _~O: tbe-_Cre_dit- ' .
of the respective Services. fa~ which the:Same may b& ·isaued, aa ·
specified in ·such: Orders: P,rovi<lecl always, tba~ _ th.i.s . Enactment
shall not be construed _to empower the Treasury or any·Authority
to direct the. Payment, _by nny s11ch Priµcipal·1 A ·ccountnn_t;.of ·.. •· Expenditure: not sanctioned by· nny A.ct whereby Services. are-:
~ or may ,_
b e charged on the Co~oliclnted Fund, or by n .Y?te of
. , the Hou~ of Commons, or by an Act for. the.:Appropriation of .
. : the Supplies annually granted by Parliament.". '. :
Qnarte~Ij , ·.. ~ - . 12. At the Clo5e of each of the Quarters ending ·on the.
Accounts of
Thirty-fir!St Day of JJiarch, the Thirtieth Day of June, the
~~:,.~o:Cet~d Thirtieth Day of September, and the Thirty-first D:iy of December.
Cons~lidated in every Year the .Treasury shall prepare an Account of the
Fund to be
Income and Charge of the Consolidated Fund in Great Britain
prepared.
ancl in Ireland for such Quarter, and. the Charges for the Public
Debt due on the Fifth Day of April, the Fifth Dn.y of July,
the Tenth Day of October, ancl the Fifth Day of January shall
be incluc.le<l in the Account> of the saic.l Charge for the Qumier3
ending on the Days preceding the latter Dates; nn<l a Copy
of such Account shall forthwith Le transmitted by the Treasury
If it appear by to the Comptroller and .Auditor General; aiid if it shall appear
such .Account by such Account that the Income of the Consoliuutccl Fund iu
tbat there is a
Great Britain or in Ireland for tbe Quarter is not sufficient to
Deficiency of
defray the Charge upon it, the Comptroller noel Auditor Geuenil,
the Consolidated Fund,
if satisfied of the Correctness of the Deficiency, shall certify
Comptroller,
the Amount thereof to the Bank of England or to the Bank of
&c. to certify
Ireland, as the Case mny be, ancl upon such Certificates the
to Bank of
England or
said Banks shall be authorized to make Advances, from Time
Ireland, who
to Time, during the succeeding Quarter, on the A pplicn.tion 0£
may make
the Treasury, by "Writing, in n. Form to be from Time to Time
Advances,
determined by them, to an Amount not e::i::ceecling in the aggregate the Sums specified in such Certificates; . and all such
Advances shall be placed to the Creclit of the Exchequer
Accounts at the said Banks, ,and be available to · sati.sfy the
Orders for Credits granted or to be granted upon the sai<l
Accounts by the Comptroller and Auditor General ; . an cl the
Principal and Interest of all such ..Advances shall be pa.i<l out
of the growing Produce of the. Consolidated Fund in the saicl
· . · · •. i ..
, .... · _.. . . .... . .. ; ·- . -~ . :... . -·' .
succeeding Quarter. . _
Credits to be
· 13. The Comptroller . and Auditor General shall grant to
granted to the the Tren.sury, from Time to Time, on their Hequisitions nuthoTreasury for
rizing the same, if satisfied of the Correctness thereof, Creilit.s
Consolidated
th{. Banks'. · of
Fund Services. on the .~xchequer ··Account:i
Ireland, or on the. gr.owing Bnlances ..thei:eof, nofe:Cce~c1~ng, .the
Arnonnt of. the Charge. in the afor_e:ia.id. ·q i1~_~terlj ' Account · of
tho Income u.n<l .Charge_ of the Coruoli<lat~d ;Fund . rcmai~ing
unpaid.
. ,. .
·
· .·
The Comptroller and Auditor General shall also grant from
Snpplemental
Credits for
Time to Time to the Tren.5ury, on simil:i.r Requisitions, suppleSerrices
mental
Credits for Services payable under any Act out of the
charged on the
growing Pro- growing Produce of the Com;oliclated Fund, and. not includeu

nt

duce.

<England,"nnd

Jn

-225JSG6.

Excl~equer

and Audit Departments.

Cap. 39._

in the aforesaid quarterly Accoun~; and the Issues or Transfers Iss.ue~ to
of ::\Ione•s required from Time to Time by· the Principal PArmcipal
,;
.
d ccountant5.
Accountants to enable them to mnkc the Payments mtruste
to 1.hcm shall be ma.d e out of such Cre.d its on Orders issued
to 1.he said Banks, signed by One of the Secretaries of the
Treasury, or in their Absence by such Officer or Officers as the
Treasury may from Time to Time appoint to thn.t Duty, a.nd
in all such Orders the Services for which the Issues may be
· Daily Advices
authorized shall be set forth.
A daily Account of nll Issues or Transfers made from the of Issues to be
Exchequer Accounts, in pursuance of such Orders, shall be sent to ComptransmitteJ by the eai_d Banks to the Comptroller and Auditor ~~~t::nd
General.
·
General.
14.- \Vhen any Su{n
Sums o( 1\foney shall have been Royal Order
granted to Her Majesty by :t 1-lesolution of the · House of ~r 8_upply
. _ .. Commons, or by an Act of Parliament, to defray Expenses for ernces.
any_. specified Public Services_, it shall be lawful for Her·
.- Majesty from Time to Time_, by Her Royal Order under the
' R.o_y.al_ Sign Manual, countei:signed by the Treasury, to authorize ~d require th~ Treasury to issue, out of the Credits to be .
: · granted to them on tbe Exchequer Accounts as herein-after
p:·o,ided, the Sums w11icb may be requii-ed from Tim~ to Time
to clefroy such Expem:cs, not exceeding the Amount of the
Sums eo \oted or granted.
.
.
..
15. When ·any "\Vays and i\Icans shall have _been granted Credits for
by Parliament to · mnke good · the Suppiics granted . to Her ~.11 r;ly SerJ\Iaj esty. by any .Act of Parli:unent or Resolution of the House ice·
of Commons_, the Comptroller and Auditor General shall grant
to. the Treasury, on their Hequisition authorizing the 1.::ame, a
Credit or Crecl!ts on the Exchequer Accounts at the Dank of
England and Bank of Ireland, or on the growing Balances
thereof, not exceeding iu the whole the Amount of the \Yays
and l\Ieans so granted. . Out of the Credits so granted to the Iss~c~to
Treasury I::sues shall be made to Principal Accountants from PAnncipal
.
cl to tie
l s:m
. l B an];.s, s1gne
.
d by ccountants.
.
T ime
to T"ime on 0 r d ers issue
·
One of the Secretnries of the Treasury, or in their Absence by
such Officer or Officers as tlrn Trca:::ury may from Time to
Time appoint to that Duty; nnu the Services or Votes on
account of '"hich the r~sues may be authorizecl shall be set
forth in such Orders: ProYidecl alwn)s, tbat the Issues for
hrm.r an!J..;\:n·y Sen ices shall be rnaue U.Uder the generali.mtls-- ··· ·
of" Army 'anuc-:--N:tT")""'~·!.1:eepeofrv-al- ·
··
---~-A&iH);-ACCoiiiil.m'"all-i-m:rn·~l'mule from the Exchequer
Account;; in pursuance of ·such Orders shall be transmitted
~y the said Banks to the Comptroller and Auditor _General.
·. 16~ _·: within Fifteen Days after the Expiration of the -Quart.er;; Treasury to
ending on the Thirty_.first Day of JIIarcll, the Thirtieth Day prepare Acof Jwie, , the Thirtieth Day of September, aucl the Thirty-fir~ ~~~n~:1~";- '
Dny of December in e,·ery Year the .Tre:isury- shall · prepar~ Income applinn .Account _of tJ1e Public lncome and Expenditure of the c.able to Reduc· d .u.mg
T.-·
dom, .accorc1"mg to _tIJC ac_tual R ec~1pt
. · aJJ. cl . I ssue· t1on
of the
u. mte
Nationa!Debt.
·
of
: ..

·or.

.-
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.. ·of :Moneys on the Exchequer Accounts at the Bank of England
and Bank of Ireland in the Tweh-e : Months ending · on such
Quarter Days respectively; nnd if there shall appenr by such
Account to be a Surplus of Income above Expendit.ure, the
Treasury shall certify the same to the National Debt Commis3ioners, ancl One Fourth Part of such Surplus shall be
applicable to the Reduction of the National Debt as hereinafter directed; and the National Debt Commissioners shall
publish from Time to Time in the London Gazette the Sum·
which will be so applied in the ensuing Quarter. The Treasury
shall cause One Fourth Part of such SurplU3 Income to be
char:red on the Consolidated Fund in the Quarter succeeding
the Termination of such Account ; and the Sum so charged
shall be issued by the Treasury from Time to Time in the
next ensuing Quarter to the National Debt Commissioners,
who shall apply the 1;ame, clurinrT the said Quarter, in redeeming
Funded or Unfunded Debt, o~ in repaying to the Bank of
E119lancl or to the Bnnk of Ireland any Atlvances made hy
them, under the Provisions of this Act, towur<ls supplying the
Deficiency of the Consolidated Fund during the said Quarter;
nnd all Debt so redecmetl shull be forthwith cancelled. And
a Copy of eYcry Account prepared by the Treasury as aforesaid, certified by the Comptroller and Auditor General, ::ball
be laid before the House of Commons within Fifteen Days
after the Expiration of the s:i.id q unrterly Periou::i, if Parliament
be then sitting, or if not sittixw
then within One 'y eek a.fter
0
Parliament shall be next assembled.
Certain
17. All Debts accruing due under :my Contract or Lease
Payments
now
or hereafter entered into or taken for the Public Service,
under Contracts or Leases and payable out of the Supplies from Time to Time voted by
to be made by Parliament to Her Majesty for the Public Service, in any
the Paymaster Department for which the Payments are made by the Pnyma:;ter
General.
General, shall be discharged and paid in manner following; that
is to sny, such Debts shnll be payable on the Order of the
Department, and the Payment thereof shall be made by a Draft
dra.wn by the Paymaster General on the Bank of England,
according to the Course and Practice of his Office, payable
to the Persons to whom such Debts may be due, or to their
Agents.
·
.
·
Treasury to
18. The Treasury may from Time to Time determine at what
determine wLat Banks Accountants shall keep the Public :Moneys entrusted to
Accounts shall
them, and they may al:>o determine what Accounts so opened
be deemed
Public
in the Names of Public Officers or Accountants in the Books
Accounts.
of the Bank of England, of the B:ink of lreland, or of nny
other Bank, shall be deemed J.>ublic Accounts; and on the
Death, Resignation, or Removal of any such Public Officers .
or Accountants the Balances remaining nt the Credit of such
Accounts shall, upon the Appointment of their Successors,
unless otherwi:;e directed by Law, ,·est in nncl be transferred
to the Public Accounts of such Successors nt the said Banks,
and shall not, in the eyent of the Death of any such Public
Officers
~
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Officers or Account:mts, constitute Assets · of the Deceri.sed,
or be in any :?\fnnner Eubject to the Control of their legal
Representnti ,·es.
19. It shall be lallfnl for the Treasury, wheneYer they shall
consider it for the Advantage of th e Public Sen·icc, to <lirect
thnt the Accounts of .n.ny Public Officer or Department, which
b' anv Act or Acts are required to be kept uncJer Eeparate
I4ead~ nt the Bank of E11.qla11d or nt the Bank of Ireland, shall
be comolidated i.n such Manner as they shall judge most convenient for tbe Public Service.
20. It shall be lawful for the Bank of Eugland and Bank
of Ireland, at the Request of the Treasury, signified by One of
their Secretaries, for the Public Convenience, to open nnd keep
Accounts of Government Stock and Annuities in the Books of
the said Banks under the official Description of any Public
f'
l T.mm b emg,
·
· l10ut nammg
·
]11m;
·
Offi cer ior
tie
wit
an d t h e
Dividends on such Stock and Annuities may from Time to
Time be received, and the Stock and Annuities or any Part
thereof to the Credit of such Account may from Time to Time
be transferred, by the Officer for the Time being holding such
Office, ns if such Stock nnd .Arurnities i:;tood in his own Name;
nn<l upon the Death, Resignation, or Removal of any such
Public Officer, the Stock and Annuities standing to the Credit
of such Account, and nll Dividends thereon, including any
Diddends not theretofore received, shall become vested in his
Succe~sor in Office, and be receivable and .. tramSera.ble accordingly. And any such Public Officer in whose official Desci-iptiou
::uch GoYernment Stock and Annuities mny be standing n1ay,
by Letter of Attorney, nutborize the Bnnk of England or
the Bank of Ireland, or all or any of their Cashiers, to sell and
tramfer all or any Pnrt of the Stock or Annuities from Time
to Time standing in the Books of the said Banks on· such
Account, :mcl to receiYe the Divi<lends due and to become due
thereon; but no Stock or Annuities shall be sold or transferred
at the said Banks un<ler the Authority of such general Letter
of Attorney, except upon an Order in \Yriting, Eignecl by One
of the Secretaries of the Treasury, directed to the proper
Officers of the said Banks.
~ .. -., -

Treasury may
direct Con•
solidation of ·
Accounts at
the Bank. ·.

Accounts of

~tock

m7.

t:eo~~~~s :C

the Banks
under. o~cial
Description
of Public
Officers.

The Banks
may be authorized to receive
Dividends and
sell Stock.

.APPROPRIATION ACCOUNTS •

. 21) , The ' Treasury' shall cause an .A.c~ount tO be prepared Annnal Acand trammitt.ed :· to the Comptroller and Auditor_General for counts of Issues
.
·
f"
for ConsoliExam i nation on · or bewre the Thirtieth Day oCSeptember in dated Fund
every- Year; showing . the . IEsues made from the Consolidated · Services to be
Fund ·of ,Gr.eat Britain and Ireland in the Financial " Year prepared and
-, ended ·· o'D. · the Thirty-fin;t· Day' .of' Jtfcirch . pre.c eding:· for the ~:~n=~~~~
Interest and 1'1anagement of the Public Funded and Unfunded
Debt, for the Civil List, nnd all other Issues in the Financial
Year for Services charged directly on the said Fund; and the
,,. . ! : . Comptroller.and Auditor Genera.I shall certify and rep~rt upon . :~ ..:
the· same w1th_referen<;e t~>_ the Acts Q.f Parliament under the . .;

~ ;~

~Authority

\

··.. . .
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Authority of 'Yhich such Issues may hn:ve_been ~ected; mid .L~
such Accounts nnd Reports shall be la.id before the House of · ..
Commons by' the Treasury on or before _' the Thirty-first Day .:;~·
of January in : the following Year; if Parliament be .t hen · .
sitting, nnd if not sitting, then within One Week after Parlin.. roent shall be next assembled.
Annual Ac22. On or before the Days specified in,.. the respective
counts of the
of Schedule A. annexed to this Act; Accounts of the
Columns
Appropriation
Appropriation
of the several Supply Giants comprised . in the ~ ·
of Pttblic
Money to be
Appropriation A~t of each Year shall be prepar~d by the several ..
prepared for
Departments,
and be -transmitted for Examination to the Comp- ·,_
the Holl!!e of
troller
and
Auditor
General and to . the Treasury,, and when ·
Commons.
certifi~d and reported upon as herein-afte~,. directed _
t hey shall
be laid before the House of Commons ;,': '.and such Accounts
shall be called . the '.' Appropriation Accounts" of the :Moneys
expended for the Services to which they may respectively
relate; and the Treasury shall determine by what Depru:tment.s .
such Accounts shall be prepared nnd rendered · to the Coi:np- .,. ·
troller and Auditor General, nntl the Comptroller and .Auditor. ., ·
Generu.l shall certify nnd report u1ion such Accounts as herein- :·
after directed; and the Reports thereon . shall be signed by ·
the Comptroller and Auditor General: Provided always, and
it is the Intention of this Act thnt the Treasury shall direct
that the Department. charged with the Expenditure of -any
Vote under the ..;\.uthority of the Treasury shall prepare the
Appropriation Account foereof: Provided also, that the Term
"Department/' y.,·he~ used in this Act in connexion with the
Dnt.y of preparing the said Appropriation Accounts, shall be
-construed as including any Public Officer or Officers to whom
that I;>uty may be assigned by the Treasury. .- . .. .
_ .
. .
Ea<ffi Depart
23. A Plan of Account Books and Accounts, . adnp~ed, t~ ,.;;.··;
1::i~ht ~~!:{se~r the Requirements of each Service in ..orde~::. to .:.exhil#~ in· a ~. ·
Account as
coriveil.i~nt Form, the . whole :of. the Receipts.: a.n:(.Paym~n~ in .i..;mar be pre- , respec:t . pf- each:. Vote;' shall . be. designed . _un~er~ the.. Superin- '·.
;:nbed by the;, tendence of the Treasury; and Her :Majesty· may, from Time .
reasury.
to Time, by. Order in Council, prescribe . the Manner iu _which
each Department of the Pu?lic Service sball'keep its.Accotmts.Description of
24. An , Appropriation Accot~nt o( .:·_ Supply ,Grants ' shall ·. ~.
Account.
exhibit on the Charge Sid~ . thereof 'the.:· Sun;i~.0~1·: Sumi'appro.:· '~~ ·
printed by Parliament for the Service of the Financin.l Y enr ': :to which_the Account relates; and.'\)li ~he D_i~~~arge Side ~hereof .'..
• •·i . .
t~e ~ums :wb_ich.may _have· actually come in ~ourse ..of :pnymeJ?,t ;_/ ·
· · _w1th1~ t~e same Period.,; a.n 4 no_. Impi:es~ , ~r_.A:d-v:nnce; .of . the '
·:. ·: Application of which ~ nn .A ccount may not have oeen i·endered /
. to arid allowed by the accounting Department, shall be included . ·
on the Discharge Sicle thereof.
· .
·· . . ·
A Balance
25. The J?e.I?artment charged with the DutJ: of preparing
Sheet or
the Appropnatlon Account of. a . Grant shall, if required so
Statement to
nccomp:my the to do by the Comptroller and .Auditor~ Genera.i;·trnnsmit. to
Appropriation him, together with the annual Appropriation :.Accouiit. of:··~-~i°ch·_;
Account.
Grant, a Balance Sheet. so·prepared as to ~l~<?.w · t!rn Debtor nncl · ·· ·
·
· ·
· . · · Creditor
4

.

1
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Creditor Balances in the Ledgers of such Department on the
Day when the eai<l. Appro1~riat.ion Account was closed, a.nd~ to ·
verify the Balances appearmg upon the annual Appropnat1on.Accouut: Pro~ided always, that the Comptroller and Auditor
General may, if he thinks fit, require the said Department to
transmit to him in lieu of such Balance Sheet a certified
Statement ehowin<T the actual Disposition of the Balances
appearing upon. th~ annu:il Appropriation Account. on the la.st
Day of the Period of such Account.
· ·
.
26. EYery Appropriation Account when rendered to the The Appropriation Account
Comptroller and Auditor General shall be accompanied by an to
be accom- ·
Explanation ehowing how the Balance or Balances on the Grant panied by a
or Grants included in the previous Account have been adjusted, Statement
explaining
and shall also contain an explanatory Statement of any Excess Disposal
of
of Expencliture over the Grant or Grants included in such BallUlces, &c.
Account, and such Statement as well as the Appropriation
Account shall be signed by such Department.
.
27. E"rery Appropriation Account shall be examined by In what
:L\!anner the
the Comptroller and Auditor General on behalf of the House Examination
of
of Commons; and in the Examination .of such Accounts the Appropriation
~ Comptroller and Auditor General shall ascertain, first, whether Accounts shall
conducted
the Payments which the accounting Department has charged ·to be
by the Compthe Grant are supported l)y Vouchers or Proofs of Payments, troller and
and, second, -rrhether the 1'.foney expen,ded hns been applied to Auditor
the Purpose or Purposes for which .· tmch .Grant was intended GeneraL
to provide: Pro>iclecl. .always, and it is -hereby. enacted, that
· wheneYer the en.id Comptroller and Auuitor . General s~all be ..
required by the Treasury .to nscert.'lin whether the Expenditure
. includ~d or~~ be includeu in _a}1.Appropriation A~~ount, or any ..
.. Portion of such Expendi~.?re, 1s supported by . th,e Authority of-:
the · Treasury, the Comptroller and Auditor General shall
c:tamine rnch Expenditure with that Object, and shall report
to the Treasury any Expenditure which mn.y n.ppear, upon such
~ _ Ex.amination, to ha>e been incurred without such Authority; .
' ·· nnd if the Treasury should not thereupon see fit to sanction such
unautborized Expenditure, it, shal~ :L>~. ,regarded _~ being not . . .
- properly ·chargeable ·to a Parliamentary Grant/ and eh all 'be·,,.'
·reported t~ .the 'House of Commons in the Manner herein-after . .
'·provided. .. -- ·
· · .·
· ·
.
· 28. In order that such Examination may as far as po:sible The Compproceed, pdri passu, -with the Cash" Transactions of the several ~ol~~r and
accounting Departments, the Comptroller and Auditor General G~n~~~ to
"Shall ha>e free Access, at all convenient Times, to the Books of have Access
Account and other Documents relating to the Accounts of tAo Books of
• t be several D epartments inccount
&c.
soch . D epartments, an cl may require
the a;countconcerned to furnish him, from Time to Time, or at regular ing DepartPeriods, · with Accounts of the' Cash Transactions of such ments.
Depltrtments Tespectively up to such Times or Periods. ·
-·
29. ·In conducting the Examination of the Vouchers relatinCT How the
to the Appropriation of the Grants for the eeveral Service~ Vouchers of
Appropriation
enumerated in Schedule (B.) to this Act annexed 1 the Comp- Accounts
troller
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troller nnd Au<litor General, after satisfying himself that the
Accounts bear Evidence tha.t the Vouchers ha.ve been completely checked, examined, and certified as correct in every
respect, and that they have been allowed a.nd passed by the
proper departmental Officers, may admit the sall!e as_satisfactory
·Evidence of Payment in support of the Charges to which they
may relate:- . Provided always, tha.t if the Treasury should ..
desire any such Voucber3 to be examined by the __ Comptroller
and Auditor General in g-reater Detail, tbe _,Comptroller-and
Auditor Genera.I shall cause such Vouchers to be subjected·
to such a. detailed Examination as the Treasury mny think £t
to prescribe.
··
··
How other ·
30. In conducting the Exaroinntion of the Vouchers relating
Vouchers
to the Appropriation of the Grants for any Services not
are to be
enumerated in the aforesaid Scheclule;~ ·the· Comptroller and .
e:tamined.
Auditor General shall test the Accuracy 'of the . Q~stings . and · . :
Computation of the several Items of such Vouchers: Prnv1ded
always, that when any Vouchers have been certified to be
correct by nny Officers specially authorized to examine the
same, it shall be ,lawful for the Comptroller and Auditor
General, with the Consent. of the Treasury, to dispense with a.
Second Examination of the particular Items of such Y oucher~.
31. If <luring the Progre~s of the Examination by the
Objections
m:itle by the
Comptroller and Autlitor General herein-before <lirectecl any
Comptroller,
Objections shoula arise Jo any Item to be introduced into the
&c. to be
Appropriation Account of any Grant, such Objections shall,
reported to
the accounting notwithstanding such .Account shall not have been rcnclerecl to
Departimnt,
and in certain him, be immediately communicated by him to the Department
concerned, and if the Objections should not be answered to hi:J
Cases to the
Treasury.
Satisfaction by such Department, they shall be referred by him
to the Treasury, and the Treasury shall . determine in what
.Manner the Items in question shall be entered ·in the annual
Appropriation Account.
·
·what Reports
32. In reporting as herein-befor~e cli~~ct_ed, for__ th~_ I,nfo~ma- _
the Comptroller tion of the .House of Commons/the ~esult.. of t4e.Examination .,,
Gedn~~d!~:u _'of . the Appropriation· Accounts,'"the Compfr~l!~r~~~.:..A.udi_tor _)
prepare for
__ General shall_prepare Reports on __ t~~. App~op_:i;:1~~~o~ fo.ccount
Submission to . of the Army and on that of the Navy separately. /
P:irlfament.
·
He shall prepare a Report on the Appropriation Accounts of
the Departments of Customs, Inland Revenue, and Post Office.
He shall prepare a. Report or Reports on the Account3
relating to the several Grants included within each of the
Classes into 'vhich the Grants for Civil Services are divided in
the Appropriation Act.
In all Reports as aforesaid he shall call attention to every
Case in which it may appear to him that a Grant bas been
exceeded, or that :Mone] received by a Department from other
Sources than the Grants for the Year to which the Account
relates has not been applied or accounted for ncconling to the
Directions of Parliament, or that a Sum charo·e<l.
arrainst
3.
0
0
.
Grant is not supportetl by Proof of Payment, or that o. Pnyment
included. in
Schedule (B.)
shall be e:xamined.

i

Ii

I
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ment 60 chnrrre<l <lid not occur within the Perio<l of the .Account,
or wns for a~1y other Hearnn not properly chargeable against
the Grnnt.
If the Treasury shall not, within the Time pre~cribed by
this Act, present to the House of Commons nny Report made
by the Comptroller and Au<litor General on any of the
Appropriation Accounts, or on the Accounts of Issues for
Coneolidnte<l Fund Service1', the Comptroller nud Au<litor
Gf;!neral eball forthwith present such Report.
..
··
Accomns

OTHER THAN APPROPIU.A.TION

. !

AccouXTS.

33. Besi<les the Appropriation Accounts of the Grants of

Accounts other

Parliament, the Oom1)troller and Auditor General shall ex- tb:i.n
Appropriation Acamine and audit, if required 60 to <lo by the Treasury, and in counts to be
accordance with any Regulations that may be prescribed for examined
his Guidance in that Behalf by the Treasury, the following ~::;~Tr::~lons
·Accounts; viz., the Accounts of all Principal Accountants, by the Comp·
the Accounts of the Receipt of Revenue by the Departments troll~r and
of Customs, Inland Revenue, and Post Office, the Accounts of ~udito~
every Receiver of l\Ioney which is by Law payable into Her enera ·
1'Iajesty's Exchequer, and any other Public Accounts which,
though not relating directly to the Receipt or Expenditure of
Imperial Fun<l!.', the Treasury mny by Minute, to . be la.id
before P:trliament, cl\rect.
34. The Accounts wl1ich by the last prececling Section the By -whom such
Treasury are empowered to subject to thc"E:;:amina.tion of the Accounts shall
be rendered.
Comptroller nml .Auditor General shall be rendered to him by
the Departments or Officers "·ho mn.y be directed so to do by
the Treasury; aii.d 'the Term "Accountant," ~Yhen .used in this
.and the. following Sections of t!iis _Act· "f\)th ;-eference to any
,.' sud1 .. Accounts, shall_be taken to mean the Department or
· ,Officer .t hat may be so required by th~ ~reasury to.. 1·ender the
same; · and every Public Officer into ~ . whose Hands Public
,,:Moneys, either in the Nature of Revenu~ .. or Fees of. Office, ..
. shall be paid by P~rsons bound by Law or Regulation to do .
· :.so, or by e.urbordinate or other Officers . whose Duty it nia.y be ..
·. to pay ~uch ,Moneys, wholly. or iIJ. part,. into th.e·:-~~seipt ~f .
,. lier Majesty s Exchequer, or to apply the same t<? _any Public:
· Serrice, shall, at such Times and in such Forfil as the Treasury .
shall determine, render an Account of bis Receipts and Pay- .
··. ments to the Comptroller and Auditor General; and it shall
be the Duty of the Treasury to inform him of the .Appointment
of e>'ery such Officer.
· ·
.
· 35. Accountants shall transmit their Accounts toO'ether with Acco\llltants
the Authorities and Vouchers relntinO' thereto to tl~e Office of to t;ransmit
'
· 11er an d A u d.1tor G enera"'1 m
· suell F orm, and for &c
their Accounts
th e C omptro
to Comp- '
such Periods, and under such Regulations as he may from troiler and
. Time to Time prescribe for the Gui<lance of euch Accountants : Auditor
Provided alwaye, that no .such Regulations shall be obligatory ~ne;:;~lertain
on i;uch Accountants until they ehall have been approved by Regulations.
the Trearnry.
[.No. 23. Pn"cc 2d.]
z
36. The

\
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36; The Comptroller imu Auditor Geneml shall examine the
several Accounts trammitted to Lim 'Yith as -little Delay as
possible, a.ntl when the Examination of each Account shall be
completed lie shall make up a Statement thereo( ju such Form
as he may deem fit, and if it sholl appear from the Statement
so made up of· any Account, beinO'
au Account Current, th::i.t
0
the Balance thereon agrees with the Acconnta.nt's Balance,
or if it shall appear from any .Account rendered by an Account.mt,
as -well as from the Statement of such Account by the Comptroller and Auditor General, that the Accountant fa " even··>, . " and quit," the Comptroller and ·Auditor. General is hereby ."
required to sign and pass such Statement of Account so mnde :··
up by him · as aforesaid: Provided always, that in all other
Cases -whateyer, the Comptrollel" ant! Auditor General having
made up the Statement of Account as herein-before cljrectecl
shall transmit the same to the Tre::tallly, who, having considered
such Statement, shall return it to him, mth their \Varrant
attached thereto, directing him to sign and pass the Account,
either conformably to the Sta.tem.e nt thereof, or with such
Alterations as the Treasury may deem ju:;t and reasonable; and
a Statement of the .A.ccount macle up by the Comptroller nncl
Auditor General, iu accordance ,,-ith such Treasury "\ValTant,
shall then be signed ::ind pas:oecl by him: Provided further,
that a List of all Accounts which the Comptroller ancl Auditor
General may sign and pass (such Liat to be so prcparccl as
to show thereon the Charge, Discharge, aml Bnl:mce of each
Account respectively) shall be submitted by him to the Treasury
twice in eYery Y car, videlicet, not later than the F.irst \Veek of
February and the First Week of August.
37. It shall be lawful for the Comptroller ancl Auditor
Voncbers may
he allowed
General, in the Examination of any Accounts, to admit and
though not
ollow, in Case:! where it shall appear to him to be reasonable and .
stamped.
expedient for the Public Service, Vouchers for any i\Ioneys - i
expressed therein, although such Vouchers be not Elampecl
according to Law.
Certific::ites of
38. '. As soon as ·any ..A.ccoun t shall hav:e been sigrie~r and ·
Discb:i.rge. to - passecl by the Comptroller and · Auditor-. General, he· _
slliill ..
be delivered to
transmit tci- the :' Accountant a Certificate,· in'·which''tbe''-total
A ccoun tan ts.
Amount' of · the · Sums forming reapectively · the' Ch.n rge . nnd
Discharge of such Account, and the Balance; if any, remaining ,,. ·.·
.due t~ or by ~uch Accountant; shall be·· set .forth; ·and ·every
.such· Certificate shall be signed by him, and ' shall be :vngd .. ancl . ,
effectual to di~cbarge the Accountant, ···as "the Cnse ''inay be, ·'::;:;.
either wholly, or from so much of the Amount with which he
may have been charge::i.ble, as he may appear by such Certificate
to be discharged from : Provided always, that when any Account,
not being an Account C~1rrent, has been signed and passed by
the Comptroller and And1tor General with a Balance due thereon
to the Crown, - he shall not make out or grant any such
Certificate as aforesaid until the Accounta.nt has satiafied him
either that he has discharged the full Amount of such Balance,
and
·
-

As to the
E::t:i.min a ti on
and passing of
Accounts.

I

i
I
I

I
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and any Interest that may, as herein-after provided, he payable
thereon, or that he hns be"u relieved from the Payment thereof,
or of eo much thereof as .1as not been paid, by a \¥arrant from
the Trearnrv.
39. X o Declaration shall be made by the Comptroller and Declaration
Auditor Gen~ral before the Chancellor of the Exchequer in bofeiore
fccotbunets
·,
relation to any _.\ccount, or any State or Statement thereof; nor Chancellor of ·
eha11 any such State or Statement be enrolled as of Record in the ~xchequer
the Office of Her l\lajesty's Remembrn.ucer of the Court of abolished. ·-· ..
Exchequer, any La.w, Usage, or Custom to the contrary notwithstanding; but every Statement of an Account made out,
signed, and passed as aforesaid, shall be i·ecordecl in the Office
of the Comptroller and Auditor General, and the recording of
such Statement of Account iu bis Office shall be as valid and
effectual for enabling any Procees in the Law aga.inst the Party
cbargea.ble, and any other Proceeding for the Recovery of any
Balances and any Interest thereon, and for all other Purposes,
as the Enrolment of a declared Account in the Office of Her
Majesty's Remembrancer -would have been if this Act had not
been passed; aud a Copy, certified under the :Elands of the
Comptroller and Auditor General, of the Record of any such
Statement of Account, shall be taken notice of and proceeded
upon in the like l\fonner as the H.ecord of any such declared
Account, enrolled as afores:i.id, might ha'le been if this Act had
not been pas: ed .. _ _. .
.
.
.' 40. In all Cases where the Comptroller and Auditor General Examin~tion
·shall be required by_the Treasury to exami~e and audit the s~d p~smg ~r
,. Accounts ·. of. the Receipt, Expenditure, Sale, Transfer, ·or ·· ore .. cco~ 8 "
' Delirnry of any Securities, .. Stamps, Government Stock or
Annuities, Pro'lieions,) '.>r'Stores, the Property of Her Majesty,
µ~:~k~~~; -~~.the.. Exa~i~atio:i1of ~uch Accounts being c~mpleted, .
ttr~~~~~t·~. a. St~temen~ the~~of,. or a)leport thereon, t~ the
T~easury, who shall, if they thmk fit, signify their ApproYal
b~- ~~~1£~..-:L\,ccoun_t~ }o:. ~i!u;: .~nd.. ~~ shall thereupcn tran~UJit_ to._., .
the Accountant n. · Certificate m a Form to be from Time to ·
Tin:ie · de.ter~ined. b.)~ ·the · Comptroller ancl Auditol· ·General,
which shall be to such Account.ant a rnlicl and effectual Di~charge
from eo much as he may thereby appear to be discharged from.
· -41. E-rery Accountant shall, on the Termination of his Adjustment of
Cha.rge as i:uch Accountant, Ol" in case of a deceased Accountant Balances on
his Representatives shall · forthwith pay o-rer any Balance of Ahccounl tst, antd
· i'l\J oney t 11en d ue to tie
l p u bhe
· in respect ·of such Cha.r<Te 'W
en n eres
P u bl 1c
may be charsed
to the Public Officer authorized to recei>e the same; and in ~ll on such
Cases in which it · shall appear to the Comptroller and Auditor Balances.
General that Ba.lances of Public ::hfoney have been improperly
and u~necessarily retained by an Accountant, be shall report
the ·Circumstances of such Cases to the Treasury ; and the
Treas?-ry-".shall :take euch 1.feasures as . to them may t?eem
expedient fo..r reco~ering by legal Process, or by ot~er J~wful
Ways and JJfeans, the . Amount of euch Balance or Balances
together with Interest -thereon, upon the whole or Part · of
Z 2
such
·: ·

.

__" ·~~ - ....
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such Balance or Balances, for such Period of.Time and at such
Rate, not exceeding Five Pounds per ·centum per Annum, as to
the Treasury may appear just and reasonable.
. ·.
42. In all Cases where any Estate belonging to a Public
Where Estate
ofa Public
Accountant shall be sold . under any vVrit of Extent or any
Accountant is
Decree
or Order of the Courts of Chancery or Exchequer, and
sold under
WritofE:xtent, the Purchaser thereof or 9f any Part thereof shall have paid
nnd the Purhis Purchase :Money into the Hands of any Public Accountant
chase :Money
paid, the Pur- authorized to receive the same, such Purchaser shall be wholly
chaser to be · exonerated and discharged from all further Claims of Her
exonerated.
M :0esty for or in respect of any Debt arising upon the .Account
of such Accountant, although the Purchase :Money so paid be
not sufficient in Amount to discharge the whole of the saiu
Debt.
Accountants
43. In all Cases
which an Accountant may be dissatisfied -:.
to have in all
with
any
Disallowance
or Charge in his Accounts made by the_.
Cases a Right
Comptroller ancl Auditor General, such Accounta~t shall have
of Appea.l to
the Treasury. a Right of Appeal .to the Treasury, who, after such further
Investigation as they may consider equitable, whether by viva
voce Examination or otherwise, may ma.ke such Order, dir~cting
the Relief of the Appellant wholly or in pa.rt from the Disallowance or Charge in question, as shall appear to them to be
just and reasonable, and the Comptroller and Auditor General
shall govern himself accordingly.
Treasury mny
4 ·1:. It shall be lawful for the Treasury, from Time to Time, .
dispense with
if
they see fit so to do, to dispense with the Transmission, to
Examination
of certain
the Comptroller and Auditor General, of any Accounts not
Accoun!s hy
being Accounts of the Receipt and Expenditure of Public
th~C1m£troller £.Ioney;and with the Audit of such Accounts by him, any Law,
Gener:l. tor
Usage, or Custom to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided
always, that Copies of any Treasury :Minutes dispensing with
the Amlit of such Account3 shall be laicl before Parliament.
Saving all
45. Nothing in this Act containecl shall extend to abridge
existing Rights
or
alter the Rights and Powers of Her l\fajesty to control,
of the Cro,ra.
suspend, or prevent the Execution of any Process or Proceeding,
under this Act or otherwise, for recovering ~Ioney due to the
Cro\vn.
Acts in
46. The Acts mentioned in Schec1ule(C.) to this Act annexed
Schedule (C.) shall be repealed to the Extent mentioned in such Schedule,
to be repeal~d.
and ::i.11 Account.s required or directed to be audited by the Board
of Audit shall be audited according to the Provisions of this
Act: But nothing herein shall be deemed to confer upon the
Treasury the Po,vers with respect to Audit vested in the
Admiralty by the " Greenwich llospital Act 1865," or to affect
any Right, Title, Obligation, or Liability acquired or accrued
before the Commencement of this Act: Provided always, that
this Act shall not affect any Proceecling·which may have been
commenced under any of the said Acts before this Act comes
into operation.
Commence.47. This Act shall commence on the First Day of April
ment of Act.
One thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven.
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SCHEDULE A.
Dates after the Tcnnination of e\'ery
Financial Year to "°hlch Appropriation
Accounts relate, on or before -which they
are to be made u p and submitted.
Grants or Sernces to "U"hich

ITotroller
t~e CompIsury
To the Trea- ·
and
by Comp- To the House of
AuditorGeneral\ tro!lcr and
Commons by the
·
Depart- .
Auditor
Treasury.
,by theruents.
General. .
. ·
I
--------------'-------1-----------1
g~]
the Appropriation .Acco.unts relate.

Army
Navy

-1

...... .0

.

:; ~ ~

31 December: 31 January · 5 February

·

-

-

~liscellaneous Civil Services-

(Classes I. to VII.)
Revenue Departments (Salai-ies, Superannuation, &c.,
and Expenses)
Post Office Packet Service and
.AJl other Services ;oted m
S upp Iy

,

.!f~~c> 4d~
.:::! 8

:::i

~ .:! .&

'>30Novem-15Januury . 31January
ber

'·
· ·
~

·

r.S~=a

·

.8 fl'~
'i:i 5

Je~ =a·a
:§ gi~
~·z
~-~:::.i

;::;

SCHEDULE B.

.Army;
Na>y;
and such other Services ns the Treasury, by their Minute, to
be laid before ParEament, mny direct; but no such Minute
shall take effect until it shnll ha;rn lain before the House of
Commons Thirty Days, unless it shall haYe been previously
approred by a Resolution of the House of Commons.

SCHEDULE C.
ENACTMENTS REPEALED.

·25 Geo. 3.

c. 52.

An Act for better examining .and · auditing · the Pub!.i_ck Ac-..
·counts of this Kingdom.
27 Geo. 3. c. 13. An Act for repealing the several DutiesI
, in part.
of Customs and Excise, aud granting j
.
other Duties in lieu thereof, and for
applying the said Duties, together 1litb ~
the other Duties composing the Publick
Re,euue; for permitting the Importa.
,.
tion of certain Goods, ·wares, and .
t·
· l\!ercbandize, the Produce or l\Ianu- m par ; namely,facture of the European Dominions of
·
· the French King, into this Kingdom ;
and for applying certain unclaimed
Monies, remaining in the Exchequer
for the Payment of Annuities on Lives,
to the Reduction of the National Debtj
Section SeYeoty-two.

z

3
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39 & 40 Geo. 3.
c. 54.
in part.

45 Geo. 3. c. 55.

46 "Geo. 3. c. BL
~I

;

47 Geo. 3. Sess. 2.
c. 39.
52 Geo. 3. c. 52.
53 Geo. 3. c. 150.

57 Geo. 3. c. 48.

1 & 2 Geo. 4.
c. 121.
in pa.rt.

10 Geo. 4. c. 27.

2 & 3 Will. -4.
c. 26.
2 & 3 Will. 4.
c. 99.

c. 104.
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An - Act for more effectually· cho.rging · __:. ____ __ - ~
Publick Accountants with the Pn.yment of Interest; for allowin 0r1 Tntein part ; name1y,rest to them in certain-Cases ; and for
compelling the Payment of Balances
clue from them
- ·
Sections :Folll', Five, Si..::t, Nine, Ten, ancl Thirteen. .. •·
An Act to a.mend an .A.ct mnde in the T"enty-fifth Year of ·
His present Majesty, for better e::oc:nmining ~md. n.ucliting
the Publick Accounts of thfa Kingdom ; and for ena.bling
the Commissioners, in certain Cases, to allow of Youche1~,
although not stamped according to Law: - ·· ·· -- ·
An .Act for ma.king more effectual Pronsion .•for the more
speedy and regular Examination and Audit of the Publick
Accounts of this Kingdom._
An Act for more effectually charging Publick Accoun~'Ults .
with Interest upon Bn.la.nce8, and for other :Purposes relating
to the pns.sing of Publick Accounts.
An Act to proYide for the speedy nnd regular Ex.o.minntion
nod Audit of the Public .A.ccounta of Irelancl ; and to
repeal certain former Acts relating thereto.
An Act for the more ~peedy ~mcl effectual Examination nn<l.
Audit of the Accounts of )lilitary ExpencUtm·e in Spnin
nnd Portngal ; for rcmonng Delays in pasi;ing the Public
Accounts ; nnd fo1· making new A1Tangementa for concluctin;; the Business of the Amlit Office. ·
An .Act to make fm·ther Provision for the Adjustment of the
Accounts of the Consoliclnted Fund of the United Kingdom ; nnd for making good nny occasional. Deficiency which
may arise in the said Fund in Great Britain or Ireland
respecfrvely ; and to direct the ..Application of :;)Ionies by
the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt.
An Act to niter 1mcl abolish certain
Forms of Proceedings in the Exche- . - _ ..
quer ancl Audit Olfice refath·e ·to
Public Accountants; aucl for making
further Provisions for the Purpose of
facilitating ancl expediting the p:i.ssing '>-:- of Public Acc?unts in Great Britain ; 1 .•
and to render perpetual antl amend an 1·
Act passed in the Fifty-foi.uth Year
of His late i\Iajesty for the effec-J · · · ·
tual Examination of the Accounts of
certain Colonial ReYenues - . · · Except Sections 'l\venty-seven, Twenty·eight, nod
Twenty-nine.
·
·.
An Act to amend the several Acts for regulating the Re<luction of the National Debt.
An Act to authorize the Commissione1"3 for auditing the Public
Accounts of Great Britain to e::tnrnine nnd auuit .Account:J
of the Receipt and Expcndihrre of Colonial Revenues.
An Act for trn.nsfening the Powers micl Duties of the Commis::ioners of Public Accounts in Irelnutl to the Commi.3sioners for a11tlitir.g the Public Accounts of Grent Britain.
An Act to regulate the I'criocl of rendering the Public
Accounts an<l making up the Gcnernl Imprest Certificntes.

.'

;·'
·'

l ···
I

..
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Exclieguer ancl Audit Departments.

4 & 5 \\ill. 4.
c. 15.
in part.

I

'

Cup. 39, 40.

l'e~uln.tc

A.n .Act to
the Office of the}
Receipt Cl.f His l\lnjesty's Exchequer : - ·
at '\Vestnnuster
. .
.Except Sections Seven nud Twenty-six.
3 & 4 Yict. c. 108. An Act for
Regulation of '11unicipal } .
t
Corporations in helaucl
- . · , _ m pnr ; nam~ .Y"-:-" . · ._ ·
in part.
Sections Two hundred nnd thirteen and Two hund~:ed_ : . ·:11
:md fourteen.
.. .,
9 &· 10 Viet. c. 92. An Act to pronde for the Preparnticin, Audit, and Present.a- .~ · ·.~··
: tion to Pm:lia.ment of 8.nnua.l Aceot.int.s of the Receipt and .· .\
·~ Expenditure of the N aTal and Military Departments.
.
-H&15Vict. c. 42. An Act to· make better Provision for
. Management of the ·woods, Forests, ' · .
.. · ·. _.,
in pa.rt.
and Land Re•enues· of the Crown, in part ; nnmely,and for the Direction of PuLlic Works
;
·
. :mu Buildin,,.s
. .• i
- Section Thirty-eight wholly, and Sectio~ Thirly-uiue as :;: 1
for ns it relates io the .Accounts of the Commis- :
i;ioners of Her Majesty'.s Works and Pubiic Buildings. • }~ 1
17.& 18 Viet. c. 19. The NaTal Pay and Prize Ac~, 18.14.
· ·
c. 94. ..A.u .A.ct to alter the l\fo<le of providing}
in j):U-t.
for certain . Expenses now charged.
·
upon certain Branches of·the Public in pa.rt; namely,~·
Ile•enues and upon the Consolidated
Fund
- .
Sections Three, Four, and Firn.
.
18 & 19 ..\'''lct. c. 96. The Supplcmental_Customs Consoliila.-}. · ·t
. 1
tion .Act 1855
..
_ 1Il par. ; name y,in pru.t.
'
.
.
. ~
Section One.
·
24 & 25Vict. c. 93. An .Act to pronde for the rreparntion, .Audit, nnd Presenta.. · ;
tion to Parliament of annual Accounts of the Appropriation of the i\Ioneys voted for the Revenue Departments. ,
28 &29Yict. c. 93. An .Act to consolidate the Offices of Comptroller General of
the Exchequer :mu Chairman of the Commissioners for
nuditi.ug the Public .Accounts, and for other ~urposes.

the

1

the} · " .',

..:
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C A.. ·P. · 1X C1L
Ai1 . Act lo proYide for ·the Preparalio11, ·Ai1<lit; and Pi'c.s(>n'..:.:
l'nlion to Parlim~1e11t of · a1111ual Accout1L'i Qf ~· tlie H.eci.>ipt

. "· !

i:..... ~

'' , .-1

.t

0

..

\';.:

.'

· ,an<l Expenditure ot' the N<wul nn<l l\lilitury Dt>pnrtnwnts .
. .: ·
. . . . : , . .. : .
... ". . . .. [26th
.
.. AugUf~·
. . . ..J 84.G.}
-.;;.
' ':-tiTIIEH.EAS by nn Ac~ pn!;sed in the ·$ecoh4 Yenr of the'
•.· ··y Reign of His lnte l\lajesty King William the Fourfo, .. foti-·
' tuled An Act lo amend t!te Lau:s relati11g to the ~usi11e.~s of the' 2 & !l W.-1. c.40. ·
c· Cit:il Dcparlme11ts of the .i.Yav'y, a11d to make otl1C1· B~gulqti0i1s;
,..
'for more cjj'ectualZ11 cari·yiug on tlie Duties of th( said ))f'pa'rt' 111c11fs1 Provi!!ion was mncle for tl1e making up; nnd 1 the-· Jayi1lg'
' Lefore Padimuent, of nn nnnunl Account of Naval Recei1lt 'un:li ·
' Expi?nrlitul'\! 1 exn.miued nnd certi()i;,d. by _th~ Com\llissioners -fori ,.
,(

_._-_-,I_

' nutliting the Public Ac.count.~: And wheren.&lfflis'eXj)edient"to; /

'~nh1ei1d:.~ho ~1·qvisious':: 4 :u1e.·1:_aai<l~Actfnrt.4'. ib;rpr6\ride'.:fol'.'ilie·•-.: , ·
·- '.J?i~P!!l'.f tion, Au ill t,' tiu. d ~1;esei.itnt.1on:,.to.:~a;:1i£\.i;l·e4y19fL~cco'il'ttts~".,,

~
'
1
..l
· ~rsr:::~H(·:Appropi:iation .'.~of:the.:.Monies 'niin'tililly':gtimtetl; 'tor3.~_He
' Nn,'nl nnu l\Iilitnry Services //He it ' therefore chn.cted :. b:fthc' So much of
Qneen'i; most E:otcellent i\I1~iesty, by niHl "witli the Ad\'ice"nl1d: reci1ed Ar.t ns "··-\
Consent of the Lords Spiritunl nnrl Te1'npornl, i\m1 Common!:I, '- in re'1•kR lfoN/\c· 1
' pre~cnt I> nr'l'inment nssembl'cu,
.1
' ' <>.f .tie
I • cr.unt
11\' a
".
t l ns
nnu.1 by t. Iie, A
.. utl tonty
n c ·i o, 1 •&c.
ii
1
snnie1...'.£h.nt ~~ ~1':1ch '. o_f. the P.ni~- ~~~ci.ted · :Ac_t ·as· rclat~s- !d ! the: rc~l·~I~.i.
~
.Aeebulit~of~JS1\Vnl·~ec~1p.t7:nhd'E:xpe11d1t'hre slrnll 'lie'·1·epenle.d !'-Pi·o.: Pnn·i•o.
:
"iuetl 11lw1lyt=, thnt-11othing in tliis'.Act contained shnll' be construeif
- ~-

r

to nffcct the Prepnrntion, UllU the l:iying IJeforo Purlinment, of tho
e:nid Account for the Year ended tho Thirty-first Day of Jlarr.lt'
One thou:mntl eight hnndrerl nml forty-i;ix, in accorunuc:e with the ; .. -.·i. :..~·":''.~ U.t . . 3
Provhions of the before-recited At't. ,;.
.. · · · · .: : ' ·' :,- ". ·:~ . 1' : ""J~*r· '·J.
II. Aml he it cnoctell, Thot. on or beftll'e the Thh'tielh Dny of. Ac<'.0~1;\!i~r,:~·~:: ~, \
Not·embcr in enGh Year nn Ac~ount of. the Receipt nnd -E:<::pendl.· · ~~~~·~k~=::!h.
tu re of ,tJ~e Sum:; granted for N a;al Se~·vices for the ·~ ea~ ended· c~·~~iis~~;i;·~, ,
on the 'l h1rty-firs-t Dny of fifarclt preced111g, and on or before the. a·r\d Ordn~Hce·,1:•1
. Thirtieth Dny of Azn·il in en.ch Yenr_-similnr· Accotinta of··the· Hei. ScrH<'cs'1~ ~i·! ~ ·, ._
ce~~.t.• o.nd " Exµenditm·e of::the.'.S.mus·-·g1;anted1·forArmy; C1otn~i~'":'' a~111uall)'.. all~'~".> : :
sar1at; nncl Ordnnnce Services for· the Yenr· ended ori. the:<rlnrty.:. di~t>~ .bf. C1~m;;1 · ,:
fij:'~t_'1 D~:r ·of .~·~farc~.,:.~f .t?~ prec~Ung : ~ ear..Lfclas.s7d:!~11_~erl'.the',!1::i'!~:?,i15~~i.~:;i~· :
eev.ernl Hends · oi_Sernce "fis • expi1eslled "'1tt"'th~"'rApproprmh9r1 ·Act'' Accc•iii~~ hiid .,, ·:

· ·

:or3· Acts:· for t,J1e 1;'eur, !, shall·b~ i tro.nsw.i tte~· iby\~~cq;· D.epnrtmenti transmiu;d% l""
charged. with . the Preparatioh ·of-'. the said Accounts · to :the ·:O:ii~1'!. the Trcnsury.
infeisioners for •nuditing the ·Publiq'Accouilte 11~'who~ shall ".'oxnn1ln~ /
..
~ the', gaid 'Ac.co.u~ts~ and.. 1Jertify' thereo!t;~ as. to' ihe~C~r.rech1es6; of':tlle1J,,
. ..,, \
/
rSumll therem ~h.arged, 1 as com pRred ·w 1th· the.'Boeiks' and ·youchenr. ;
•• '!
·<:
oftQe several Depnrtmentsrand the eaicl Commissioners .arc herebr
l
· r~quiied ' tcs ·tnmsmit· Copies :of.. the sn.id" Accounts;:scf!exn.mint?d ,...,...•
·:\11d•certifled, -~ to·: tlie Commissiot1ets 1 of ·Her:Majesty'" tl're::u;ury:-s:·
Pro\"i<led nlwn.ys, that if the Commissioners for o.udtting the Public' Ir Errors dis·. ~
Acc.ounts shall disco>er nny Innccnrncies in the sa.i<l Accounts of cn,·erl'd,
0
Heceipt nnd Expeuditure, they shnll, if required i;o to do by the ~;~:~~:1.~ 10 ethe ·
~

'

tc-

Commissioners of Her Majesty's Trenimry, return the sniu Acconnts; n·~iwcth·e
nc.compa.niell by Sta.tcmenls of the Errors discovered · therein, to· Oflice~ for
the respective Departments concerned, for Correction; and nmendetl f:orr~ctiun.
Arcounts i;hnll be prepnred, nnd £.ent to the Commii;sioners of
9&10VtcT.
Illm
Audit,

. -l

"'j

~·

·.:·::.~
";.·:\

':.:;Jf~
·•.l
{•.
·~-.

. ·..

If:\:·;·.
1i}•.;,_
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AuClit, ·by the snitl Depnrtments, fo , lieu of. the Accounts retui:ned ·.· ·. ~
·.·for Correction ; nntl the suitl Commissioners shnll transmit; Copies .: : ~
,-t.,:1 of.' such n~en.uetl. A.ccou. nts, ex~minetl ·,nntl certified as aforeso.id, to ', -~;
r~~·~·
!·) tpe Commissioners of Her Mn.Jest_y's 'lreasury•.J.t
. . . _. ::· !;~
!/~·r .. · No Imprests tb . : · -1u . .1.And'!be};it1·,~n,actednT~.l!-t :.!!.0·1sum'!!hall!be~ohiil'ged:.-iri"'th~. ·
~it:·~.: be. charged in 8ni<PAcc_o unts "<•'Iv hich'~~nyi1~·be~·of.:~th.e lli:rnhire''1of:''nnWJmprestf'or,... ...
~-- ·: :;,' said Aceounts. Advance of the Expend1ture " ox:;!--:pph(!_at~o~~l2f.'2':°!!LchtaIUAccount' · · ·
is'to . be·subsequently.irenderea.""
.
. . · '...
•( > Commis~ioner!t IV. Ancl be it enacted, That. the Commissioners for nuditing ·.r
of Auuit to hn•·e the Public Accou1its shnll be nllowed Access te> all Books, Orders, · ·
:(.'
Accesstol3ooks, nnu other Papers to which they inny desire to mnke reference
Order,, anc.I
in the Progress of their Ex:nminntion of the Account Dooks nncl
Papers.
Vouchers 'of ' the severnl Departments. ·intrustecl with the tlctniled . ·;·
Applicntiori of the Sums gran~ed for·Nnvy; Army, Com1nis~llriat, ;;·. -~,~.~
·,
nnd Orc1nurice Ser\'ices.
· · ,. · ; ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·. •· · "' ·
;•
,.
'1
Oujection,
Y . . And . be ' it e~ndteu, ' That . if ·· during .ti1e '. Progre~s: or' the ·; >.:;
made to Items Examination by the Audit Office of the Books and V9uchers of :·: :/
l~
):
~i~:c~:W::~~~ the said Depnrtments any Objections shall nrise to nny Item to be ' ·:t
when not satis- introduced into the Acconnts -of Receipt and Expenditure· to b~ ' , ~
r:ictorily nn- .
transmitted to the Commissioners of Audit as nforcsni<l, such Ob- / .:~~
,"..
,;
swl!!ccl,.to ~ir,;, jections shall, notwi thstnnc1ing the' sni<l Accounts shnll not have :.~·,r'.-~'.
liy · · been · so transmitted, be immedintely communicntecl by the silitl .··.:_.::·',.:'..J
i' ' reforred
Commi~si111iers· Comm1ss1oners
• •
·'
to t I1e D epnrtments to wh.1c li t h ey mny re1nte, nnu.1
ot'Audit lo the
·
J S • fi •
f
}
C
·
Treasury. -_ ·:_" if tlie 1mme shall not be answered tot ie ntrs nctlop. · O t 1e om- . ;;;~J~t·
,·
"."
' • · · missioners of Auel it by the Officers in · the snid Depa1·tinents to ·;.\'i \~f;
:,v:;·.
:
/
~
'
:.
· _': ) ;_· ivhom such Obj?ctions sl~nl\ be nddressecl;. the ·same· shnl~ ~e re~ Y.~~~
..i .
• '.>-·,. ;•.:: :"
ferretl by the said Comnuss1oners of .Audit to the Comm1ss1oners /:.\;') .
~
of Her Majesty's Treasury, who shall determine in whnt l\Ianne1<r1:~
.... .... .
the Item or Items objectetl to sbnll be presented to Pnrlinment. . . :~f,1_'.(}
!tntlitor~ to np·
YI. And be it enacted, 'llh1it7.ithe~.Q9xµ_rqissioneta..r0l:l!lnudithrr.::, ~.~:
pe!•d to end• : the ,.Pub lie 1Accou11ts:1shnll vnp penc.hitorench"Accoun tato•be.,..tt<iiriii'P'~,;['_J
Account n Ile · 1hii ttec.1 l'fo "I.the' Co1111nissioue1·st<.o.faHen1Mnjesty~aiL'.r_paaurpns:.-nfore...,/ ·'.·:·
r::~;1 ~\t!~cd .
sai,~1 :n!Ueport·1in 7 'Whic1il¥they.,s1.in111:'i;eciipith1ate!lthGlse.V&rtil.:rllericlS >~·
.• '
the Treasury. · · ~6f- ~~1e r.Acr?tint· ~nd.et.W.~ch1.th~~~~s·e~p~ndccl:sh~~th~~~ce~~<~ ·. \ :
..
the Sums ~voted,~g1vmg"um1er~; ench'ZHencl~h~:x:PlhhnhoilSWW1th 1 } .
,.J .
·
which' the{mny~ have "been' fi.frriisliec1~of1thOICtitises10£tE:tc·easr1f i'fd~ ~ .,;
L~.
certifying·'i. thut':':such~1Excesses11hnvef'beenlsanctioned~bynhe~Gom.iii11 · -_ \,
, ,. !.
·
missionel's'
of Her'l\Iajesttslll'rensi.µ;y;~nccop.ling~.to~the..Provisions• .
. .;:· :
·ofttluf nnnunF.Ap1froprfoHoif\-".Act1'f3nuc1 the suitl .Commissioners of · ·
Audit shnll moreover ntlvcrt in their Report to any Items in
respect of \Vhich, nlthough utlmitted:under the r1·ovisiOl1S,Of this
Act, their Objections shull remnin unsatisfied.
· ·
•
:;, •;.
'. ·
..
.Accot;nts, and
VII. And be it ennctec.1, 'l'hnt:the1<..A.ccounts:of.rlteceipti>nncl•E-x••
,.
Auditors Repen di tu re; together \vith'-tho He ports of ~he .Commisaioners.of~Audito : '
.. port'
s thereon, to thereon, trnnslll,i.±ted to the Commissiomfrs ·of.Herl\lo.josty?s a:'rensury. · ..
t i ,.
he lahl before.
ns aforesnid,' a~l be:lnid ·bcfore\t11e• Hbuse.-of-'Conimo1is"b:tthe~snid•
the House of
Commons by : · Commissioners of' Her:J.\Iaj esty.'s ~Treasnrr 01u tllerDnys 1 nfte1•0iileri&»> .
..·,
l
the Trl':lsury; · tioned, if Parliament be then sitting, or if not, then in each Cnse
'~
·' ''
within One ·week nfter Pnl'liament sho.11 be next n!!sembled; ( vide~ ·, ·:
licet,) the Nnvo.1.Account of Receipt nntl Expenditure on or before · ...
the 'l'hirty-lirst Day of January next following the Thirtieth Day :. :
.of.November herein-before mentioned, nnd the.Army, Commissnrint, .;
... : ·, .
~m1 Qnlunnce Accounts of l!eceipt nnu Expenditure on or uefore
·
·
·
the ;,. '

:i:. ..·
:'." ·

l . ,

l

·
•

..

-

ft::-:··

j '.

c.
..
r

: i

'.

to

~·

l

~.

r

.' .

.

• C"

~·

..
L
I

. ,,:.:.. :
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the First Day of June next following the. Thirtieth Day .of April
herein-before mentioned.
·
· f · :,;,: · • .:.. ; · ;
·_ .,·'
. YllI. An<l lie it enacted, That this Act shall commence nnd take Commencement;.::.
·
effect as to the Accounts to be rendered of the Application of the of Act,
~
.td
;
"1
H1!
,:!
,,:,.~
Grants for Naval and Military Services for the Year ending on
.. i ,.·::..·: ·· 1: ".:- ·:
the Thirty-first Dny of ~Im·cli One thousand eight hundred _nod
·: · J ! !l .''.1'1~'- i:j ,;!
forty•se\ren.
: .'; I :
~· · , : , ~ ·; r.~ l"
'. t

· c·. A

~

I>..

• · ' '. ' ' '

: ·

XCII!. . . ...

' ·

•

. ":' . I • ' ;.

·. f ,'.

•• :

.... .....
An Act for compensating the Families of Perso11s killed

;_ I

·

•'.' 1. ·111 1t

..

11J :/ •! 11-'

0

by :• r! ' '' i:t111 ..
''

,

11

J(J . ' .

'·

.. Accidents.·
· ·
·
[26th Augus{l846~J ': ~·~-~:~''.!;~\ -~~ .
~ "l;
HEREAS no . Action at La\v is now maintainable ·. agains.t
·n .. q.;':
',
. a Person who by his wrongful Act, Neglect, or Default
' •
,·
' iHay have caused the Death of auotlier Person, and it is oftentimes
\t nncl expe<l.ient tliat the ·wrongdoer in i)Uch Caso should be
· ' ir: i:'.• ,;_r· i ·;
'
' ~ ....wemble .in Damages for the Injury so caused by hi~:' J:3e it ~ " ~ ,:r .,, !,;:M : ,·:.i
therefore enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by ai1~ :~1. .. ·1 ;• ;;'' """ h ·
'vith the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual aud Tern~ ,.. ,,.,'I .,i umll"
poral, nnd Commons, in this present Parlinment assembled, and .; :, .! 1"'' 1 ,,.,.,! ,,......
by the Authority of the same, That \Vhcnsoever the Death of a. An .Acti61do'::' · ·
Person r;hnll be causecl by wrongful Act, Neglect., or Default, and be mainuiin~ble ; .
the Act, Ne 0..,lcct, or Default is such ns would (if Death had not against anf :·: '. ; , ? .;
Person causing · .
ensued) h:we entitled the "Party injured to maintain an Action and Dellth throligliJ , ....
recoYer Damages in ·respect · thereof, then und in every .such Qnse Neglect,' &c:,· • ·:·
t11e Person who would have been liable it Death· had not ensued notwithstRnding :. .
·r;hnll be liable to an Action for Damages, not\vitbstanding th~ Death of Per- . <
Deuth of the Person injured, nnd nlthough the Death shall hll.ve son injured. ·
.;:
been cnusccl un<lei' such Circumstances ··as · amount in Law to
.
.
'
'
Felony.
.
..
.. . .. . ·:i r" · . "
II. And be it enacted, 'fhnt every such Action shall be for th~ For whose ·· 1• 1./
Benefit of the '\vife, Husband, Pru·cut, and Child of- the Person Benefit Aclion: ·· ;;-_
shall be~ and ''' : ; ~ ·
'vhose Death shall have been so caused, nnd shall be brought by by whom.to' b~; :·.::
nn<l in the Name of the Executor ot· Administrator of the Person brought. ':;""' ' ·~·- '
deceased·; and in e>ery such Action the Jury may give· such · . · · - ~ · · '• 'J 1 . /~'.
Damages as they may think proportioued to the Injury resulting.
,.
fr,...,_ such Death to the Parties respectively for whom and for
·:
: :,
"I
~ Benefit such Action shall be brought ; nnd the Amount so
...... ·
· •. .
recovered, after deducting the Costs not recovered from the Defen~
~~.':'Ii°:
d:
shnll be divided amongst the before-mentioned Parties in
.,
_. .... ......
su"" Shares ns the Jury by their Ver di ct shall find nnd direct. · ·· ·
: ;~;'°;
: · IlI._Provided always, and be it enacted, That not mor.e than Only One Ac-):.t<·;One Action shall lie for nnd in respect of the same Subject· Matter tion to lie, and · ;;.·~
of Complaint, and tbnt every such Action tlhall be commenced Time of Com;':<'£0'.~
i.vithin Twelve Calendar Months after the DeRth of such decell..'led mencemen~ _,; '1 \t'.-:
~
11 - '• '~ -·
Person.
. .
. . ·..i':-.. .t>\:
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